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ABSTRACT
SOFOKLIS GOULAS: Essays on the Economics of Human Capital.
(Under the direction of Luca Flabbi)
In the first paper we use a natural experiment that relaxed class attendance requirements for one
school year to explore students’ marginal propensity to skip class, and to examine the effects of
their absences on scholastic outcomes. We exploit exogenous variation resulting from a one-time
policy Greece implemented allowing high school students to miss 30 percent more class hours
without penalty during the 2009-10 academic year, a period when officials feared outbreaks of
swine flu. Using a new dataset, we analyze which students missed more classes, and the effect of
these absences on scholastic outcomes across the distribution of student ability, income, and peer
quality. We find that while the swine flu itself did not affect the student population, the relaxed
class attendance policy caused an increase in absences of roughly 10 hours per student, with more
absences taken by those who had higher academic performance records, have academically weaker
peers in their classes, or who live in poorer neighborhoods. End-of-year exam results show a
positive effect of absences on grades across the ability distribution. The magnitude of the positive
effect of absences on grades increases as we move to right of the ability distribution. Our results
suggest that students who may have the resources or the human capital accumulation to learn
outside the classroom may have lower performance when a strict attendance policy forces them to
stay in class.
In the second chapter we study the effect of disclosing relative performance information (feed-
back) on students’ performance in high-school, on subsequent university enrollment, and on ex-
pected subsequent earnings. We exploit a large-scale natural experiment in which students in some
cohorts receive information about their relative performance within their schools and across the
nation. Using unique primary data, we find an asymmetric response to feedback: high-achieving
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students improve their final-year performance by 0.15 of a standard deviation, whereas the final-
year performance of low-achieving students drops by 0.3 of a standard deviation. The results are
more pronounced for females, indicating greater sensitivity to feedback. We also document the
long-term effects of feedback: high-achieving students reduce their repetition rate for the national
exams; they enroll into university departments that are more selective by 0.15 of a standard de-
viation and their expected annual earnings increase by 0.17 of a standard deviation. By contrast,
the results for low-achieving students are negative. We provide suggestive evidence that feed-
back encourages students from low-income neighborhoods to enroll in university and to study in
higher-quality programs, which may, in the long run, reduce income inequality.
In the third chapter we examine the extent to which college decisions among adolescents de-
pend on the decisions of their peers. In particular, we ask whether individuals derive utility from
conformity in college enrollment and academic mobility. We propose a new methodology in mit-
igating reflection and endogeneity issues in identifying social interactions. We use the proportion
of females in a student’s last year’s reference group (school and neighborhood) as an instrumental
variable. We investigate utility spillovers from the educational choices of students in consecutive
cohorts. Spatial variation allows us to identify social interactions in groups of various sizes. We
use a new data set that spans the universe of high school graduates. We find positive and sig-
nificant externalities in the decision to enroll in college and the decision to migrate to a different
city among peers that belong to the same social group. Results indicate that students who are in a
school or neighborhood with 100% more peers who enrolled in college last year are 29% or 9.6%
more likely to themselves attend college.
In the fourth chapter we consider how economic recessions alter the costs and expected returns
of attaining college education in general and pursuing a specific college major. We examine how
changes in the unemployment rate affect demand for college education, demand for different fields
of university study and degrees’ admission thresholds. We use panel data for applications sub-
mitted to the universe of undergraduate programs in Greece that span seven rounds of admission
cohorts combined with a degree-specific job insecurity index, and time series on youth (ages 18-
25) unemployment. We find that degree- and major-specific job insecurity turns applicants away
iv
from degrees and majors that are associated with poor employment prospects. Results indicate
that the steep increase in the unemployment rate that started in 2009 is associated with an increase
in the number of college applicants. The effect is heterogeneous across fields, with an increase
in the demand for degrees in Psychology as well as for entrance to Naval, Police and Military
Academies, and a decrease in the demand for degrees in Business and Management. We also find
that the business cycle changes degrees’ admission thresholds by affecting their popularity.
v
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECT OF COMPULSORY CLASS ATTENDANCE ON ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE
1.1 Introduction
Most educational systems rely on lectures and class meetings as a means of instruction. This
is even more prevalent when secondary or pre-tertiary education is considered. Lecture learning is
based on group learning, which may not be the optimal learning style for everyone. In a classroom,
students compete for the attention and time of the instructor. Thus, their consumption of education
induces externalities on one another. As a result, many students decide to skip class when given
the opportunity. Therefore, if the optimal level of class attendance is below perfect, is compulsory
class attendance beneficial for every student?
In this paper, we investigate the causal relationship between compulsory class attendance and
exam performance. In our setting, high school students in Greece are allowed to be absent from
school up to a certain number of school periods without penalty. Exceeding the upper limit is pun-
ished by grade retention. In 2009, the Hellenic Ministry of Education received information about
an increasing number of Swine Flu cases around Europe. Though high-school students in Greece
did not constitute a population at risk, the ministry nevertheless decided to take action. This action
went into effect several months later, when the European swine flu pandemic was over. The unique,
one-time-only reform increased the number of periods a student could miss without penalty. The
ministry specified that students did not need to provide a doctor’s note, or to seek their parents’
approval to take up the extra absences. Our paper exploits variation from this natural experiment
that increased the absence allowance of high school students by 34 school periods or 30 percent.
The treatment offers exogenous variation by relaxing the time budget constraint of students, who
maximize utility by allocating time between school and leisure. Using an Instrumental Variable
approach, we identify the causal effect of class attendance on exam performance. We control for
individual-specific heterogeneity by using longitudinal data on the exam performance of students
in consecutive grades. The Swine Flu Reform allows us to mitigate endogeneity stemming from
unobserved common shocks that vary across grades.
Students may miss class both when they are sick and when they are not sick. In the latter
case, student may miss class to enjoy leisure or study. Absence due to sickness may decrease
performance. Absence for reasons other than sickness may have a non negative effect on perfor-
mance depending on how the time outside the classroom is spent. We exploit a natural experiment
that allowed students to miss more classes without actually being sick. The effect of absences on
performance estimated comes from absences that are not related to sickness.
We divide students into three groups. The first group includes students who never skip class,
and attend no matter whether they have the option to skip or not. The second group of students
skips class regularly. Those students choose to skip regardless of whether the class attendance
policy is strict or loose. The third group of students chooses to attend class only when the class
attendance policy is strict. Students who have the resources or enough human capital accumulation
to sufficiently substitute class work with out-of-class individual work or tutoring belong in the third
group. Our instrumental variables approach estimates the effect of absences on exam performance
that is due to a relaxed class attendance policy. Returns to absences are identified for students who
can replicate class activities outside the classroom that is, the group of students who are most
likely to exploit the relaxed class attendance policy.
The relaxed attendance policy makes some students to skip class. Our findings show that for
students whose class activities are not too costly to replicate outside the classroom, school absences
increase exam performance. We can view this the other way around: A strict class attendance
would reduce school absences for those students who would skip class if given lax attendance
rules, could cause exam performance to decrease. A decrease in exam performance due to a strict
attendance policy could stem from two sources. First, class learning could be sub-optimal for some
students who have the resources to acquire human capital through other pedagogical methods. In-
tuitively, the larger the class, the less efficient class learning becomes because the instructor’s time
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is divided among more learners. Second, class peer effects could affect individual exam perfor-
mance. We do not know a priori whether students capable of learning outside the classroom receive
positive or negative class peer effects when they must adhere to a strict attendance policy. Be that
as it may, we know that students are assigned to classes using alphabetical order based on their last
names. Lexicographical class assignment allows for heterogeneous environments where students
from different points of the ability distribution interact with each other. Such environments may
be conducive to disruptive behavior or acting up that leads the learning experience to deteriorate.
Thus, while estimating returns to absences due to a relaxed class attendance policy we are mea-
suring the net externality the rest of the class imposes on students capable of learning outside the
classroom.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we exploit variation stemming from a natural
experiment to mitigate two sources of endogeneity: time-invariant, individual- specific, unob-
served heterogeneity, such as parental supervision or personality traits; and grade-varying, com-
mon shocks such as teacher or student-age effect. Second, we use new, hand-collected transcript
data from a random sample of 114 schools in Greece in order to provide evidence relevant across
the ability distribution. Thus, we can answer the question: Who benefits from the school more,
the good or the bad students? The natural experiment utilized in our paper didn’t force students
into taking action but merely relaxed one constraint of their utility- maximization problem. In
other words, the element of choice remains in both the strict and the relaxed class attendance pol-
icy regimes. Thus the third novelty of our paper is that we are able to estimate the differential
response to the relaxed constraint as well as differential returns to absences that may be induced
by student or school characteristics. Moreover, the natural experiment increased the upper limit
of unexcused absences. Unexcused absences can be absences in the middle of the day, and they
do not require a doctor’s note or a parent’s approval. That means students choose which period
and subject to skip. Therefore, the students may choose to skip English but attend mathematics
in the same day. The estimates of returns to absence identified by this unique reform pertain to
the situation where the students strategically choose which school periods to attend and to miss.
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Moreover, we delve into the reasons students choose to be absent from school. Because the ex-
ogenous policy change that we exploit for identification did not force students to skip class, and
because not every student took advantage of the new policy to the same extent, we are able to
explore the heterogeneous propensity to skip class across different observable student, school, and
class characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 places in the literature, Section 3
provides a motivation in the context of economic theory, Section 4 provides a description of the
institutional setting, Section 5 describes our data collection, Section 6 summarizes the data used,
Section 7 describes the empirical strategy, and section 8 discusses our results. Section 9 contains
robustness check for our results, and Section 10 concludes.
1.2 Our Place in The Literature
Educational interventions can be classified as taking one of two forms: those that improve the
quality of the inputs of the production function and those that increase their quantity. Much of
the work to date has focused on estimating the effects of interventions that targeted the quality
of educational inputs, such as teacher quality, class size or classroom environment (Hanushek,
Mayer, and Peterson 1999, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005b, Hanushek 2003, Angrist and Lavy
1997, Krueger 2003) or measuring the effects of all school production factors on both the quantity
and quality margins (Card and Krueger 1990, Loeb and Bound 1995, Betts 1995). Nevertheless,
investment in resources are likely to happen concurrently. Historically, school districts with the
longest term lengths were those with the highest paid teachers, making it difficult to disentangle
the effects of interventions in quality from those in quantity. This work joins a strand of the
literature focused on determining the returns to increasing the quantity of inputs, namely time in
school, separately from changing their quality (Pischke 2007, Hansen 2011, Marcotte and Hansen
2010, Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek, and Webbink 2010, Sims 2008)
The literature regarding class absenteeism is divided into two main categories: one refers to
the reasons for students being absent from class (Levine 1992, Chong, Cheung, and Hui 2009)
and the second one is concerned with the effect of students’ absenteeism on their scholastic out-
comes (Romer 1993, Caviglia 2006, Chen and Lin 2008, Arulampalam, Naylor, and Smith (2012),
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Latif and Miles (2013)). Most of these papers use college and field-specific class attendance data.
In particular, most of these papers use data regarding Economics, Accounting or Management
students. The majority of these papers find a negative or negligible relationship between stu-
dents’ absenteeism and academic performance, or, in one case, a negligible relationship (Caviglia
2006). Evidence from the existing literature suggests that class attendance improves educational
outcomes. Romer (1993) claims that college students in three elite U.S. universities were found
to perform better when attending classes and completing homework. Nevertheless, this claim may
apply for only a small part of the right tail of the ability distribution in a given population. Chen
and Lin (2006) using a sample of 129 college students in Taiwan find a 4 percent exam score im-
provement associated with higher class attendance. A subsequent study by the same authors Chen
and Lin (2008) involved an experiment where different sections of the same college course were
subject to random changes in the curriculum although everyone took the same exam at the end of
the semester. The authors found that having the instructor cover all of the material improved score
by as much as 18 percent. Latif and Miles (2013) used panel data of exam scores of Canadian col-
lege students to measure the effect of class attendance on exam performance. They find that when
controlling for student heterogeneity, exam performance is positively related to class attendance.
Similar results have been obtained when college classes on science (Moore 2006) or economics
(Cohn and Johnson 2006) are considered. Arulampalam et al. (2012) use panel data to identify
the causal relationship between class attendance and students’ university performance. Focusing
on economics students, they use quantile regression analysis and find that skipping classes leads
to poorer performance. Interestingly, they highlight that the relationship between class attendance
and students’ performance may vary with student ability. Caviglia (2006) examines the impact of
mandatory attendance of microeconomic classes on students’ college performance. After account-
ing for students’ motivation, he finds that class attendance did not impact grades. This is the only
paper that finds a negligible effect between class attendance and students’ academic outcomes.
Despite the rich literature that involves college data, there is little evidence that the same results
hold in a less-filtered context, such as high schools. Fitzpatrick, Grissmer, and Hastedt (2011) use
quasi randomness in the timing of kindergarten assessment to examine the effect of time spent in
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school on student achievement. Their estimates suggest that a year of schooling increases math and
reading test scores by about one standard deviation above normal developmental gains. Aucejo and
Romano (2016) exploit a North Carolina state policy that resulted in variation in the length of the
school year to jointly es- timate the effect of high school attendance and the length of the school
calendar on performance while controlling for student and teacher characteristics. They also use
local flu prevalence data to instru- ment for absences. They find that 10 days of school absence
reduce math scores by 5.5 percent and reading scores by 2.9 percent. In the context of Aucejo and
Romano (2016), students skip class because of the flu, and, thus, they have no choice over which
periods to skip.
1.3 Theoretical Motivation
Following Arulampalam et al. (2012) we build a theoretical model to motivate both our hy-
potheses and our empirical strategy. Suppose the representative student faces the following addi-
tively separable utility function:
U = u(s(c, h, a), l) (1.1)
which is a function of leisure, l and the following educational production function
s = s(c, h, a) (1.2)
where s is a measure of a student’s educational performance, c is the amount of time the student
spends in class, h is the amount of time the student spends in out-of-class learning activities, a
captures individual characteristics such as ability, motivation, and effort. Suppose for simplicity
that the marginal utility of s is one and the marginal utility of leisure is constant for every unit of
time outside the classroom1.
The objective of the student is to maximize utility from performance and leisure given their
1The assumption of constant marginal utility of leisure is not crucial. Here is an example where we relax this
assumption. Consider the following production function: s = s(c, h, a). Suppose the utility function takes the
following form: U = u(s, l) = s(c, h, a) + γ
√
l = α
√
c+ β
√
h+ γ
√
l. Maximizing utility under the time constraint
gives the following optimal time allocation: {c∗, h∗, l∗} = { α2α2+β2+γ2 , β
2
α2+β2+γ2 ,
γ2
α2+β2+γ2 }
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time constraint, which takes the following form:
c+ h+ l ≤ T (1.3)
where T is the maximum amount of available time in a given period. Assume initially that c
and h in the production function are neither complements nor substitutes but independent. The
student maximizes their utility by allocating their time efficiently between leisure, in class study,
and out of class study. We assume there is no coordination among student in the decision of time
allocation. Thus any peer effects are random and not the result of a collective behavior.
In reality, marginal products are likely to vary from person to person. A student faces the
challenge of knowing whether in or out of class learning works best for them. In other words, stu-
dents are supposed to know their relative marginal productivities of the inputs in their educational
production function.
Assume that students have accurate information regarding the parameters in their own produc-
tion function. This assumption may hold less for students in elementary school and more for high
school students as the latter have had more learning experience. Assume also that the marginal
products of study time in class and out of class are positive but exhibit diminishing returns and are
independent of each other and of ability: ∂s
∂c
:= mpc > 0, ∂s
∂h
:= mph > 0, ∂
2s
∂c2
< 0, ∂
2s
∂h2
< 0,
∂2s
∂c∂h
= 0, ∂
2s
∂c∂a
= 0, and ∂
2s
∂c∂a
= 0. We also assume ∂s
∂a
> 0. We will relax some of these as-
sumptions later. Under these assumptions we can represent diagrammatically the solution to the
problem of the utility-maximizing student.
In Figure 1.1a, we see that the utility-maximizing student will optimise at point A, choosing to
attend c∗ hours of class and engaging in T − c∗ hours of out of class study. Whether this involves
absences from class will depend on the number of scheduled classes available to the student. In
that sense, the school imposes a constraint on time. If there are significant external net benefits of
attending class, then the number of classes supplied to the student, denoted by tcs, is more likely to
exceed the student’s optimal number, thus tcs > c∗, as in Figure 1.1a. If now tcs < c∗ as in Figure
1.1c, then the outcome will be inefficient as mpc > mph.
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In the case described in Figure 1.1a, the optimising student will choose to miss tcs−c∗ hours of
class. At the margin, if students were required to attend tcs hours of class, their academic perfor-
mance would decrease as mph > mpc for the marginal classes. Suppose that class attendance is
compulsory but that absence is not penalized. Then the propensity of students to miss at least some
fraction of the suboptimal tcs − c∗ classes will depend on their attitudes to compliance, which we
suppose it’s randomly distributed across the student population, but may change with age. Then,
under the assumptions of the model, class absences in the range tcs − c∗ will be associated with
higher performance. This may seem as a depart from the standard hypothesis in the literature
that more absences decrease performance, but our prediction emerges from an optimizing setting
in which choices are made under perfect information. At the margin, class attendance improves
performance, but only up to an optimizing point.
Suppose now that we relax our assumption that factor inputs are independent and allow the
marginal product of attending class to be positively correlated with ability, ceteris paribus: ∂
2s
∂c∂a
>
0. This case is represented in Figure 1.1c, where the mpc for more able students, mpc2, lies above
that of the less able, mpc1. We see that utility-optimizing makes the more able students to skip
fewer classes in comparison to less able ones: c∗2 > c
∗
1 in Figure 1.1c. In a framework where class
attendance is optional, performance will be greater for the more able students and, thus, will be
negatively associated with class absence.
Moreover, mph can also be positively correlated with characteristics captured in a. For ex-
ample, students from economically more advantaged backgrounds may have better to access to
private tutoring, books, faster internet and other resources, which thereby result in a higher mph.In
that case, whether c∗2 will be less or greater than c
∗
1 will depend on comparative advantage, that is
the relative correlation of a with mpc and with mph.
In an econometric estimation of the effects of absence on performance, correlation between
a and either c or h in the education production function given by equation 1.2 could potentially
generate endogeneity bias if a is not perfectly observed. If more able students are less likely to
be absent from class c∗2 > c
∗
1 , as in Figure 1.1c then the estimated adverse effect of absence on
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performance will be biased upwards, in absolute terms, through endogenous selection and the re-
sulting ability bias. The empirical investigation of the effects of absence from class on performance
should be constructed so as to allow for heterogeneous effects of this sort. This observation lies
behind the design of our later estimation strategy. In the case in which c∗1 > c
∗
2, then the direction
of endogeneity bias will be downward but, again, the effects will be heterogeneous.
As we have seen, ability differences across students can affect absences from class through
their influence on the educational production function, equation 1.2. But suppose now that there
are differences across students in marginal utility of leisure, mul . In Figure 1.1d, we consider
the effects of an exogenous increase in the marginal utility of leisure. In this case, there will be
an increase in the number of classes missed along with an associated drop in performance. In the
model, the marginal utility of leisure, mul , is taken as exogenous. In reality, mul is likely to
be influenced by various arguments. For example, individual, family or even city characteristics
may account for differences in marginal utility of leisure. The marginal utility of leisure may also
be related to student ability, and hence to a in equation 1.2. If, for instance, more able students
undertake more non-curricular activities, then mul will be positively correlated with ability. In
this case, more able students will be more likely to miss class. Note also from Figure 1.1d that
the effect of missing class will be greater for more able students as mpc∗2 > mpc
∗
1 . Again,
unobserved differences in ability across students will create a bias in the estimated effect of absence
on performance as part of the association between absence and performance is being explained by
a differential propensity of the more able to be absent from class.
In summary, we have seen that, in an optimizing framework, the theoretical effect of absence
on performance is ambiguous. If class attendance is compulsory and students differ only in a
randomly-distributed propensity toward compliance, then absence will have a positive association
with performance as the less compliant will be more likely to adhere to the optimal number of
classes. If, on the other hand, students are heterogeneous in ability then they will be likely to choose
different optimal levels of class attendance: if ability is associated with a comparative advantage
in class attendance as in Figure 1.1c then the more able will have a higher attendance rate and
absence will be associated with poorer educational performance. Ability might also be correlated
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with the marginal utility of leisure: if more able students have a higher opportunity cost of studying,
then it is likely that they will attend fewer classes. In this case, class absence will be likely to have a
positive association with performance. Estimation of the effects of absence on performance will be
biased if ability is not observed or accurately proxied and the direction of bias will depend on the
relative dominance of factors of the type we have identified. The model predicts that the magnitude
of any effects of absence on performance will vary with student ability: if, for example, ability is
relatively highly correlated with productivity of class attendance then the negative effect of absence
on performance will be greatest for the more able students. Nevertheless, out-of-class productivity
is also positively associated with more classed missed. Ability may also be correlated with out-
of-class productivity in the sense that more able students are better at learning on their own. If
out-of-class-productivity exceeds in-class productivity, i.e. if there is a comparative advantage in
out-of-class learning, lower class attendance may be associated with higher performance. These
considerations inform our choice of empirical estimation strategy.
The model we have outlined so far assumes that students have sufficient information to be
able to select their optimal level of class attendance. In reality, this is unlikely and students will
make mistakes, attending either more or fewer classes than would be privately efficient. If students
systematically under-estimate the marginal product of class attendance, then absence will tend to
have an adverse effect on performance. This tendency might also be correlated with ability, so that
less able students miss more classes and suffer a further reduced level of performance.
Informed by this theoretical motivation on the optimizing behavior of individuals, our empir-
ical strategy will involve: first, an analysis of the effects of a relaxed class attendance policy on
absences, second, an attempt to identify causal effects of absence on student performance using
the exogenous variation from the relaxed attendance policy, third, an investigation of whether and
how any effects of the relaxed attendance policy on absences and school performance vary system-
atically with student, class, and school characteristics.
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1.4 Institutional Setting
1.4.1 Background
It is useful to provide some background on the design of the institutional setting in which our
natural experiment takes place. Public high schools are the norm in Greece; only around 8 percent
of students attend private high school2. Assignment to high school schools is based on geographical
proximity, namely a school district system. Every high school offers the same curriculum, and
funding is a linear function of the number of students. Teachers’ quality characteristics, such as
education and experience, are not taken into account for the allocation of teachers to schools. By
law, students’ assignment to classrooms is based on alphabetical order.
Students in the Greek educational system are allowed to be absent from class for a limited
number of hours in a given school year. Class absence can be either excused or unexcused. Total
absences are the sum of excused and unexcused hours of class absence. Excused absences are
whole day absences that the student provided for a doctor’s note or a custodian -usually a parent
came to school to sign off their child’s absence. Class absence for less than a whole day cannot
be excused and therefore count towards a student’s unexcused absences. For example, if a student
goes to school late in the morning or if she decides to skip school midday, these absences cannot
be excused. Whole day absence from school that is not excused counts towards a student’s unex-
cused absences. Under the current class attendance regulation, every student could have 50 hours
of unexcused and 64 hours of excused absence from class within a given year. The penalty for
exceeding the number of allowed absences is severe, requiring that a student repeat the grade.3
It is worth mentioning that, by design, periods of the same subject are usually spread out within
the weekly schedule of classes. This is important because one may worry that eligible students
2Descriptive statistics from a dataset that covers the universe of high school graduates between 2003 and 2011 show
that 90% of students attend public schools, 2% attend public experimental (charter) schools and 8% attend private high
schools. There are 1319 high schools in Greece, of which 112 are private and 23 are experimental.
3Near the end of the school year 2005-2006, a new bill was passed that included new, more lenient regulations
regarding the number of allowed hours (periods) of absence from school. The new bill provided eligible students
with 50 additional hours of excused absence. Eligibility was determined on the student’s past Grade Point Average. In
particular, every student who had received a Grade Point Average higher than 15/20 the previous school year (2004-05)
was allowed more absences in the following school year (2005-06).
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might skip classes of a particular subject. This strategic selection of classes is not entirely possible
because only whole days of absence can be excused. Around 60 percent of school subjects are
mandatory, and the remaining consist of electives and specialization courses. In Greece, unlike the
situation typical of other educational systems, students remain in their assigned classrooms for the
majority of school periods, instead of moving to different rooms depending on the subject being
taught. This setting guarantees that a student’s peer group remains the same for a series of courses,
including Greek language and mathematics, subjects considered in our analysis.
All schools in Greece offer three academic tracks in the eleventh and twelfth grade. Each track
offers different courses. The level of the track courses is comparable to the Advanced Placement
(AP) courses found in the US educational system. There are three track courses in the eleventh
grade, and four track courses in the twelfth grade. The Tracks are: Classics, Science and Infor-
mation Technology(IT)4. All track courses are mandatory and available only for students within
a track. Attending a particular track gives access to a set of college degrees relevant to the track
attended. Exam scores in the track courses determine college admission. At the end of senior
high school, students take national, standardized exams in the track courses in addition to Greek
Language and one elective that matter for both high school graduation and university admission.
The format of the national exams is the same as the one of the within-school exams in the previous
grades, and they are externally marked and proctored.
1.4.2 The 2009 Swine Flu Pandemic
In late spring 2009, the first, sporadic cases of swine flu surfaced in Europe. The 2009 flu
pandemic in Europe was part of a pandemic involving a new strain of influenza, subtype H1N1.
H1N1 is commonly called swine flu. The pandemic infected at least 125,550 people in Europe.
There were 458 confirmed deaths in Turkey, 438 confirmed deaths in Russia, and 299 confirmed
deaths in the United Kingdom.
4Students attending the Classics track take Ancient Greek, Latin, and Philosophy in the 11th grade, and Ancient
Greek, Latin, Literature, and History in the 12th grade. Students attending the Information Technology track take
Mathematics, Physics, and Programming in the 11th grade, and Mathematics, Physics, Computer Programming, and
Business Administration in the 12th grade. Students attending the Science track take Mathematics, Physics, and
Chemistry in the 11th grade, and Mathematics, Physics, Biology, and Chemistry in the 12th grade
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Swine influenza was first proposed to be a disease related to human flu during the 1918 flu
pandemic, when pigs became ill at the same time as humans. The first identification of an influenza
virus as a cause of disease in pigs occurred later, in 1930. For the following 60 years, swine
influenza strains were almost exclusively H1N1. Then, between 1997 and 2002, new strains of
three different subtypes and five different genotypes emerged as causes of influenza among pigs in
North America. The H1N1 form of swine flu is one of the descendants of the strain that caused
the 1918 flu pandemic. As well as persisting in pigs, the descendants of the 1918 virus have also
circulated in humans through the 20th century, contributing to the normal seasonal epidemics of
influenza. However, direct transmission from pigs to humans is rare, with only 12 recorded cases
in the United States since 2005.
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in humans the symp-
toms of the 2009 swine flu H1N1 virus are similar to those of influenza and of influenza-like
illnesses in general. Symptoms include fever; cough, sore throat, watery eyes, body aches, short-
ness of breath, headache, weight loss, chills, sneezing, runny nose, coughing, dizziness, abdominal
pain, lack of appetite and fatigue. The 2009 outbreak evidenced an increased percentage of patients
reporting diarrhea and vomiting, as well. ”The 2009 H1N1 virus was not zoonotic swine flu, as
was not transmitted from pigs to humans, but from person to person through airborne droplets”, we
read in the Hellenic Hellenic Center for Disease Control and Prevention (HCDCP) annual report
from 2010.
Influenza spreads between humans when infected people cough or sneeze, then other people are
exposed by breathing in the virus or touching something with the virus on it. Vaccines are available
for different kinds of swine flu. If a person becomes sick with swine flu, antiviral drugs can make
the illness milder and make the patient feel better faster. The most common cause of death is
respiratory failure. Other causes of death are pneumonia (leading to sepsis), high fever (leading to
neurological problems), dehydration (from excessive vomiting and diarrhea), electrolyte imbalance
and kidney failure. Fatalities are more likely in young children and the elderly.
The HCDCP reports describe the chronicle of the swine flu outbreak: On May 19, 2009, au-
thorities confirmed the first case of swine flu in Greece. The infected person was a 19-year-old
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Greek student who studied in New York and who had flown to Greece a few days before becoming
ill. He was hospitalized at Sismanogleion General Hospital of Athens, but was not considered to
be gravely ill. The authorities contacted many of the passengers who sat near this patient on the
plane, and examined them for suspicious symptoms. At that point in time Greece officials said
they had enough anti-virals to cover 12 percent of the population. (European Union directives pro-
posed that health officials have supplied on had to cover at least 10 percent of the population.). The
19-year-old was soon released, and none of the passengers in his flight were found to be infected.
Looking back at newspaper articles from 2009 in conjunction with the HCDCP announcements we
get an idea of how the swine flu spread in subsequent weeks after the first case: On June 14, 2009,
the total number of cases in Greece had reached 20; on June 17, 25 total cases had been reported.
On July 9, the total number of cases had reached 216, with 93 of these individuals having fully
recovered; on July 14, the total number of cases had reached 323, with 200 having fully recovered.
On September 16 the total number of cases had reached 2149.
Schools started on September 12, 2009. The number of new H1N1 cases started declining
after October 2009 (Sypsa, Bonovas, Tsiodras, Baka, Efstathiou, Malliori, Panagiotopoulos, Niko-
lakopoulos, and Hatzakis 2011). The Hellenic Ministry of Education, indicating that it feared a
recurrence of the outbreak, announced on April 12, 2010 a one-time-only increase in the number
of hours of absence a student was allowed to make without penalty by 30 percent for the current
academic year.
The upper limit of absences before and during the reform is given in Table 1.1. After the school
year 2009-2010, the old attendance regulation was restored.
1.5 Data Collection
To study the effect of compulsory attendance on school performance we need information on
class attendance and performance. Data on attendance are not centrally collected, and can only
be found in the school archives. We have visited 134 schools and constructed a unique dataset
on student transcripts from a large, randomized sample of high schools in Greece. For this study
we focus on public schools (Full Sample: 110 schools, 51,666 students). We also use data from
three experimental/charter schools (4,981 students) and five private schools (2,893 students) in our
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robustness checks. This novel dataset includes every student who attended one of the sampled
schools between 2006 and 2012, and contains panel information from the following sources:
1. Administrative data from the high schools containing class identifier, class size 5, gender,
year of birth, and year of graduation, information on the courses taken by a given student,
and d exam results in each of the last three years of a given student’s secondary education .
For each student we also know how many hours were she was absent from class for each of
the three years of high school (10th, 11th, and 12th grades). We know how many absence
hours were excused by parents or with a doctor’s note, and how many hours of students’
absences remained unexcused. We do not have information on the schools students transfer
from or to.
2. School-specific information, including the name of school, type of school (private, public6,
experimental7)), and geographical location.
3. Average net income information for population within the postcode of the school (expressed
in 2009 euros), provided by the Ministry of Finance.
4. Urban density information, provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Urban areas are
those with more than 20,000 inhabitants. We also match data on local population from the
Hellenic Statistical Authority using the school postcode. Local population refers to city
population or the population of the smallest unit of area obtained from the 2011 National
Census.
5. Data on flu cases provided by the Hellenic Center of Disease Control and Prevention.
In our analysis we use administrative data provided by high schools in Greece. The map in
Figure 1.2 shows the schools included in our data. We analyze course participation and grades at
5corr (class size, income)=0.149,corr (class size, experimental)=0.249, corr (class size, urban)=0.179
6Students are assigned to public schools according to a school district system
7Admission to experimental schools is based on a lottery
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the student level for all three high school grades for the years between 2006 and 2012. High school
students are assigned to classes by alphabetical order based on their last name. We know to which
class each student is assigned, and we use this information to create peer-quality and peer-class-
attendance measures. We also have some background characteristics, such as nationality, age and
gender, which we use a check for the identification strategy, and to reduce the variance of the error
term.
Measuring the causal effect of class attendance on grades requires data on attendance. For
every class, attendance is registered by the instructor and two teacher-assistants. The assistants
verify which students are present or absent, and gives the list of absentees to the instructor, who
checks and signs it. All attendance lists are collected at the end of the day. The record is then
digitized by a teacher who is responsible for notifying y parents about their child’s attendance once
per semester. Even if the administrative data contain no measurement error, the attendance rate is
likely to have some inaccuracies for the following reason: The teacher responsible for keeping
the attendance record may under-report the actual absences of a student who is extremely close
to the cutoff. Going over the cutoff means that the student cannot be promoted to the next grade,
and that the school must retain her. Nevertheless, this reason may not lead to an under- or over-
estimation of the effect of absences on grades. To see this, note that the effect of absences on grades
is estimated through an IV procedure, where a simple Wald-estimates equals: E[G|D=1]−E[G|D=0]
E[A|D=1]−E[A|D=0] ,
where G is the grade, A is number of absences in hours and D=1 if one is subject to the relaxed class
attendance policy. First, underreporting the actual number of absences outside the year of treatment
underestimates the hours of absence by students who were subject to the relaxed class attendance
policy ( ̂E[A|D = 0] < E[A|D = 0]). Underreporting of absences outside the treatment years may
happen because for some students the attendance policy is too strict for some students, and they
find themselves too close to the grade retention cutoff. Second, underreporting the actual number
of absences during the year of treatment underestimates the hours of absence by students who were
subject to the relaxed class attendance policy ( ̂E[A|D = 1] < E[A|D = 1]). Underreporting of
absences during the treatment years may happen because some students over-exploit the relaxed
attendance policy, and when they find themselves too close to the grade retention cutoff; their
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teacher may underreport their absences to save them from the devastating charybdis of retention.
We do not see any reason why the latter should be greater or smaller than the former. As long
as underreporting remains stable over time, the estimated causal effect of absences on grades is
unbiased.
1.6 Summary Statistics
Our initial panel consists of 57,380 individuals from 110 schools. Not all schools keep at-
tendance records for every year. For 38,042 individuals from 102 schools we have full transcript
information and attendance history. For 34,461 we have full transcript information and attendance
history for at least two consecutive grades. For 21,514 individuals from 90 schools we have full
transcript information and attendance history for three consecutive grades: 10th, 11th, and 12th
grade. For 1,873 students there is missing age or gender information. Attrition can be either from
transferring schools, dropping out, or grade retention. Grade retention can be either due to failure
to obtain a grade point average of at least 9.5 out of 20, or due to missing more than 50 hours
of class without a parent’s approval or a doctor’s note or 114 hours of class in total. Transcript
information can be missing due to grade retention. When a student is grade retained we observe
a note in the transcript that the student was retained along with the reason for his/her retention.
If a student is retained because they went over the upper limit of absences they are not allowed
to take the end-of-the-year exams and thus we observe missing values on the individual subject
scores and the GPA for those students. Average grade retention is almost 4%. 1.3% of students
is retained due to missing too many classes. We provide summary statistics for grade retention
and grade retention due to absences in Tables A.1 and A.2 respectively. Grade retention due to
absences is more common among lower performing students. Specifically 3.1% of students in the
bottom quintile based on their midterm score in Mathematics end up being retained due to missing
too many classes. Grade retention is more common among males than females: 5.1% in males and
2.7% in females. Grade retention has also higher incidence among students who are 18 or older:
19% compared to 3.3% for students younger than 18 years.
For our analysis, we use all students for whom we have full information in all three years (N =
19,641). Table 1.3 summarizes the data used in our analysis split by treatment status. Treatment
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group consists of observation in the year 2010, while control group consists of observations in the
years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012.
Our theoretical motivation described a situation where the optimal level of attendance may be
lower than the required level of attendance. If this holds in the educational system that we examine
in our study, we would expect the students to exploit in full their absences allowance, that is the
number of hours of class they can miss without penalty. To investigate whether students’ absences
constraint is indeed binding we plot the distributions of absences under the two attendance policy
regimes. Since -as we have mentioned- excused absences require either a doctor’s note or a parent’s
approval, they are more costly compared to unexcused absences. For the absences constraint to be
binding we would expect a disproportionate amount of student to miss as many hours of class
as he/she can getting very close to the upper limit of absences. We would expect this to be more
apparent for the less costly type of absence, unexcused absences, as the cost of providing a doctor’s
note or bringing a parent to school may not allow the students to fully exploit the excused absences
limit.
In figure 1.3 we plot the density distribution of total absences under the old class attendance
regulation. We see that a portion of the distribution piles up close to 114 hours, the upper limit of
total absences. In figure 1.4 we plot the density distribution of total absences under the new class
attendance regulation. We see that the right tail of the absences distribution occurs to the right of
the old limit and to the left of new class absences limit. In figure 1.5 we plot the density distribution
of unexcused absences under the old class attendance regulation. We see that the distribution of
unexcused absences piles up close to 50 hours, the upper limit of unexcused absences. In figure 1.6
we plot the density distribution of unexcused absences under the new class attendance regulation.
We see that around half of the density is to the right of the old limit and to the left of new class
absences limit. Since the hours of absences under the old regulation pile up close to the limit,
especially so when we look at the less costly type of class absence, unexcused absence, we see
that students experienced a binding absences constraint under the old regulation. When the new
attendance regulation increased the upper limit of absences a great part of the absences distribution
shifted to the right of the old limit, suggesting that students exploited the lax attendance policy.
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1.7 Identification Strategy
In this section we present our empirical strategy for identifying the causal effect of compulsory
class attendance on student’s attainment. Using our dataset we estimate returns to absences among
high school students. The standard approach when estimating the effect of absences on school
performance consists of regressing an individual’s performance on the number of classes missed.
Estimating returns to absences using OLS will lead to biased estimates of β. The main problem
is that Absences may be correlated with omitted variables that also affect student performance.
In other words, the correlation of Absences with the error term would bias the OLS estimates.
A student’s own personality, ability, and motivation, as well as his/her class, school, and family
environment can affect his/her joint decision of attendance and effort.
To control for unobserved characteristics of the students as well as past input history, we em-
ploy the following lagged value-added specification:
Scorei,s,c,g,t =β0 + β1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + β2Scorei,g−1 + β3Xi,s,c,g,t
+β4Class controlsc +Grade FEg + School FEs + i,s,c,g,t (1.4)
where Score of student i, in grade g, school s, in classroom c, and in time t is a function
of her hours of absence in grade g, school s and time t, some time-invariant factors that vary
across grades, and grade varying student characteristics such as age. By including the lagged year
performance in the regression model implies, according to the literature of teacher value added
(Todd and Wolpin 2003), that we no longer need to incorporate additional measures of ability or
previous years inputs. Score can be final exam score in mathematics, Greek, physics or the grade
point average (GPA). Scores are standardized by school and grade. We also include controls for
class characteristics such as peer quality, measured as the average lagged GPA of the class peers,
and class engagement, measured as the average lagged absences of the class peers. We include
school fixed effects to control for school-varying characteristics. In section 9 we expand on our
specification by allowing for a linear trend as well as school-specific linear time trends. Cluster-
robust standard errors are obtained at the classroom level as peers in the same classroom in the
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same year are likely to share unobservables that may affect both performance and attendance.
When estimated via OLS the above specification give a biased estimate of the effect of absences
on performance due to unobserved differences across the students in their relative productivity of
time spent in and out of the classroom. Unobserved differences across students in the opportunity
cost of learning in class will create a bias in the OLS-estimated effect of absences on performance
as part of the association between absence and performance is being explained by a differential
propensity to skip class of those who at the margin have a comparative advantage in learning
outside the classroom (and an absolute advantage in learning in general). The opportunity cost of
learning in class depends on the relative productivity of time spent in and out of class, and may
be related to ability, age, family background, and endowed resources. Out-of-class productivity
in terms of learning may be age-varying. Students’ cognitive gains from one year to the next
depend on their endowed ability (Kuh 1995, Bandura 1994, Winne and Hadwin 1998, Pintrich
2000, Zimmerman, Boekarts, Pintrich, and Zeidner 2000, Blomeyer, Coneus, Laucht, and Pfeiffer
2008, Schack et al. 1991). To mitigate the bias from unobserved age-varying opportunity cost of
learning in class we exploit exogenous variation from a one-year-only reform that relaxed the cost
of missing class. Our instrument changes the cost of class attendance and helps estimate the effect
of absences on performance for students who were constrained by the higher cost of missing class.
Our instrument comes from a natural experiment that took place in the school year 2009-2010
in Greece. During that school year the Hellenic Ministry of Education implemented an one-time
only reform that increased the unexcused absence allowance for all students in view of the rapid
spread of the H1N1 virus in Eastern Europe. The swine flu-related one-time only reform increased
the number of hours students could be absent from class by 30 percent. We exclude from our
analysis students who enroll into private schools in order to eschew both potential selection issues
and heterogeneity in terms of the implementation of the attendance policy regulation.
An instrumental variables approach can address biases due to selection, omitted variables, and
measurement error. The bias from measurement error may be less of a threat when this error
is time invariant but even measures of performance and attendance are less than perfect. Our
identification uses the one-time flu-related absences reform as an instrument for the endogenous
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variable Absences.
The first stage regression equation for our lagged value-added estimator of the returns to ab-
sences is the following:
Absencesi,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1FluReformt + α2Scorei,g−1 + α3Xi,s,c,g,t
+α4Class controlsc +Grade FEg + School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.5)
Where FluReformt = 1[schoolyear = 2009 − 2010]. It’s important to note that the Flu
reform didn’t increase the realized number of absences but only relaxed the students’ time budget
constraint allowing them to do more absences if they choose so. Thus, the coefficient δ can be
viewed as the intention-to-treat effect on the treated (ITT). For all specification we cluster stan-
dard errors at the individual level to allow for nonzero covariance of the error term within each
individual.
Students may miss class both when they are sick and when they are not sick. In the latter
case, student may miss class to enjoy leisure or study. Absence due to sickness may decrease
performance. Absence for reasons other than sickness may have a non negative effect on perfor-
mance depending on how the time outside the classroom is spent. We exploit a natural experiment
that allowed students to miss more classes without actually being sick. The effect of absences on
performance estimated comes from absences that are not related to sickness.
The validity of our empirical strategy relies on the assumption that the counterfactual trend
behavior of outcome variables in treatment and control groups is the same. In other words, we
require that our outcome variables do not exhibit a time-varying trend, because in that case we
wouldn’t be able to disentangle this trend from the time-varying treatment effect. Tables 1.7 and
1.8 show mean gpa and individual subject exam scores over time along with a 99 percent margin
of error. We see that the time series of the scores remain relatively steady over time, suggesting
that any effects pertaining to 2010, the year of the treatment, are not the result of a time trend.
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1.7.1 Validity of the H1V1 virus outbreak instrument
The validity of the Flu reform as an instrumental variable relies on the assumption that it has
no direct effect on treated students’ performance (exogeneity assumtion). To explore how the Flu
affected the treated population we provide a graph8 that shows the number of verified H1N1 cases
and H1N1-related deaths for high-school age individuals during the school year 2009-2010. We
see on Figure 1.9 that among 209,958 students attending high school at the school year of the
reform, 301 were contracted with the H1N1 strain and 2 of them died. The very few H1N1 cases
in the population of high school goers appease potential worries about a direct effect of the H1N1
virus on scholastic performance.
In figure 1.10 we provide visual evidence of the low geographical prevalence of swine flu in
the locations we collected data from. Out of the 20 prefectures sampled, five had zero or one
cases of swine flu, 10 had two to five cases, 2 had between six and 10 cases, while only the
prefecture of Attica, that is home to more than five million people, had 145 cases of swine flu in
high school students. We do not exclude affected areas from our sample as the symptoms and the
recovery period of the swine flu are no different from the symptoms of the common flu (Smith,
Vijaykrishna, Bahl, Lycett, Worobey, Pybus, Ma, Cheung, Raghwani, Bhatt, et al. 2009).
In addition, we provide evidence related to the timing of school absences to further appease
potential concerns that the swine flu pandemic affected absences directly and not only through
the relaxed class attendance policy. In figure 1.11 we draw mean absences per semester for the
2009-2010 school year. Although the number of new H1N1 cases in Greece started declining after
October 2009 (Sypsa et al. 2011), we see that absences increased in the Spring semester of 2010 to
39 hours from 29 hours in the Fall semester. The relaxed class attendance policy was announced in
April of 2010 and was put in place retroactively for both the Fall semester of 2009 and the Spring
semester of 2010.
8The number of all high school students in Greece is an estimate constructed as follows: For 12 and 11 graders of
school year 2009-2010 we use the number of students who participated in national exams for university admission,
provided by the Hellenic Ministry of Education. For the number of 10th graders of 2009-2010 we use the number
of 11th graders of 2009-10. The data on H1N1 verified cases and deaths come from the Hellenic Center for Disease
Control & Prevention
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Placebo Tests
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that absences react to time shocks that
are related to class-attendance reforms. One may be concerned that other time-specific shocks may
obscure the direct effect of changes in class-attendance regulation on absences. After reviewing all
the parliamentary and regulatory activities around the 2009-swine flu pandemic, we didn’t find any
other reform coinciding with the change in class attendance regulation during the 2009-2010 school
year or any educational reform that could potentially impact school performance during the years
included in the sample. Nevertheless, it is possible that macroeconomic variables may affect both
school performance and class attendance. For the change in absences to be attributed solely to the
one-time-only change in class attendance regulation, one may require that mean absences returned
to their pre-reform levels once the reform was removed. To appease potential concerns regarding
differential time trends of absences before and after the reform in class attendance regulation,
we provide visual evidence in Figure 1.12. We find that mean absences followed the following
trajectory: Mean absences were 66.6 hours in the 2008-09 school year; 76.4 hours in 2009-10
school year (with the more lenient attendance policy); and 66.4 hours in 2010-11 school year.
Although our data expand only up to 2012, we see that for two consecutive school years after
the reform in class attendance regulation was abolished, mean absences returned to their pre-2010
levels, suggesting that the time trend of absences remains the same before and after the reform,
and that the single peak in the time pattern of absences coincides with the class attendance reform
of 2009-10.
Moreover, one may be concerned that the change in the variation of absences over time is
caused by time trends and not by swine flu-related reform in class attendance regulation. Exploiting
the withinschool, across-time variation of absences, we run following specification and capture the
coefficients of the year dummy variables.
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Absencesi,s,c,g,t =γ0 + γ2Scorei,g−1 + γ3Xi,s,c,g,t + γ4Class controlsc
+Y ear FEt +Grade FEg + School FEs + ζi,s,c,g,t (1.6)
We model total hours of school absence of student i, in grade g, in school s, in year t as function
of her own time-varying and time-invariant characteristics such as gender, age, age squared cap-
tured in vector Xi,s,c,g,t, and lagged Grade Point Average, grade fixed effects, school fixed effects,
and year fixed effects.
Next, on Figure 1.13 we plot the coefficients of the dummy year variables obtained from the
estimation of the above specification along with their 95 percent confidence interval obtained with
clustering the standard errors at the class level. school year 2005-2006 is used a base year and is
omitted from the model specification. We anticipate that the only coefficient significant in magni-
tude is that of the 2009-2010 year dummy variable.
The coefficients of the years 2007-2008, 2010-2011, 2011-20129 are not statistically signifi-
cant. Although the standard errors of the 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 year dummy coefficients are
quite small, the year dummy coefficients for 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2010-2011
are roughly one fourth in magnitude of the 2009-2010 year dummy coefficient, suggesting an in-
crease in mean absences between 9 and 13 hours in 2009-2010 in comparison to the school years
spanning from 2005-2006 to 2010-2011, after controlling for student, grade, and school character-
istics.
1.7.2 Assumptions for estimating LATE
In our study, the interpretation of LATE is the average treatment effect of those students who
skipped class during the 2009-10 school year when a one-time-only relaxed attendance policy
was in place, but who would not have skipped class otherwise. Nevertheless, LATE can only be
9Our data contain 860 observations for 2011-2012, while we have 19,101; 20,027; 21,567; 18,178; 14,120 obser-
vations for 2005-2006; 2006-2007; 2007-2008; 2008-2009; 2009-2010; 2010-2011 respectively. Small sample size for
2011-2012 may result in statistical power issues when it comes to the statistical significance of the 2012 year dummy.
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identified when the instrument is exogenous, when we have a valid first stage, when the exclusion
restriction is satisfied, and when the monotonicity assumption is met (Imbens and Angrist 1994).
The exogeneity assumption is met because the students do not control their year of birth, and,
consequently, they cannot control the timing of their school enrollment. The validity of the first
stage and the rejection of the weak-instrument problem are shown in the next section. For the
exclusion restriction to be met, we need to establish that the instrument (namely the new relaxed
class attendance policy) does not affect grades directly other than through absences. The new
attendance policy was introduced immediately after a swine flu pandemic in Europe. To address
any concerns regarding the direct effect of the instrument on grades, we use data on flu cases to
show that, in fact, very few students contracted flu during the 2009-10 school year. Next we explain
why the monotonicity assumption is met. Following Imbens (2010, p.415), imagine a model where
the grade of student i solely depends upon his absences as follows:
Si = αo + α1At + i (1.7)
Absences are endogenous (cov[At, i] 6= 0), due to personality traits or parental monitoring
correlating both with absences and scores. Now, one can think of an absence not as a binary
random variable, but as a continuous latent variable (A∗t ) which describes the student’s utility of
skipping class. Next, this latent variable can be modeled as follows:
A∗i = βo + β1Di + υi (1.8)
Where Di reflects the assignment to the relaxed class-attendance policy. The continuous vari-
able A∗t is mapped into a binary variable by the following:
Ai =

1, if A∗i ≥ 0
0, if A∗i < 0
(1.9)
The inclusion of Di in the equation above reflects the benefit of being absent from class. That
is, if Di = 1, the utility of being absent from class is higher, since you are free to invest your time
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the way you want. Hence, a rational utility-maximizing agent would set β1 higher than 0. Other
characteristics such as lack of motivation remain in the error term υi. Unmotivated students won’t
go to class, even if Di = 0: υi ≥ −β0. They are the always takers. Very motivated students will
go to class, even if Di = 1: υi < −β0 − β1. They are the never takers. The estimated results
come from the compliers, who are defined as: −β0 > υi ≥ −β0 − β1. This framework excludes
the existence of defiers, since (i) if an individual is absent if Di = 0, this implies they will also be
absent if Di = 1 (if υi ≥ −β0, then υi ≥ −β0 − β1) and (ii) if an individual is present if Di = 1,
this implies they will also be present if Di = 0 (if υi < −β0 − β1, then υi < −β0 − β1, then
υi < −β0). Therefore, we are able to identify a well-defined local average treatment effect.
To see why the IV estimate of the second stage (α1) does not equal ATE, we switch to a
heterogeneous framework. This means that the parameters potentially differ by individual, so
formally we have α1i in the first-stage regression. If absences were exogenous in the first place,
we would still be able to measure an ATE(T), since ATE(T ) = E[Gi|Ai = 1]− E[Gi|Ai = 0] =
E[α1i] =
1
n
∑n
i=1 α1i = α¯1. Since Ai is exogenous, this average can still be interpreted as an
ATE(T). Now consider Ai as an endogenous variable and one used 2SLS in order to get a constant
estimate. In a heterogeneous framework, the 2SLS estimator is as follows:
α1,2sls =
cov[Gi, Di]
cov[Ai, Di]
=
1
n
sumni=1α1iβ1i
1
n
sumni=1β1i
(1.10)
This boils down to ATE(T) if and only if α1i = α1∀i and/or β1i = β1∀i. Therefore, in a
heterogeneous framework the 2sls estimator equals a weighted average of individuals’ treatment
effects, with largest weight for whom the instrumental variable is most influential. Under the
assumptions mentioned above the weighted average measures a LATE. This exercise makes clear
that homogeneity in the first stage means LATE equals ATE. Thus, to characterize the LATE, we do
the following. We rerun the first stage and include interaction effects between Di and observables
to find for which individuals i, β1i is large or small. Equation 1.10 makes clear that individuals with
a large β1i contribute to the LATE estimator and individuals with a small β1i do not contribute to
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the LATE estimator 10. Whereas the monotonicity assumption is also fundamentally untestable, we
would not want the total effect of Di to become negative. Indeed, this would cause the explanation
below equation 1.9 to break done, since β1i is not positive for all individuals.
1.8 Main Results
1.8.1 Effect of Performance
Main results are reported on Table 1.4. The first column in Table 1.4 corresponds to the contem-
poraneous specification without lagged score and without school and year fixed effects. The unit
of absences is in tens of hours. This shows that missing ten additional hours of class, a student’s
grade point average decreases by 6.5 percent of a standard deviation, ceteris paribus. In column
(2) in Table 1.4 we expand on the contemporaneous specification by including the student’s grade
point average in the previous year. Controlling for lagged score allows us to capture both innate
ability as well as the history of all inputs included in the educational production function up to the
current period. When we control for lagged performance, we see that the effect of absences on
performance becomes less negative, indicating that past performance explains some portion of the
association between absences and performance. In other words, higher levels of past performance
may be associated with both higher attendance and higher performance. We find that missing ten
hours of class decreases one’s performance by 2.2 percent of a standard deviation on average.
In column (3), which corresponds to specification 1.4, we include school fixed effect in our
value-added specification to control for school-specific patterns of performance. We see that our
estimates don’t differ much from column (2): a ten-unit increase in the number of hours of class
missed decreases a student’s performance by 2 percent of a standard deviation.
Our estimates of column (3) are subject to an omitted-variable bias as unobserved grade-
specific shocks may be associated with lower rates of attendance and poorer performance. For
example, some students may be afflicted with sickness in certain years but not others. When a
student is sick, it is probable that they exhibit lower performance as well as lower class attendance.
10In the extreme where β1i = 0 the contribution of student i is zero
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Moreover, not everyone is affected by such time-specific shocks in the same time periods. Never-
theless, when these time-specific shocks occur and are not observed, we cannot disentangle their
effect on performance from the effect of absences on performance, as we do not observe who was
subject to such a shock and who wasn’t. There are additional grade-specific factors that could
bias the effect of absences on performance. Students may become better at learning on their own
as their grow up. It’s important to note that our analysis looks at students who are at the end of
their adolescence and near the beginning of their adulthood. Students who get closer to the age
of 18 may have accumulated enough human capital, so as to substitute sufficiently class learn-
ing with self learning. The existing literature (see, Kuh 1995, Bandura 1994, Winne and Hadwin
1998) supports that college aged individuals are more able to learn on their own in comparison to
younger students. Therefore, as students reach the end of their secondary education and prepare
for their university entrance exams, they may find it more productive to learn on their own rather
than in class. This effect is time-specific as it is more relevant to students in the junior or senior
year of high school. However, the extent to which age brings upon a certain student the necessary
self-discipline and maturity to learn on their own is largely idiosyncratic and differs from person to
person. In that sense, our omitted-variable bias comes from a combination of grade and individual
-specific unobservables.
To mitigate the omitted-variable bias from grade-student-specific shocks we exploit variation
in the class attendance regulation. During the 2009-2010 school year students were allowed to
miss 30 percent more classes without penalty. The relaxed attendance policy allowed students to
miss class for reasons different from those related to sickness. As students could miss class without
providing a doctor’s note or their parent’s approval, students could miss class to enjoy more leisure
or study. The reform allows us to compare same grade individuals across years, while controlling
for their past performance, to net out any unobserved grade-student-specific unobserved shocks.
Our estimates are reported in column (4) of Table 1.4 and correspond to specification 1.4 estimated
with IV. We find that missing ten hours of class increases the grade point average by 4.1 percent
for those students who missed more classes due to the relaxed attendance policy. Since the new
attendance policy didn’t force students to miss class but rather simply gave the opportunity to miss
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class more frequently, only students who would be better off either in terms of leisure of studying
at home would take advantage of the new policy. Exploiting the relaxed attendance policy to enjoy
more leisure or to study at home would generate in principle different returns to absences. We
do not know how students actually allocated their out-of-class time. However, we can interact
students, class, and school characteristics with the variable of interest and estimate heterogeneous
effects of absences. Our reduced form and first stage estimates are reported on Table 1.5. We find
that the relaxing the class attendance policy results in a roughly 11 hour increase in the number of
hours of class missed in a given year. Our reduced form results show that the reform that changed
the attendance requirements induced a 4.6 percent of a standard deviation increase in the grade
point average.
Robustness
One threat to identification is the existence of upward trend that could explain the positive
estimated effects of absences on performance. To control for the existence of time trends in our
outcome variables we perform the following robustness checks: We augment our specifications by
adding a linear time trend or school-specific linear trends. In the case of a linear time trend our
main specification 1.4 becomes:
Scorei,s,c,g,t =β0 + β1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + β2Scorei,g−1 + β3Xi,s,c,g,t + β4t
+β5Class controlsc +Grade FEg + School FEs + i,s,c,g,t (1.11)
where the parameter β4 captures the effect time t on our outcome variables. We go one step
further by allowing for the existence of school-specific linear trends in our outcome variables. In
that case, our main specification 1.4 becomes as follows:
Scorei,s,c,g,t =β0 + β1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + β2Scorei,g−1 + β3Xi,s,c,g,t + β4ts
+β5Class controlsc +Grade FEg + School FEs + i,s,c,g,t (1.12)
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where the effect of time ts on performance is now allowed to vary from one school to the
next. Both specifications 1.11 and 1.12 are estimated via IV using exogenous variation from the
introduction of a relaxed attendance policy.
Our results are shown in Table 1.6. We see that although our estimates of the returns to class
absences decrease in magnitude compared to Table 1.4, the estimated standard errors remain almost
half the size of the effects of absences both in odd-numbered columns that include a linear time
trend as an additional control, and in even-numbered columns where school-specific time trends
have been included to the list of explanatory variables. Our estimated effects are smaller compared
to the specifications without the time trends in Table 1.4, suggesting the existence of some time
trends. Nevertheless, when we control for even school-specific time trends, the effect of absences
on performance is found positive and significant both in magnitude and statistically. Specifically,
our preferred specification shown in column (8) of Table 1.6 shows that a ten-hour increase in the
class absences leads to an increase of school performance by 2 percent of a standard deviation.
1.8.2 Heterogeneous propensity to skip class
1.8.3 By Ability
The H1N1-related reform relaxed for one school year only the class attendance policy. The
reform allowed students to skip up to 34 more hours of school without penalty. Nevertheless,
the decision to skip class when given the opportunity may not be identical for everyone. In fact,
individual propensity to skip class may depend on individual, class or school characteristics. In
this section we explore whether there is differential response to the relaxed time-budget constraint.
The first question we ask is: Does the effect of the flu shock on absences differ across the ability
distribution? To answer this question, we employ the following regression model with interaction
terms. The model below is an augmented version of regression equation (1) where the flu-shock
variable is interacted with a prior-ability variable. To proxy cognitive ability we obtain the student’s
within-school rank based on the 10th grade GPA. The Ability variable takes the values in [1,100]
where the value 100 represents the top 1 percent of one’s class. The following model is estimated
for students attending 11th grade or 12th grade across years.
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Absencesi,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1Flut + α2Flut × Abilityi,10 + α3Abilityi,10 + α4Xi,s,c,g,t
+α5Class controlsc +Grade FEg + School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.13)
We hypothesize that when the class attendance policy relaxes student who have the resources
or the ability to learn outside the classroom may choose to skip class. Among those students we
expect that students with higher human capital accumulation or ability may exploit the relaxed
attendance regulation even more. Our findings are presented in table 1.8. We find that the higher
the measure of prior cognitive ability the more the hours a student skips class. In particular we find
that when controlling for variation across students and grade, being ranked 1 percent higher in your
class increases the effect of a relaxed class attendance policy on your hours of absences by almost
2 hours. However, our estimated effect has large standard error. When we focus on different types
of absences, we find that being ranked 1 percent higher in your class increases the estimated effect
of a relaxed class attendance policy on your hours of excused absences by more than 2 hours, with
a standard error almost half the size. The effect of the lax attendance policy on unexcused absences
does not seem to vary with prior ability as the estimated coefficient of the interaction of interest is
not significant quantitatively and statistically.
1.8.4 By Peer Quality
Next, we examine how the effect of the relaxed attendance policy on absences changes with
the mean performance of classroom peers. Peer quality is defined as the average of lagged Grade
Point Average of class peers11. Since we are employing a within-school estimation approach,
the peer quality variable would pick up differences in the peer quality across classes and across
years within the same school. We are using a logarithmic transformation of one’s peer quality to
normalize those differences and to estimate the effect of relative rather than absolute changes in
the peer quality. We model differential effects of the flu shock on absences by peer quality using
11We follow the so-called leave-one-out approach in defining peer quality. For each student we calculate the average
lagged GPA of the other students in the same classroom.
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the following specification.
Absencesi,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1Flut + α2Flut × Log(PeerQuality)c + α3Log(PeerQuality)c
+α4Scorei,g−1 + α5Xi,s,c,g,t + α5Class controlsc +Grade FEg
+School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.14)
Where Class Engagement is the average lagged absences of class peers. Our OLS estimates
of the equation 1.14 reported in table 1.9 show that on average peer quality matters significantly for
the effect of the flu shock on absences. Specifically, a 10 percent decrease in peer quality leads to a
one and a half-hour increase in the effect of the relaxed attendance policy on mean total absences.
When we split absences in excused and unexcused we see that peer quality matters for the effect
of the relaxed attendance policy only on excused absences, that is whole day absence for which
the doctor’s note or a parent’s approval was provided. In particular, a 10 percent decrease in peer
quality leads to a almost one and a half-hour increase in the effect of the relaxed attendance policy
on mean excused absences, with a standard error of two fifths of that size. Peer quality doesn’t
seem to matter for the effect of the relaxed attendance policy on performance, as the estimated
coefficient of the interaction of peer quality with the shock is not significant either in magnitude or
statistically. Considering that the relaxed attendance policy is more likely to be exploited by those
students who can learn outside the classroom, the estimated differential effect of the flu reform by
peer quality measures the negative externality such a student incurs when they are forced to stay in
a deteriorating class environment.
1.8.5 By Postcode Income
Next, we are interested in measuring potential differential effects of the flu-related reform on
absences by socioeconomic status. Although we do not observe students’ family income, we have
a measure of mean family income at the postcode level. We are interested in the cross-sectional
variation of income rather than the over-time variation for two reasons. The flu reform is a variable
that changes over time, and in order to measure its heterogeneous effects in terms of cross-sectional
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characteristics, we can’t have those characteristics changing over time as well; if this were the
case, we wouldn’t be able to completely exclude the possibility of that part of the variation in
our cross- sectional characteristics could be explained by our instrument. Thus, as a measure of
socioeconomic status, we use the mean family income at the postcode level expressed in euros in
2009, a year before the flu-related reform. We explore differential propensity to skip class in terms
of rural setting using the following model:
Absencesi,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1Flut + α2Flut × Log(Income)s + α3Log(Income)s
+α4Scorei,g−1 + α5Xi,s,c,g,t + α5Class controlsc +Grade FEg
+School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.15)
According to table 1.10 a 10 percent decrease in family income increases absences by almost 10
hours on average when under the relaxed attendance policy. This evidence suggests that the better
socioeconomic conditions negatively correlated with skipping class. We propose two hypotheses
that may explain our evidence; these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. First, students of
higher family socioeconomic status (as proxied by the mean postcode income) may be less prone
to the absenteeism not necessarily because it is not in their best interest to skip class but perhaps be-
cause social norms and behaviors they have been exposed to may deem such a behavior as immoral
or unacceptable. Second, public schools in wealthier neighborhoods may provide higher-quality
schooling in terms of either the educational inputs or the learning environment. Nevertheless, our
results are robust to controlling for peer quality. As previously noted, the ministry of Education
does not take into consideration any quality characteristics when allocating teachers to schools;
however, self-selection cannot be excluded.
1.8.6 Heterogeneous Returns to Absences
1.8.7 By Ability
Next, we investigate whether and how returns to absences vary across the ability distribution. It
is important to note that the estimated returns to absences that we have discussed so far are relevant
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to those who choose to miss class due to the newly introduced lax attendance policy. Assuming
that only students who would benefit from class absence who choose to skip class, we anticipate an
average return to class absence higher than zero, even though the magnitude of the return to absence
may vary across the ability distribution. Using within-cohort ranking in the 10th grade to proxy
cognitive ability, we estimate the effect of absences on performance due to the introduction of a
relaxed attendance policy conditional on cognitive ability. We employ the following specification:
Scorei,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + α2Absencesi,s,c,g,t × Abilityi,10 + α3Abilityi,10
+α4Xi,s,c,g,t + α5Class controlsc +Grade FEg + School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.16)
where g ∈ 11, 12. Specification 1.16 is estimated by IV. The two endogenous variables-
absences and the interaction of absences and our proxy for cognitive ability-are instrumented by
the flu shock and the interaction of the flu shock and our proxy for cognitive ability, respectively.
Our results are shown in Table 1.11. We find that the higher a student’s prior performance, the
more positive the effect of absences of school performance. In particular, the performance of a
student at the top one percent of his cohort improves by a net almost 0.2 percent of a standard
deviation when he misses additional 10 hours of class in a given year. Our findings suggest that
students who exhibit higher cognitive ability are worse off staying in class compared to less able
students. Our results are opposite for student at the left end of the ability distribution. The per-
formance of students at the bottom 1 percent of their cohort decreases by a net 0.2 percent of a
standard deviation when they miss additional 10 hours of class in a given year.
Our evidence suggests that students of different cognitive ability either exploit differently the
relaxed attendance policy or their out-of-class learning productivity is not homogeneous. The
strong positive returns to absences for more able students suggest that better students may choose to
skip class in order to study or avoid some class externality that could possibly disrupt their learning
process. On the other hand, the negative returns to absences for weaker students implies that
their out-of-class productivity is not higher than their in-class productivity either because weaker
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students may spend their out-of-class time in leisure or because they do not have enough human
capital accumulation in order to harvest the same gains from self-study as better students do.
1.8.8 By Peer Quality
To see how returns to absences differ across the peer quality distribution we estimate the fol-
lowing model where we interact the effect of absences with the natural logarithm peer quality.
Peer quality is calculated for each student as the average lagged GPA of other peers in the same
classroom.
Scorei,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + α2Absencesi,s,c,g,t × Log(PeerQuality)c
+α3Log(PeerQuality)c + α4Scorei,g−1 + α5Xi,s,c,g,t + α5Class controlsc
+Grade FEg + School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.17)
Our estimates are shown on Table 1.12. Overall, having class peers at the top quintile of
the sample distribution increases your return to absence in terms of GPA, suggesting that high
achieving peers may intimidate a student or the instructor neglects weaker students. However,
the estimated standard error of the interaction term of interest is much larger than the coefficient,
suggesting that that the effect of absences on performance does not vary statistically significantly
by peer quality. It is important to note that the variation we observe in the peer quality in the
classroom is not large. The difference in the mean peer quality between the top and bottom quintile
is 16.58%, where peer quality is defined as the mean lagged GPA of one’s class peers.
1.8.9 By Postcode Income
We explore differential effects of absences on performance by estimating model (1.18).
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Scorei,s,c,g,t =α0 + α1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + α2Absencesi,s,c,g,t × Log(Income)s
+α3Log(Income)s + α4Scorei,g−1 + α5Xi,s,c,g,t + α5Class controlsc
+Grade FEg + School FEs + ηi,s,c,g,t (1.18)
Our results in Table 1.13 show postcode income does not seem to matter quantitatively or
statistically for the effect of absences on performance.
1.8.10 By Subjects
In this section we explore how returns to absences differ among different subjects. We focus
our analysis on Modern Greek, and Mathematics. Both subjects belong to the core curriculum and
are mandatory courses for every high school student. It is important to note that we do not observe
in our data how many hours of classes each student missed for every subject in a given school year.
We rather observe an aggregate number of hours of absences for every student in a given school
year. We investigate the effect of the total number of absences a student makes in a given school
year on the end-of-the-year cumulative exam scores for Greek and Mathematics. Exams scores are
not curved a follow a 100-unit scale. We standardize the exam scores by school and grade. Our
specification is that described in equation 1.4 and is estimated by IV. The outcome variable Score
takes the values of standardized exam scores in Greek, and Mathematics. Our results are shown
in Table 1.14. We find that the level of Absences does not have a statistically significant effect
on the exam score in Greek. However, our estimates show that there are positive and statistically
significant effects of Absences on the exam score for Mathematics, suggesting that missing more
hours of class improve the Mathematics exam score. Specifically, missing additional 10 hours of
class improves the Mathematics exam score by roughly 3 percent of a standard deviation. Our
estimates are robust when we include school-specific linear time trends, shown in column (4) of
Table 1.14.
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1.8.11 By Track
In this section we explore how returns to absences vary across different specializations. We
have already mentioned that students in the 11th and 12th grade choose a field of specialization
(track): classics, information technology, or science. Attending a specific track allows students to
apply for admission to university degree programs relevant to the chosen track. For instance, in
order to apply to university degree program in History and Archaeology one must have attended
the Classics track in high school. We use the subsample (18,943 individuals) of 11th and 12th
grade students for whom we have full specialization information, final exam scores in the track
courses, and attendance information to investigate heterogeneous returns to class absences for
the three tracks available. We estimate the following specification via IV, where the endogenous
variable absences is instrumented by the exogenous reform in the class attendance policy during
the 2009-10 school year.
Scorei,s,c,g,t =β0 + β1Absencesi,s,c,g,t + β2Scorei,g−1 + β3Xi,s,c,g,t
+β4Class controlsc + School FEs + i,s,c,g,t (1.19)
The difference between specification 1.19 and specification 1.4 is that in specification 1.19 we
cannot include grade-specific fixed effects. Therefore specification 1.19 is estimated for 12th grade
students using lagged score values from the 11th grade as a control variable.
Our results are shown in Table 1.15. We find that absences have a significant effect on per-
formance both quantitatively and statistically for students in the Information Technology (IT) and
Science Track. The effect of absences on performance for students attending the Classics is found
to be negative, suggesting that missing more hours of class decreases the average score in the track
courses for students specializing in Classics. On the other hand, missing more hours of class seems
to improve the performance in terms of the average score in the track courses for students attending
the IT or the Science Track, who missed more classes due to the relaxed attendance policy.
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1.9 Conclusion
Our study uses new high school transcript data to address two questions. First, why does a stu-
dent skip class? Second, what is the effect of absences on performance? Our identification strategy
exploits a natural experiment that occurred when a European outbreak of swine flu led Greek of-
ficials to adopt regulations allowing students to miss 30 percent more class time without penalty
during the 2009-20 school year. We provide evidence that very few students were directly affected
by the swine flu; high school students were not a high-risk group, and most student absences took
place well after the outbreak ended. Our institutional setting has the following features. First, stu-
dents are assigned to classes according to the alphabetical order of their surnames, and class peers
remain the same across subjects. Second, assignment to schools follows a school- district system
based on geography. Third, attendance is diligently monitored, and the penalty for missing more
than 114 class hours in a given year is severe: grade retention. The one-time-only reform allowed
students to skip one period or a whole day of school. We use a within-student estimator to control
for individual and age effects. Our outcomes include grade point average in the 10th, 11th, and
12th grades, and exam scores in specific subjects with minimal curricular variation across classes
and schools.
We show that, when given the opportunity, students who are more likely to skip classes are
those who have established records of higher prior performance, who have academically weaker
peers in their classes, or who live in poorer neighborhoods. We find that students who choose
to skip class when the attendance policy relaxes perform better, achieving an overall GPA that is
0.04 of standard deviation higher. We explore how the introduction of a relaxed attendance policy
affected students in different parts of the ability distribution. We find that students of higher prior
ability enjoy higher returns to absences, suggesting that more able students can do better under a
less strict attendance policy. Students at the top one percent of the ability distribution proxied by
the 10th grade GPA enjoy a net two percent of standard deviation increase in their end-of-the-year
exam performance when they miss additional 10 hours of class. Our results are opposite for weaker
students. The performance of students at the bottom one percent of their cohort, as measured in the
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10th grade, decreases by two percent of a standard deviation when they miss additional 10 hours
of class.
We also explore heterogeneous returns to absences across both different subjects in the core
curriculum as well as across different specialization tracks in the 11th and 12th grade. We find
negative returns to absences in Greek language and positive returns to absences in mathematics
in the core curriculum. Our results are similar in the specialization track analysis, where we find
negative and statistically insignificant returns to absences for students in the Classics Track, but
positive returns for students in the Information Technology and Science Tracks, which both put
emphasis on mathematics in the track curriculum. Our finding suggest that it is possible to gain
from absence in certain fields of study but not in others.
Our estimated positive effects of absences show that a compulsory class attendance policy can
hurt the performance of certain students. Allowing students to miss class has considerable effects
on their performance. Our effect is of comparable magnitude to being taught by a teacher one
standard deviation above the average (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014b, Rivkin, Hanushek,
and Kain 2005c). Moreover, our effect on test scores is of a similar magnitude to reducing the
class size by 10-15 percent (Krueger 1997, Angrist and Lavy 1999b). These interventions are
significantly more costly than a lax attendance policy and it could free up resources that could be
used to boost the performance of those who rely more on school resources.
One limitation of our study is that we do not observe class attendance for specific subjects, and
thus we cannot exclude the possibility that the observed differences in returns to absences may
be due to the students’ selecting to skip specific subjects but attend others. Our findings speak
both to literature exploring the reasons for absenteeism as well as the literature investigating the
quantity of inputs in the educational production function. A revealed preference argument leads us
to claim that those who exploit a relaxed attendance policy do so because it makes them happier,
either because they can enjoy more leisure or because they can learn on their own. Our estimated
return to absence can be viewed as the externality compliers incur when they are forced to attend
class. This externality may be related to class size, peer quality, and/or school characteristics. Our
study supports the view that students of different characteristics have different input needs, and
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it highlights the trade-off between equality in an educational system and efficiency in terms of
allocation of educational inputs.
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Figure 1.1: A MODEL OF TIME ALLOCATION
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Table 1.1: UPPER LIMITS OF SCHOOL ABSENCES
Old Regulation Flu Regulation
Excused Absences 64 83
Unexcused Absences 50 65
Total Hours 114 148
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Figure 1.2: NEW TRANSCRIPT DATA
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Table 1.2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF ABSENCES
Total Absences Excused Absences Unexcused Absences
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Average 59.13 63.47 25.02 24.03 34.09 57.35
Math Score
Highest Quintile 60.06 32.92 31.68 26.40 28.36 13.99
Fourth Quintile 58.46 31.60 28.42 24.40 30.04 14.33
Third Quintile 60.75 30.91 28.45 24.01 32.25 14.09
Second Quintile 64.94 30.33 29.85 23.78 35.03 13.83
Lowest Quintile 88.77 83.91 32.31 25.41 56.47 82.93
Gender
Male 66.16 29.18 23.68 22.76 36.95 35.59
Female 65.71 42.71 31.90 25.51 33.78 32.23
Grade
10th 53.69 55.55 19.42 19.79 34.29 51.13
11th 61.79 52.91 23.29 21.50 38.40 47.80
12th 83.36 36.34 45.34 24.02 38.03 27.72
Semester
Fall 26.50 28.43 9.48 13.63 17.02 23.10
Spring 35.49 28.85 18.26 18.35 17.23 21.03
Setting
Urban 65.01 43.33 31.57 27.29 33.50 32.74
Rural 66.98 50.62 29.78 24.63 37.17 43.58
Neighborhood Income
Highest Quintile 68.19 58.10 29.41 24.28 38.48 52.90
Fourth Quintile 66.22 44.80 30.56 25.50 35.77 35.51
Third Quintile 67.83 48.16 30.49 24.47 37.34 39.87
Second Quintile 63.84 45.02 28.15 23.67 35.70 36.71
Lowest Quintile 68.38 54.75 30.51 25.53 37.88 48.97
Peer Quality
Highest Quintile 66.40 31.54 31.67 25.01 34.55 15.37
Fourth Quintile 69.31 32.00 34.36 25.41 34.67 15.49
Third Quintile 69.88 31.65 34.54 25.54 35.13 14.97
Second Quintile 71.72 32.49 35.92 25.06 35.77 17.58
Lowest Quintile 72.53 32.25 36.57 24.72 35.97 17.07
Year
2006 62.47 51.68 26.24 22.44 36.22 45.86
2007 66.37 52.53 28.96 24.16 37.41 46.09
2008 63.22 47.80 27.53 24.13 35.71 40.49
2009 66.92 50.35 30.15 24.44 36.53 44.27
2010 76.42 49.78 35.56 27.84 40.89 40.20
2011 66.42 46.81 31.39 24.17 35.06 39.42
2012 65.30 59.96 32.99 27.39 33.81 53.13
Sample: 58,923 obs; 19,641 individuals. Neighborhood income is measured as average family
income at postcode in Euros in 2009. Peer quality is the mean lagged grade point average of
class peers
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Figure 1.3: DISTRIBUTION OF ABSENCES UNDER OLD ATTENDANCE REGULATION
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Figure 1.4: DISTRIBUTION OF ABSENCES UNDER NEW ATTENDANCE REGULATION
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Figure 1.5: DISTRIBUTION OF UNEXCUSED ABSENCES UNDER OLD ATTENDANCE REGULA-
TION
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Figure 1.6: DISTRIBUTION OF UNEXCUSED ABSENCES UNDER NEW ATTENDANCE REGULA-
TION
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Table 1.3: TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUP
Control Treatment Difference
Variable Mean Mean (b/s.e.)
Student Characteristics
Age 16.928 17.530 0.602***
(0.008)
Female 0.558 0.558 0.000
(0.005)
# of Students 48,528 10,395
Class Characteristics
Class Size 22.908 22.296 -0.612***
(0.038)
Mean Lagged GPA 13.769 13.733 -0.036**
(0.13)
# of Classes 2,508 534
School Postcode Characteristics
Rural 0.060 0.058 -0.002
(0.003)
log(Population) 11.109 11.103 -0.006
(0.011)
log(Income) 9.967 9.964 -0.003
(0.002)
# of Schools 85 83
Note: Data span graduating classes of 2008-2012 (years 2006-2012). Sam-
ple: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Annual Income is in 2009 Euro. We
use data from 12 schools in rural areas and 73 in urban areas. Grades use a
20-point scale. Population refers to city population or the population of the
smallest unit of area obtained from the 2011 Census. The treatment period
is the year 2010 while the control period consists of the pooled years 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5%
and 1% level respectively.
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Figure 1.7: No Trend Assumption
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Figure 1.8: No Trend Assumption
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Figure 1.9: H1N1-INFECTED HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IN GREECE
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Figure 1.10: SWINE FLU CASES IN GREECE IN 2009-2010
Figure 1.11: TIMING OF ABSENCES IN 2009-2010
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Figure 1.12: Common Trends Assumption
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Figure 1.13: Placebo Test
54
Table 1.4: RETURNS TO ABSENCES USING ATTENDANCE POLICY INSTRUMENT
GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absences -0.065 -0.022 -0.020 0.041
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.011)***
Instrument None None None Flu Reform
Grade FE X X X X
Class Controls X X X X
Lagged Score X X X
School FE X X
Sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Scores are standardized by school and grade.
Cluster-robust standard errors at the class level are reported in parentheses. Class controls
include average lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit
of Absences is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and student
controls. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 1.5: REDUCED FORM, AND FIRST STAGE RESULTS
Absences GPA
First Stage Reduced Form
Flu Shock 1.121 0.046
(0.067)*** (0.012)***
F-Statistic 277.23
Note: Sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level are reported
in parentheses. Specifications include, student controls lagged score, class controls, grade fixed effects, and school
fixed effects. Class controls include average lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of
Absences is tens of hours of classes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
Table 1.6: ROBUSTNESS
GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Absences -0.066 -0.069 -0.022 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021 0.026 0.019
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.011)** (0.010)*
Instrument None None None None None None Flu Reform Flu Reform
Grade FE X X X X X X X X
Class Controls X X X X X X X X
Linear Trend X X X X X X X X
Lagged Score X X X X X X
School FE X X X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X X X
Sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Scores are standardized by school and grade. Cluster-robust standard errors at the class level are
reported in parentheses. Class controls include average lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of Absences
is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and student controls. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1%
level respectively.
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Table 1.7: REDUCED FORM, AND FIRST STAGE RESULTS
Absences GPA
First Stage Reduced Form
Flu Shock 1.222 1.121 0.031 0.023
(0.077)*** (0.075)*** (0.014)** (0.012)*
Linear Trend X X X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X
F-Statistic 254.08 261.25
Note: Sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level are
reported in parentheses. Specifications include, student controls lagged score, class controls, grade fixed effects,
and school fixed effects. Class controls include average lagged performance, and average lagged absences of
class peers. Unit of Absences is tens of hours of classes. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1%
level respectively.
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Table 1.8: HETEROGENEOUS PROPENSITY TO SKIP CLASS: COGNITIVE ABILITY
Total Absences Excused Absences Unexcused Absences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Flu 1.007 0.992 0.466 0.464 0.571 0.559
(0.097)*** (0.094)*** (0.073)*** (0.071)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)***
Flu × Cognitive Ability 0.192 0.194 0.220 0.222 -0.034 -0.033
(0.150) (0.149) (0.115)* (0.115)* (0.067) (0.066)
Cognitive Ability -2.002 -2.005 -0.411 -0.413 -1.586 -1.587
(0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.042)*** (0.042)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)***
School FE X X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X X
Class Controls X X X X X X
Linear Trend X X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X X
R2 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.20
Note: sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at the classroom level
are reported in parentheses. Class controls include average lagged performance, and average lagged
absences of class peers. Unit of Absences is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a
constant and student controls for gender, age, and age squared. *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
58
Table 1.9: HETEROGENEOUS PROPENSITY TO SKIP CLASS: PEER QUALITY
Total Absences Excused Unexcused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Flu 5.236 5.429 4.256 4.570 0.705 0.577
(2.221)** (2.182)** (1.625)*** (1.605)*** (1.167) (1.151)
Flu × Peer Quality -1.494 -1.573 -1.342 -1.458 -0.037 0.004
(0.830)* (0.816)* (0.608)** (0.600)** (0.434) (0.428)
Peer Quality 0.204 0.456 0.049 0.258 0.063 0.104
(0.413) (0.419) (0.306) (0.312) (0.230) (0.226)
School FE X X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X X
Class Controls X X X X X X
Lagged Score X X X X X X
Linear Trend X X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X X
R2 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.14 0.14
Note: sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at the class-
room level are reported in parentheses. Class controls average lagged absences of class
peers. Unit of Absences is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant
and student controls for gender, age, and age squared. *,**,*** denotes significance at the
10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 1.10: HETEROGENEOUS PROPENSITY TO SKIP CLASS: POSTCODE INCOME
Total Absences Excused Unexcused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Flu 10.838 11.013 7.867 8.552 1.708 1.067
(3.189)*** (3.381)*** (2.682)*** (2.815)*** (1.407) (1.508)
Flu × Log(Income) -0.965 -0.984 -0.724 -0.792 -0.111 -0.048
(0.320)*** (0.340)*** (0.269)*** (0.283)*** (0.142) (0.152)
School FE X X X X X X
Grade FE X X X X X X
Class Controls X X X X X X
Lagged Score X X X X X X
Linear Trend X X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X X
R2 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.14 0.14
Note: sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at the classroom
level are reported in parentheses. Class controls average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of
Absences is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and student controls
for gender, age, and age squared. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level
respectively.
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Table 1.11: HETEROGENEOUS RETURNS TO ABSENCES: COGNITIVE ABILITY
Dependent Variable: GPA
(1) (2)
Absences -0.002 -0.002
(0.016) (0.015)
Absences × Cognitive Ability 0.004 0.004
(0.002)*** (0.002)***
Cognitive Ability 2.154 2.156
(0.106)*** (0.105)***
School FE X X
Grade FE X X
Class Controls X X
Linear Trend X
School-Specific Linear Trend X
Cragg −Donald F statistic 556.717 545.294
Note: sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at the
classroom level are reported in parentheses. Class controls include average lagged
performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of Absences is tens
of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and student controls for
gender, age, and age squared. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1%
level respectively.
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Table 1.12: HETEROGENEOUS RETURNS TO ABSENCES: PEER QUALITY
Dependent Variable: GPA
(1) (2)
Absences -0.010 -0.276
(0.424) (0.459)
Absences × Peer Quality 0.013 0.110
(0.159) (0.172)
Peer Quality -0.474 -1.275
(1.149) (1.234)
School FE X X
Grade FE X X
Class Controls X X
Lagged Score X X
Linear Trend X
School-Specific Linear Trend X
Cragg −Donald F statistic 204.957 170.676
Note: sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors at
the classroom level are reported in parentheses. Class controls include average
lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of Absences
is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and student controls
for gender, age, and age squared. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and
1% level respectively.
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Table 1.13: HETEROGENEOUS RETURNS TO ABSENCES: POSTCODE INCOME
Dependent Variable: GPA
(1) (2)
Absences 0.120 -0.400
(0.479) (1.272)
Absences × Log(Income) -0.010 0.042
(0.048) (0.128)
School FE X X
Grade FE X X
Class Controls X X
Lagged Score X X
Linear Trend X
School-Specific Linear Trend X
Cragg −Donald F statistic 293.669 43.371
Note: sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Cluster-robust standard errors
at the classroom level are reported in parentheses. Class controls include aver-
age lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of
Absences is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and
student controls for gender, age, and age squared. *,**,*** denotes significance
at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 1.14: HETEROGENEOUS RETURNS TO ABSENCES: SUBJECTS
Greek Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absences -0.033 -0.038 0.026 0.029
(0.016)** (0 .016)** (0.014)* (0.014)**
First Stage F-Statistic 236.19 256.92 236.58 256.26
Grade FE X X X X
Class Controls X X X X
Lagged Score X X X X
School FE X X X X
Linear Trend X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X
Sample: 58,923 obs (19,641 individuals). Scores are standardized by school, and grade.
Cluster-robust standard errors at the class level are reported in parentheses. Class controls
include average lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit
of Absences is tens of hours of classes. All specifications include a constant and student
controls. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 1.15: HETEROGENEOUS RETURNS TO ABSENCES: TRACK
Track Average Score
Classics IT Science
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Absences -0.012 -0.006 0.039 0.042 0.164 0.164
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.035)*** (0.035)***
First Stage F-Statistic 168.66 138.89 132.44 114.15 35.48 33.70
Class Controls X X X X X X
Lagged Score X X X X X X
School FE X X X X X X
Linear Trend X X X
School-Specific Linear Trend X X X
# of Students 7,750 8,809 2,384
Data: Panel for 18,943 individuals. Scores are standardized by school, grade, and track. Cluster-
robust standard errors at the class level are reported in parentheses. Class controls include average
lagged performance, and average lagged absences of class peers. Unit of Absences is tens of hours
of classes. All specifications include a constant and student controls. *,**,*** denotes significance at
the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF FEEDBACK INFORMATION ON SHORT AND LONG TERM OUTCOMES
2.1 Introduction
Knowing how one’s characteristics compare to those of others is important in many settings
of decision making. Humans are social beings, and it is natural to make comparisons in terms of
characteristics and abilities in given tasks (Festinger 1954). The theory of social comparison is
about “our quest to know ourselves, about the search for self-relevant information and how people
gain self knowledge and discover reality about themselves” (Mettee and Smith 1977). One mea-
sure that provides social comparison information is ordinal rank in addition to relative or absolute
information. In the workplace, recent evidence suggests that an individual is influenced not only
by his relative or absolute income but also by the ranked-ordered position of his wage within a ref-
erence group. So one’s ordinal rank is used when people make comparisons with others (Brown,
Gardner, Oswald, and Qian 2008, Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez 2012). Social comparison is also
an indispensable part of bonding among adolescents. In education, it is rare for teachers or prin-
cipals to provide relative performance information to students. Thus, there is little understanding
of the effects of providing information on students’ ranks, because there is limited variation in the
nature of such information that students receive-thus precluding causal analyses. However, know-
ing one’s ordinal rank may affect education investment decisions and, hence, future academic and
labor market outcomes.
Improving pupil attainments has been and continues to be an important issue for policy makers
and academics alike. In an effort to improve students’ grades, education policies have focused on
improving a wide array of school inputs, among them, reducing class size (Angrist and Lavy 1999a,
Krueger 1999), improving the quality of teachers (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014a, Rothstein
2010, Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007), extending the term length (Card and Krueger 1992)
and improving the quality of a student’s peer group (Lavy, Silva, and Weindhardt 2012, Zimmer-
man 2003a, Hoxby 2000b). Disclosing social comparison information (such as rankings), and
manipulating the availability of this information would be significantly less costly than the above-
mentioned interventions.
This paper presents empirical evidence about whether providing high school students with
information about their rank on externally marked, high-stake exams affects future performance in
similar exams. Our analysis relies on the fact that different cohorts are subject to different policies
regarding the provision of social comparison information.
We exploit a large-scale, natural experiment that took place in 2005, when Greece adopted
policies that altered the education testing regime, and eliminated information on rank that has
been available to students nationwide. Until 2005, all students had to take national exams in two
consecutive grades: one year before high-school graduation (eleventh grade), and the year of high-
school graduation (twelfth grade). Results for all students were published nationally. From the
results, students could calculate their rank within the school and across the nation, thus enabling
comparison within the school and nationwide.
After 2005, the penultimate-year (eleventh grade) national exams were abolished and replaced
with school-level exams. As a result, penultimate-year students take exams on the same subjects as
before, but only receive report cards with their own exam results; they no longer receive informa-
tion about their penultimate-year relative performance in relation to others in their school or across
the nation. These cohorts -like the previous ones- continue to take twelfth-grade, national exams
that will determine their post-secondary placement. However, they no longer receive information
regarding previous relative performance in similar exams (national exams).
We define a feedback regime as receiving information regarding one’s performance in compar-
ison to peers in school and nationwide. In the feedback regime that existed until 2005, eleventh-
grade students could compare themselves to others allowing for social comparison. Thus, we
find the effect of the feedback on students’ short-term (subsequent exam performance) and long-
term outcomes (repetition of national exams one year after graduation, university placement and
expected annual earnings) by comparing students of the same prior performance (tenth-grade per-
formance) across regimes. In other words, we compare students who do receive information on
rank in the eleventh grade and those who do not receive this information. We then use two sets
of subjects. The main analysis is conducted using those subjects on which students receive the
relative performance information in the eleventh grade. The second group of subjects, the coun-
terfactual group, is a group of subjects on which students do not receive any relative performance
information in the eleventh grade in either regime. Using new data on school performance, school
quality and national exams for university admission, we test the hypothesis that students’ final-year
exam (twelfth-grade) performance is independent of the feedback regime.
When students knew their performance in the eleventh-year exams, they could “translate” their
hours of effort into their exam result. For a given level of effort exerted by their peers, they
discover how much effort they need to put into the final-year exam to rank accordingly. Knowing
their relative performance could affect investment decisions such as the amount of effort students
decide to exert in their final year of school. Students’ performance in the final-year (twelfth-grade)
national exams is the most important determinant for university admission in this setting.
Our first finding is that high-achieving students perform better in the final-year national (exter-
nally graded) exams when they receive feedback. Providing relative performance information the
year before, improves the next period’s exam performance of the better students by 0.2 standard
67
deviations and their relative national rank by 4-6 percentiles. This is of comparable magnitude
to being taught by a teacher 1.5-2 standard deviations above the average ( Chetty et al. 2014a,
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin 2005), or to reducing the class size by 15 percent. (Angrist and Lavy
1999a, Krueger 1999). Additionally, we find evidence that the performance of students in the
lower percentiles deteriorates when feedback is provided. In particular, their consecutive-year per-
formance declines by 0.3 standard deviations, and their national rank decreases by 6-8 percentiles.
Our second finding reports the responses of males and females to feedback at different parts
of the ability distribution. High-achieving students of both genders respond positively to positive
feedback, and low-achieving students of both genders respond negatively to negative feedback.
However, females seem to be considerably more sensitive to feedback at all parts of the ability
distribution compared to males. Our results are consistent with the existing literature regarding
the gender differential response to performance due to initial different levels of self-confidence
(McCarty 1986), or competitiveness of the exam (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003).
Our third finding is that the provision of feedback changes the matching of students to uni-
versity departments. First, we rank all university departments (programs) based on selectiveness
and we construct a program list from the most-selective programs (e.g. engineering and medicine)
and to the least-selective (e.g. geo-technology and environmental studies). We find that feedback
provision corresponds to high-achieving students moving up the program selectiveness ladder by
30 positions, which is 0.15 of a standard deviation. On the other hand, low-achieving students
move down the program selectiveness ladder by 35 positions, which is 0.18 of a standard devi-
ation. Using the national Hellenic Labor Force Survey information, we find the annual earnings
of older people in each occupation, and we map them to university departments. When the social
comparison information is disclosed, we find that high-achieving students experience an increase
in expected earnings by 0.13 standard deviations. Further, feedback provision for low-achieving
students imposes a decrease in expected earnings of 0.23 standard deviations.
Additionally, we find evidence to suggest that feedback encourages students from low-income
neighborhoods to enroll in university and, as such, alters the socio-economic composition of stu-
dents who are admitted to the top programs. More students from low-income neighborhoods gain
admission to the most selective programs with the highest expected earnings after graduation (such
as engineering and law), when feedback information is provided. This implies that feedback en-
courages social elevation for students from low income families.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, this is the first large-scale study that documents
the long-term effects of providing relative performance information in an educational setting. In
particular, we document the direction and size of the effect of feedback on long-term outcomes
such as repetition rates for the national exams, students’ post-secondary placement, and expected
earnings. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that knowing one’s ranking within
the senior high school or nationwide has long-lasting effects, and changes an individual’s career
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path.
Secondly, we explore how information transparency-particularly about a student’s rank-affects
educational outcomes. We accomplish this by making use of a unique information treatment.
Disclosing information about ranks is not a standard practice for teachers or principals. Thus, the
information treatment that we study in this paper is rare. We exploit a special setting in which high-
school students receive explicit information about their relative position in at least two reference
groups: school and country. Although students may generally observe their own perspicacity, they
do not generally observe everyone’s performance in the school and the country to deduce their
ranking. Thus, we are able to separately identify the effect of knowing someone’s ranking in each
of these two groups.
This study has important policy implications. First, we provide evidence that a low-cost instru-
ment -such as providing information on one’s rank- has the potential to affect students’ educational
achievements. Our estimates of impact are at the lower end of those from the current literature
on improving school inputs. Nonetheless, all the interventions studied so far (improving teacher
quality, reducing class size, enhancing peer-group quality etc.) are significantly more costly than
manipulating the availability of social comparison information. Thus, information on rank can be
considered a new factor in the education production function1.
Second, our findings imply that when the relative performance information is disclosed, it can
be an important, additional factor in terms of the school choice. Our findings imply that being in
a school with higher-achieving peers might not always be optimal for students. That is, students
benefit from going to schools in which they are among the high-performing students (i.e. schools
with more students with relatively lower performance levels). Making a school choice on the basis
of rank only is unlikely to be correct, given that there are many other factors in the education
production function.
In the recent years, the economic literature has shown increasing interest in the effect of feed-
back on feedback on exam performance.2 Bandiera, Larcinese, and Rasul 2015 examine the effect
of feedback information on students’ future absolute performance using data for university stu-
dents registered to departments with different feedback policies. In that study, feedback is defined
1Other determinants of the education production function that have been studied include: studies on class size
(Angrist and Lavy 1999a, Krueger 1999, Hoxby 2000c), teachers’ training and certification (Angrist and Lavy 2001,
Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2008), quality of teacher (Rockoff 2004, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005a), tracking
(Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2011), peer effects (Hoxby 2000b, Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser 2012), non-cognitive
skills (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006), classroom instructional time (Lavy 2015).
2The relative feedback information has been studied in the tournament literature. Some studies find that relative
performance information has a positive effect for all participants in both tournaments and piece-rate payment schemes
(Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman 2008). On the other hand, some other studies find mixed results. Barankay 2012
uses data on furniture sellers’ effort, and finds that feedback has negative effects on the low-performing employees.)
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as the knowledge of someone’s absolute performance in the midterm exam in period one, and be-
fore students exert effort on their essay in period two. The authors find that the effect of feedback
is positive for all students, and more pronounced for more-able students. Their study refers to
feedback involving one’s own absolute performance. Our study refers to the provision of feedback
regarding relative performance.
The paper most closely related to ours is a study by Azmat and Iriberri 2010. The authors ex-
amine the effect of relative performance feedback on students’ future absolute performance. They
exploit a natural experiment that took place in a high school, in which for one year only, students
received information about the average class score in addition to information about their own per-
formance. Their findings suggest that feedback improves the performance of all students in the
subsequent test. They do not find differential effects by gender along the ability distribution. A
key difference between their paper and ours in the sample size. They use a small sample of one
high school; by contrast, we use what is in many dimensions a nationally representative sample
of 134 senior high schools. Another important difference is that Azmat and Iriberri 2010 inves-
tigate the effect of providing information about someone’s relative position within the class only.
We contribute to the literature by exploiting an explicit information treatment in which the social
comparison information refers to reference groups broader than the class, i.e. the school and the
nation.
More recently, Murphy and Weinhardt 2014 examine the effect of one’s primary school ordi-
nal rank on future exam performance. In their setting, students figure out their rank within their
class from repeated interaction with their classmates. They find that being highly ranked in pri-
mary school has large and robust effects on secondary school achievement, with boys being more
affected than girls. Our setting differs in that students receive explicit information regarding their
rank within the school and nationwide, which facilitates the policy recommendations.
An interesting question is whether the effects are driven by students, parents or teachers or
some combination of them. It is almost impossible to disentangle whether the effects are coming
from the students or the parents. However, we can rule out the two mechanisms; neither sorting
into schools by parents nor sorting into classes by teachers explains the effects. We discuss several
possible mechanisms that cannot be fully excluded, and, thus could explain our findings. They are:
1) priors, 2) information about school quality, 3) parental investment, 4) practice and 5) learning
about one’s ability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the institutional
setting and the data. Section 3 sets out our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results on
short and long-term outcomes and discusses heterogeneous feedback effects by prior performance
and gender. Section 5 discusses the potential mechanisms. Section 6 discusses the threats to
identification and reports further robustness checks. In Section 7 we conclude and discuss policy
implications.
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2.2 Institutional Setting and Data
2.2.1 Institutional Setting
All universities in Greece are public and the Ministry of Education manages the admission
procedure. Access to tertiary education is based on the “admission grade”. The admission grade in
both regimes is a weighted average of the grades a student gets in the national exams (70% weight)
and the school grades (30% weight). National exams for specific subjects take place on specific
dates every year. The questions are the same for all students and the exams are externally marked.
The school grade for every subject is the average of the term grades. Only final-year students can
participate in the university admission procedure. All students are examined on five general or core
subjects, plus several “speciality” elective subjects chosen at the beginning of the twelfth year.
First, students take the final-year exams and then their admission grades are announced. Then
students apply by submitting to the Ministry of Education a list, in order of preference, of university
departments to which they would like to be admitted in that year. Admission is made to a specific
university department. The student’s ordering of university departments is crucial: once a student
gains admission to a university department in a higher place in his preference list, he cannot be
admitted to any departments below that position. This means that students have to be very careful
in constructing their preference list. The only way a student can avoid the university admission
procedure is by not submitting a list of preferences. Then, each department admits the best students
who have included this department in their preference list. All students are compared to each
other according to their admission grades and every successful candidate is admitted to the first
department in his list where there is an available place, and every student with a higher admission
grade has already been allocated. The rest of the students are denied admission for that year.
At the end of this process, every department announces the grade of the last student it ad-
mitted in that year. This grade is considered to be the “cut-off grade” in that year. More se-
lective/prestigious departments have higher cut-off grades and students are aware of the cut-off
grades of the previous years when they construct their preference lists. The ranking of university
departments according to their cut-off grades appears to stay largely unchanged, year after year,
and this represents the students’ evaluations for these departments.
The admission grade of a student in the non-feedback regime depends entirely on students’
performance in the twelfth grade.3 In the feedback regime, students’ performance in the eleventh
grade could take some weight (30%) in the calculation of the admission grade, but only if their
3It is a combination of the national exams (70%) and the school grades (30%).
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eleventh grade performance exceeds that of their final year exams.4 Again, the overall perfor-
mance of a student in each grade is a combination of the national exams (70%) and the school
grades (30%). The eleventh-grade material in not included/tested in the twelfth-grade exams. The
results of the penultimate-year exams are not used in any other way in the university admission
procedure. So, students have incentives to perform well in the eleventh-grade national exams, but
that performance is not sufficient to secure a specific university placement. Given that the number
of seats is pre-determined, a specific score will not guarantee admission to a specific university
department, because demand for that university department also comes into play.
2.2.2 How does feedback work?
Knowing one’s own relative performance might affect the amount of effort a student exerts with
regard to a certain objective. In the context of our study, the student’s objective is to maximize his
or her score and/or rank at the end of high school.
Consider a student in the treated group. In the world of this experiment, students compete with
each other over access to a limited number of university places. At the end of the penultimate
year, students take standardized exams in some subjects with external examiners and at least two
anonymous external graders per subject.
Then two mechanisms are in action. First, everyone’s results within the school become public
knowledge: the names and detailed grades are displayed at the entrance of every school. This
provides students with information about how well they can do given a specific level of effort,
when national exams come around again. This means that students could calculate their distance
from the school’s average score, and their relative position within their school. Second, the names,
details about national exam scores, and the cohort’s average national exam score are published in
the newspaper. This means that each student could calculate her distance from the national cohort’s
average score and derive her relative national rank.
We believe that students in the feedback regime calculate their eleventh grade rank within
the school and nationally given the importance of their performance in the senior year exams.
Knowing a student’s national rank provides them with information about the competition in that
year. Each year the newspaper reports the following: cohort’s average national exam score, the
cohort’s minimum and maximum score, the score that corresponds to each decile and comparisons
with last year’s statistics. For each student the following is reported: student’s first name, surname
and father’s name, score given by the first and the second examiners (Figure 2.3 and 2.4). This
is published separately for each subject. The score given by each examiner ranges from 0 to 100.
If the difference between the score given by the first and the second examiners is not greater than
13/100, then the final score is the average score between the scores given by the first and the second
4 In this case, the overall performance of a student in the twelfth grade takes a weight of 70% and the overall
performance of a student in the eleventh grade takes a weight of 30% in the calculation of the admission grade.
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examiners. Otherwise, the final score is the average between the highest two scores given by any
examiners. The raw final score used a 1-to-20 scale that we transformed into z-scores to facilitate
the interpretation of the results.
Students use this information to calculate their national rank. Given that the names are alpha-
betically sorted, calculating a student’s rank using even a single newspaper’s scores is already a
good indicator of a student’s national rank. Calculating the school rank is much easier given that
the average school cohort consists of 79 students.
Consider a student in the control group. During the penultimate year of senior high school,
he chooses an effort level to prepare for his exams, which are now given only at the school level.
Within the school, teachers coordinate to cover the same material, and usually give the same exam
questions. Before the summer break in the penultimate year, our student takes exams on the same
five subjects, and receives a written report from school with his own grades. When he reaches
twelfth grade, he has access to the same material, study guides and past exam papers as any student
in the treated group. However, he is unaware of how his schoolmates and his cohort did relative
to him in the penultimate year final exams. Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the variables
of interest across the two regimes. Some of the differences seem to be significantly different from
zero but they are either very small or economically non-meaningful. The exact timing is presented
in Figure 2.
2.2.3 Data Collection
To study the effect of disclosing rankings, we need a prior measure of performance that is
not affected by the feedback provision, i.e. students’ tenth-grade performance. Data on students’
performance in the tenth grade are not centrally collected5, and can only be found in the school
archives. We visited 134 senior high schools across the country and constructed a database of
student performance in every subject throughout senior high school. Our novel dataset combines
information from various sources:
1. We obtained administrative data from the Hellenic Ministry of Education regarding the per-
formance of all students in the twelfth-grade national exams from 2003 to 2009. This dataset
contains student level information about gender, national and school exam results in each
subject nationally examined in twelfth grade, the senior high school attended, year of birth,
graduation year from senior high school, and speciality subjects chosen at the beginning of
twelfth grade. It also contains university admission-related information, such as the uni-
versity department where each student gained admission, number of applications made to
university departments, and the reported ordinal preference position of the admitted univer-
sity department in the student’s preference list. The dataset refers to the period 2003-2009,
5The Ministry of Education collects data on students’ scores that are used in the calculation of the admission grade.
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and gives us information about 435,589 students.
2. Because the Ministry does not collect information on students’ tenth-grade performance, we
collected this information directly from the schools.6 More specifically, we have physically
visited and collected data from more than 147 public, experimental7 and private schools from
cities and the countryside. The final sample includes 134 schools which corresponds to 10
% of the school population. We exclude evening schools8 from our analysis because they
differ9 in many aspects from the other types of schools.10This dataset includes the follow-
ing information: year of birth, indicators for gender, indicators for class, graduation year,
school and/or national exam results in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth grade in all subjects,
speciality chosen at the beginning of the eleventh and twelfth grade and a unique, individual
student identification that stays the same throughout senior high school. We have had short
interviews with the principal of every school in our sample to find out about any effects po-
tentially affecting our outcomes of interest. Inter alia, principals were asked about the size
and history of the school, facilities, attrition and teacher quality.
We match the twelfth-grade, school-level data with the administrative data using the fol-
lowing combination of information: year of birth, gender, high school attended, graduation
year, speciality chosen at the beginning of twelfth grade, and school as well as national exam
scores in each subject examined at the national level. The matching between the dataset pro-
vided by the Ministry of Education and the school datasets was very satisfactory11 providing
us with a complete senior high-school performance history for 45,746 students, which is our
sample size.
6The tenth-grade performance data are recorded in each school’s archives either in their computers or in their
history books. In most schools the data for all the years were extracted from their computers. There were cases-
especially for the data referring to the first years of our sample period- where we photocopied pages from the history
books in schools’ storage area.
7Experimental schools are public schools where admission in these schools is based on a randomized lottery.
8Which are public schools that offer evening lessons in order to target employed students.
9University cut-offs differ for students graduating from evening schools compared to any other type of school.
Including these schools in the analysis provides similar results, only varying at the second decimal point. Contact
authors for further results
10We also exclude schools that had at least one year school cohort size smaller than ten students because these small
schools may be atypical in some dimensions. Results including those schools are very similar. Contact authors for
further results.
11 92 % of students were matched, with only 8 % missing due to the lack of values either in the school level data or
the administrative Ministry level data.
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3. We obtained average household income information for 2009 for every postcode in the coun-
try from the Ministry of Economy and Finance. We employ this as a proxy for neighborhood
income.
4. We obtained postcode data on urban density information from the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs. Urban areas are those with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
5. We obtained the Labor Force Survey data for the year 2003 from the National Statistical
Authority. We use quarterly data to create a variable that maps college occupations into
annual earnings.12 We do that if respondent’s reported education is in the same field as her
actual occupation in 2003. Respondents report their occupations with high precision.13 The
earnings data are grouped into ten bins indicating the ten national deciles with the highest
frequency. We use the lowest bound of each bin14 to construct a variable that measures
minimum expected annual earnings for each occupation.
Every school follows the same curriculum, and students are assigned to public schools based
on a school district system. This school district system assigns students to schools based on geo-
graphical distance. Students are alphabetically assigned to classes in tenth grade and do not change
class throughout senior high school. Moreover, teachers are allocated to public schools based on
geographical criteria and no quality criteria are taken into consideration in the process. Figure 1
presents the geographic position of each school included in the sample. The density of the school
population in Athens is 32%- thus, many of the schools in our sample are located in Athens.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the available variables in the sample in the twelfth
grade. The variable ”internal migration” takes the value one if the district of university department
to which the student is admitted is different from the district of residence; the latter being proxied
by the school district. Moreover, the variable “early enrollment” takes the value of one if the
student enrols in the first grade before the age of six.15Interestingly, on average, 82 % of students
gain admission to at least one university department. Given that there are no fixed cut-offs, if there
is not much demand for a particular university department, the cut-off grade in that year is very
low.
Table 2 reports the mean characteristics of the schools in our sample and the whole school pop-
ulation, and, thus , allows us to investigate whether our sample is representative. There are some
12 We also map college fields to occupations.
13209 classified occupations are reported and respondent have to indicate which one is closest to their actual occu-
pations.
14Multiplied by 12 months.
15 According to the law, this happens if the student is born in the first quarter of the calendar year.
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variables for which there is a statistically significant difference between the 134 sample schools and
the rest of the school population, and these differences are mainly related to the sampling methods
that we used.16 So, though the sample may not be fully representative of national responses, but it
nonetheless looks very similar.
2.2.4 Test Scores
Our prior measure of performance is based on the overall students’ performance in the tenth
grade (GPA). The tenth grade GPA takes into account students’ tenth grade performance in thirteen
subjects. The performance in each subject is a weighted average of the final school-exam result
and the performance of the student during the school year. Teachers receive guidance on how to
mark the final tenth-grade school exam and test scores are not curved. We use the within school
rank of each student based on the tenth grade GPA as a prior measure of performance.
Our main outcome variable is a student’s twelfth grade rank in two reference groups (the school
and nationally). These outcome variables -the within school and the national rank- take into ac-
count students’ twelfth grade performance in five core-education subjects. Students take exams
at the end of the twelfth grade in these core-education subjects. A student’s performance in these
five subjects is the most important determinant for the calculation of the high-school graduation
grade under both regimes. Before 2005, these five subjects were all examined at a national level.
From 2005 onwards, two subjects are examined at a national level whereas the other three subjects
are examined at a school level. This change in the number of subjects examined at a national
and school level happened in the same year as the abolition of feedback. We do various robustness
checks to examine if this change affects our results. In particular, we use various outcome variables
(the rank in each subject separately; the average rank in those subjects examined at the national
level; or the average rank in the five core-education subjects) and the estimated effects follow the
same patterns. We call the core-education subjects “incentivized”, because performance in these
subjects is taken into account in the calculation of the admission grade.
All schools in the sample offer three academic tracks in the twelfth grade. Each student has to
choose the academic track that is relevant to the post-secondary degree they desire to pursue. Each
track offers different subjects. Depending on the track students choose, they take national exams
in four track-specific subjects in both regimes 17 We do not include the test scores in these four
subjects in the main analysis because the choice of track is based on endogenous criteria, i.e.their
perceived differential ability or preferences for a particular degree after high school graduation.
16i.e. the share of schools in Athens in our sample is higher than the share of schools in Athens in the population.
Furthermore, the share of private schools in the sample is 4 % smaller than the share of private schools in the population
and the share of experimental schools in the sample is 4 % higher than the share of experimental schools in the
population.
17 These four subjects differ from the one track to the other. The Tracks are: Classics, Exact Science and Information
Technology.
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Robustness checks show that the results remain almost unchanged when the track-specific subjects
are taken into account.
In addition to the core-education subjects and the track-specific subjects, students take com-
pulsory within-school exams in three subjects (Sociology, Religion and Modern Greek Literature)
in both grades; eleventh and twelfth. Students take school exams at the end of the eleventh grade
and each student receives a report card. This report card shows each student’s own performance in
these exams without providing information about the class or school average score. In the twelfth
grade, students are examined again on these subjects without having previously received any rel-
ative performance information in these three subjects. We call these subjects “non-incentivized”
because students’ performance in these subjects is not taken into account in the calculation of the
university admission grade in any of the regimes. Students take these exams in both regimes. We
use these subjects as the main counterfactual group.
In our analysis, we use the rankings instead of absolute scores for a couple of reasons. First,
using the tenth-grade ranking allows us to make comparisons across cohorts and across schools.
Notice that we do not observe the different feedback policies in the same year. Thus, we use
the within-school rank of a student to compare students who are exposed to different peer groups
and teachers. Second, a given twelfth-grade national exam score does not represent the same
ability level in different years. However, it is important to make sure that students of the same
ability obtain the same rank in different years. The comparison of students’ absolute scores across
cohorts would be problematic, if the difficulty of the exam changes from one year to another.
Additionally, calculating the ranking of a student in each subject takes into account the potential
difference in the difficulty of the exam from one subject to another. Thus the ranking allows us
to compare a students’ performance across different subjects. Also note that any school grade
inflation that might occur in the tenth grade does not affect our prior performance measure (tenth
grade GPA). Grade inflation would make the teacher more lenient in the overall grading procedure,
which implies that the ranking of the students remains unaffected. The national exams in twelfth
grade are externally graded. As a result, the teacher in a student’s school has no way to affect their
national exam final scores. Furthermore, the national exam procedure does not receive any grade
curving.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
This section identifies the effect of relative performance information on students’ senior year
exam performance. First, we define our measures of rank. Second, we identify if there is an effect.
Because we use as an outcome variable the rank in the twelfth grade, the effect is -if anything- of
a distributional nature. Finally, we discuss the empirical method to identify the effect of feedback
on students’ relative final-year performance.
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2.3.1 Calculation of the rank
We use the following normalization in order to calculate our measure of prior performance that
allows comparisons of students in tenth grade across schools and cohorts:
Rank10isc =
nisc−1
Nsc−1
where nisc is the ordinal ranking of student i within school s in cohort c in tenth grade18 and
is increasing in GPA and N sc is the school cohort size of school s in cohort c. The higher the
Rank10isc, the higher the ranking of student i in tenth grade in his school s and cohort c. Moreover
Rank10isc is bounded between between 0 and 1, with the lowest ranked pupil in each school having
R10isc = 0. For example, in a school consisting of 100 students (Nsc = 100), the student with the
fifth highest GPA (nisc = 95) will have Rank10isc = 0.95 while the student with the first lowest
GPA will have (nisc = 5) so his rank will become Rank10isc = 0.05.
The ranks of the student within his school in the twelfth grade and nationwide are calculated
using the following normalisations:
Rank − school12isc = kisc−1Kcs−1
Rank − nationwide12ic = ric−1Rc−1
Where kisc is the ordinal ranking of student i in school s in cohort c in twelfth grade and is
increasing in the national exam grade. Kcs is the cohort size c in school s. The Rank− school12isc
is projected into the [0,1] interval and the lowest ranked pupil in each school cohort has Rank −
school12isc=0. Notice that there are five subjects, so we first find the ordinal rank of the student
based on the average in the five scores, and then we normalise it using the above formula . Rank−
nationwide12ic is calculated in a similar way but is independent of the school the student attends.
So both Rank− school12isc and Rank−nationwide12ic are calculated based on the twelfth grade
national exams in the incentivized subjects, but they measure relative performance in the school
and the country respectively. For example, in a cohort with 50,061 students (Rc=50,061), the
student with the tenth highest twelfth grade national exam score (ric=50,051) will have a national
rank of Rank − nationwide12ic=0.999. If the same student has 78 schoolmates (Kcs=79) and he
has the second highest score within his school in that cohort (kisc=77), then the school rank of this
student becomes Rank − school12isc=0.974.
2.3.2 Identifying the effect
Figure 3 shows the average rank nationwide of each performance group in the twelfth grade
exams, conditional on students’ prior performance. Cohorts up to 2005 have received the relative
18Based on the average of the thirteen subjects, ie.the tenth grade GPA.
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performance information. We observe that the lines are parallel in the treatment period (cohorts
2003, 2004 and 2005). This means that the time trends for each quintile of prior performance
follow a similar pattern from year to year. Identification is achieved through a difference approach
for each prior performance group. The 2006 cohort is the first cohort affected by the abolition of
the relative performance information. We observe that from 2005 to 2006 the slopes of the time
trends change, meaning that the treatment affected students in all performance groups considerably
except the middle quintile, which remained unchanged. In particular, the top quintile achieved a
higher average rank nationwide in the twelfth grade when feedback was provided compared to
the period after 2006. The opposite applies to the bottom quintile where students end up lower in
the distribution of twelfth grade rank when they are aware of their previous relative performance
compared to the period after 2006.
Another important observation is that the slopes remain relatively stable after 2006, which is
the first affected cohort. So, the change in the slope of the time trends between 2005 and 2006
can be attributed to the abolition of the relative performance information. We produce this figure
using students’ rank nationwide (Figure 3) and rank within the school (Figure 4). Their measures
on rank are derived using the average rank in the general or core subjects.
2.3.3 Method
We adapt two strategies to quantify the effect of feedback provision on future performance.
First, we use the following specification to estimate the effect of feedback information on
students’ later rank, conditional on their prior performance.
Rank − nationwide12ic = α + βquintileFeedbackc ∗Quintiles10isc + λquintileQuintiles10isc
+ψFeedbackc +X
′γ + ψc + φs + ic (1a)
Rank − school12isc = µ+ δquintileFeedbackc ∗Quintiles10isc + κquintileQuintiles10isc
+ξFeedbackc +X
′ζ + θc + ωisc (1b)
where Quintiles10isc is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the student is in the
corresponding quintile based on his tenth grade performance in his school. Moreover, Feedbackc
is a dummy variable equal to one if the student takes the eleventh grade national exam ie. if the
graduation year is smaller than 2006 (feedback regime). The parameter of interest β (δ) measures
the effect of feedback on student’s rank nationwide (within his school) in the subsequent year,
conditional on tenth grade performance. In some specifications, we control for unobserved time
and school invariant factors that may affect final year’s rank using time and school fixed effects.
We also control for students’ characteristics (X) like the age and the gender of the student. Specifi-
cation (1b) exploits within school variation, thus we use (1a) without the school fixed effects when
we are interested in exploiting across schools time invariant variation.
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In addition to the first strategy, we now use the following difference specification to find the
effect of feedback on each decile of students’ twelfth grade performance. We run the following
specifications for each decile of tenth grade performance θ ∈ [0, 1] :
Rank − nationwide12icθ = δθ + αθXi + βθDc + ψc + icθ (2a)
Rank − school12iscθ = ωθ + αθXi + γθDc + θc + uiscθ (2b)
where δθ captures a performance group-specific fixed effect. Dc is a feedback dummy that takes
the value one in the feedback regime and it takes the value zero in the non-feedback regime. The
parameter of interest β is estimated separately for each one of the ten deciles, including clusters
at the school level. A similar regression across all decile groups gives the pooled OLS estimator
of βθ which is exactly zero, because as we explained before, the provision of feedback has a zero
average effect. A negative coefficient of βθ orγθ implies that feedback induces a deterioration in
the rank nationwide or within his school for students at this decile.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Effect on performance
Main OLS results are reported in Table 4. The first column in Table 4 corresponds to the
basic specification (1a) without school and year fixed effects. The dummy for the third tenth grade
quintile is omitted as a point of comparison. This shows that when feedback is provided, a student
in the top quintile in his school has a 0.042 percentile rank gain in his twelfth grade national exam
performance compared to a student who is in the median quintile in his school, ceteris paribus.
Similarly, a student who receives feedback and is in the bottom quintile in his school has a 0.088
percentile rank loss in his twelfth grade national performance compared to a student in the median
quintile in his school. In columns 2 and 3, we see that the results of column 1 are robust when
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across schools and years respectively. Adding school and
year fixed effects slightly change the coefficients estimates, which remain statistically significant
at a 1 % significance level. In all specifications, we control for a set of pupil characteristics and we
cluster the standard errors at the school level.
In specification (1b) we exploit the within school variation and results are in Table 5. The
effect of feedback on students’ within school performance in the incentivized subjects is reported in
columns (1) and (2) and in the non-incentivized subjects in columns (3) and (4). In the first column,
we show that students in the top quintiles, 5 and 4, based on the tenth grade performance, benefit
from feedback. This gain is associated with 0.045 and 0.040 school percentile ranks respectively,
compared to the third quintile. Similarly, quintiles 2 and 1 (bottom ones) experience a loss of
0.038 and 0.079 school percentile ranks when feedback is provided. In column 2 we control for
unobserved heterogeneity across years and as we expect, results are similar to Table 4 column 3
when we controlled for unobserved heterogeneity across years and schools in the national analysis.
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We replicate the analysis using the school rank in the non-incentivized subjects as the outcome
variable. In columns 3 and 4 (Table 5), we find that the coefficients are not statistically significant
and there is no evidence that the provision of feedback affects students’ performance in these
subjects. What is important here is that students do not receive any social comparison information
regarding the non-incentivized subjects neither in the feedback regime nor in the non-feedback
regime. These results are also meaningful because they provide evidence that there are no spill-
over effects from the feedback towards the non-incentivized subjects. In other words, students do
not react to feedback by studying more or less for the school exams rather than the national exams.
These findings support that the effects on students’ final-year performance are generated by the
relative performance information that is provided in the eleventh grade.
We then run specification (2a) and in Figure 5 we plot the βθ coefficients of the rank nation-
wide and the associated 95 % confidence interval. We observe that receiving information about
someone’s relative performance has a negative effect for students below the 45th percentile and a
positive effect for students above it. At the highest two deciles, the curve is slightly decreasing
implying that there is a ceiling effect. In other words, there is some upper bound on how much
improvement feedback induces for the highest performing students. Thus, receiving relative per-
formance information the year before the university admission, high stake exams improves the
final-year rank nationwide of the high achieving students by up to 5 percentiles. By contrast, when
the relative performance information is provided then the final-year rank nationwide of the low
achieving students drops by up to 8 percentiles. In Figure 6, we report γθ coefficients and the asso-
ciated 95 % confidence interval, which shows the effect of feedback on the final-year rank within
the school (and not national rank as before). The estimated treatment effects on the final-year rank
within the school (in Figure 6) are very similar to the ones found before, when the national rank
was considered (in Figure 5). For schools above or below the average quality school a student’s
rank within the school differs from his rank nationally. However, on average (across all schools)
the school rank for each decile might not dramatically differ from the national rank given that the
school sample is a representative one in terms of many observed characteristics.
Figure 7 plots the treatment effect coefficients for the non-incentivized subjects that we use as
the main non-treated subjects and we explained previously in this section. In line with Table 5, we
find no evidence that providing feedback affects students’ performance in these subjects.
We then standardize the twelfth-grade scores in each year and school to give a zero mean and
a standard deviation of one. Then we run a specification similar to (2b), but the outcome variable
is the twelfth-grade standardized score of student i in school s in cohort c in each decile θ. We
run this regression for each decile of tenth-grade performance, and we plot the coefficient of the
feedback dummy Dc. The treatment effects line for each decile of prior performance is presented
in Figure 8. There, the gain for students above the 40th percentile is up to 0.15 standard deviations
while the performance of students who are below the 40th percentile drops by up to 0.3 standard
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deviations.
2.4.2 Gender
Next, we turn to the gender analysis. As literature on evaluating social programs has shown,
individuals respond differently to the same policy (Heckman 2001). To test whether boys and girls
react differently to the provision of feedback, we estimate the following regression:
Rank − nationwideic = δ + βFeedbackc ∗ Femalei + κFeedbackc
+λFemalei + αXi + µt + ic (3a)
Rank − schoolisc = δ + βFeedbackc ∗ Femalei + κFeedbackc
+λFemalei + αXi + µt + isc (3b)
where Xi includes the tenth grade GPA performance, a dummy for early enrollment in school
and dummies for the speciality chosen in the twelfth grade. OLS results are shown in Table 7.
Although girls outperform boys, girls end up in a lower rank on average when feedback is pro-
vided. This is the case for both; the rank nationwide and the rank within their school.19 Running
specification (2b)20 for boys and girls separately produces Figure 10, which presents the treatment
lines for boys (on the left) and girls (on the right).
For both genders, the effect of feedback is positive for high-achieving students and negative for
low-achieving students. We make two important points here: first, the average effect of feedback
is positive for boys’ final-year rank and negative for girls’ final-year rank, as shown by the hori-
zontal line, which is generated by a regression across all deciles (Figure 9). Second, the effects
of feedback are more pronounced for girls. As indicated by the steeper treatment line in Figure 9,
girls exhibit greater sensitivity to rankings.
Our evidence is consistent with the literature supporting a differential gender effect of feedback,
with females responding more to additional information. In an experimental context, McCarty
1986 shows that women and men may react differently in the absence of feedback information
because of different levels of self-confidence. Also using an experimental context, Franz, Frick,
and Hanslits 2009 argue that women never have the same level of self-confidence as men because
women expect less of themselves than men do. Our gender differential negative feedback effects
are consistent with the existing literature on gender specific perceptions regarding competition.
(Gneezy et al. 2003, Gneezy and Rustichini 2004). Among women and men of the same prior
performance, women are less effective than men when they take the competitive national exams.
19In Table 7, if we include school fixed effects in columns (3) and (4), we account for heterogeneity across schools
and the coefficient estimates become the same as in columns(1) and (2).
20(2a) gives results almost identical to (2b) for both genders.
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2.4.3 Long term outcomes
In this section we examine the effect of feedback provision on students’ long term outcomes.
Students who have not been admitted to their chosen university department may re-apply a year
(or more) after graduation using their school grades and re-taking national exams in all subjects.
Those students usually do not attend any school/college, or pursue any job, or do military service
after graduation and before the next admission period.
We use binary response models to examine whether the provision of feedback affects the de-
cision to retake the exam. In Table 8, we observe that a significant percentage out of the cohort
population repeats the exams one year after graduation from senior high school21.
We define as ”misplacement” the difference between the tenth grade rank each student achieves
within the school and the rank nationwide in the twelfth grade. Thus, the misplacement variable
is bounded between minus one and one. Students with larger differences between the tenth- and
twelfth- grade ranks would have a large change in their relative performance. The misplacement
variable takes the value zero for students whose twelfth-grade rank happens to correspond exactly
to the tenth-grade rank. But it can also take positive (negative) values if the student achieves a
better (worse) performance in the tenth grade relative to the twelfth.
To examine if feedback provision affects someone’s decision to retake the national exams
through the misplacement effect we run the following specification:
Retakei,t+1,s,d = a+X
′
itsdγ + δMisplacementitsdFeedbackt + βFeedbackt
+ωMisplacementitsd + ζZtd + ξs + ωt + itsd
The decision to retake the national exam one year after graduation depends also on the oppor-
tunity cost for the student. Thus, we control for the unemployment rate in each year t and district
d of student’s residence.
Using Linear Probability (LPM), Probit and Logit models we find that when feedback is pro-
vided, students with higher misplacement are more likely to repeat the national exams one year
after graduation. In Table 10, we interact dummies that capture the magnitude of misplacement
with the feedback dummy and we observe that students in the top misplacement quintile (5) are
more likely to retake the national exams when feedback is provided. The Top Misplacement Quin-
tile (5) is the most positive one and contains students who get a better rank in the tenth grade
compared to the twelfth. In the feedback years, these are the low achieving students. In other
21 The number of students retaking the exam is calculated using the Ministry of Education dataset. The data about
the labor force capacity are collected from the National Statistical Authority.
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words, low-achieving students are more likely to resit the national exams when feedback is pro-
vided. By contrast, high-achieving students are less likely to retake the exams when feedback is
provided.
Having a particular placement in university admission affects an individual’s employment and
earnings prospects. We examine whether feedback influences the matching of students to univer-
sity departments. We first rank all programs 22 according to their average cut-offs over the seven
years period. Each program’s cut-off reflects the demand for this particular university department,
with highly demanded programs exhibiting high cut-offs. Students apply 671 to programs based
on preferences, social status and expected earnings. There are programs in total. We estimate the
effect of feedback on the difference in the selectiveness position and rank of the program admitted
conditional on tenth grade performance. Figure 10 presents the treatment effect line for the selec-
tiveness position (on the left) and rank of the admitting program (on the right). The provision of
feedback has a positive effect on the selectiveness position and rank of the admitting program in
the upper half of the prior performance distribution, and a negative effect on the lower half. In par-
ticular, high-achieving students move up the university selectiveness ladder by 30 positions, which
is 0.15 of a standard deviation. When feedback is provided, low achieving students move down
the program selectiveness ladder by 35 positions which is 0.18 of a standard deviation. Different
placements in university admission induce different gains related to the returns to college.
Enrolling into a specific university department may affect students’ career paths and their life-
time earnings. Using Labor Force Survey data, we match salaries for each occupation to each
university department. In particular, we use the 2003 Labour Force Survey to map each college
major into the most related occupation and then into the expected annual earnings after graduation
(in Euros).23 We then use these figures as the expected earnings of current students after graduation
from the particular program. In Figure 11, we present the effect of feedback on the expected an-
nual earnings, conditional on the tenth grade performance. For students above the 50th percentile,
annual expected earnings increase by 250 Euros per year, which is equivalent to 0.17 of a standard
deviation. For students below the 50th percentile, the decline in their expected annual earnings
corresponds to 0.20 of a standard deviation.
2.4.4 Social Mobility
In this section, we examine if the provision of feedback changes the relationship between
parental income (proxied by neighborhood income) and post-secondary opportunities (indicated
by the program the student enrols in). A priori, we might expect that students coming from more
advantaged neighborhoods would have better chances of embarking on a better and more-selective
22By program we mean each combination of university department.
23Mean:12,758 with 1,473 standard deviation.
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program with higher expected returns than students coming from less-advantaged neighborhoods.
Could the provision of feedback affect this flow of students from high-income families to high-
expected-income programs? Providing relative performance information might have a different
effect on students whose parents have varying levels of income; the difference in the role feedback
plays may be related to other family resources (financial support or social networks) or students
from different income backgrounds might value the ranking information differently.
To investigate whether feedback has a differential effect on students from different income
backgrounds, we create quintiles based on the neighborhood income and the selectiveness of the
program admitted to. In Table 13 we report for each quintile of neighborhood income, the percent-
age of students who enroll into each quintile of programs by selectiveness, in the feedback and the
non-feedback regime. We then calculate the difference between the feedback and the non-feedback
percentage. In the last row of Table 13, we vertically add the percentages of students who enroll
in any program for each quintile of neighborhood income, to find the total difference of enrolled
students between the feedback and the non-feedback period. In the last column of Table 13, we
horizontally add the percentages of students who enroll in each quintile of programs. We do that
to examine if feedback provision affects the total percentage of students who enroll in higher ed-
ucation. We find that 2.2 % more students (83.7% Vs 81.5%) enroll in a program in the feedback
regime.
In Table 13, we find descriptive evidence that more students coming from the lowest-income
neighborhoods (Quintile1) enroll in any program when feedback is provided (2.2% more students).
A possible explanation is that low achieving students discover that if they do not exert more effort
they will not be admitted to any program in tertiary education. Or they might discover that they are
not worse than the low achieving students from high income neighborhoods and that they still have
a chance to enroll in university. So, they might decide to exert more effort. This may show that
feedback benefits students from low-income neighborhoods by reducing social inequalities and
possibly future income inequalities. On the other hand, high achieving students from low-income
neighborhoods discover in the eleventh grade that they are highly ranked on a national scale and
they might react by exerting more effort.
We also find descriptive evidence in Table 13, that feedback provision alters the parental income
(proxied by the neighborhood income) composition of students who are admitted into the top-
ranked programs (Quintile 5). More students from low income neighborhoods are admitted to the
most-selective programs that provide students with the highest expected earnings after graduation
(such as engineering and law), when feedback information is provided (2.9% Vs 2.6 %). This
implies that providing relative performance information encourages social elevation and improves
economic opportunity for these students.
It is crucial from a policy perspective to understand if providing feedback is beneficial for
the society as a whole. On one hand, high performing students are usually the ones responsible
85
for innovation and technological breakthroughs. The technological diffusion is beneficial for the
society as a whole, because technological innovation is one of the driving forces behind a country’s
economic prosperity and productivity advance (Nickell and Van Reenen (2001)). On the other
hand, our study shows that providing relative performance information improves the performance
of high-achieving students whereas low-achieving students perform even worse. This widening
of the performance gap caused by feedback may be translated into a wage gap later. We find
evidence to this direction using students expected wages. This might be detrimental especially for
low achieving students. An economist may be fond of the efficiency achieved though information
provision as high achieving students end up higher in the society and the spillover effects of the
technological advances to the whole society. Nevertheless, at the end of the day its up to the society
to decide whether efficiency can be traded for equality.
Additionally, our descriptive statistics evidence show that providing the relative performance
information may encourage students from low income families to enroll in university and espe-
cially to more selective programs. From this perspective, providing the relative performance infor-
mation encourages social elevation for students coming from low income neighborhoods. Thus,
feedback decreases the performance or income inequality between students coming from low and
high income neighborhoods.
2.5 Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss the most likely mechanisms that could explain our findings. Al-
though it is impossible to distinguish between students’ and parents’ reaction to the social compar-
ison information, we are able to rule out the possibility that teachers are driving the results. This is
because the national exams are externally marked and teachers have no way to affect these grades.
Neither students nor parents can select which school to attend, because this allocation is centrally
managed and is based on geographical criteria.24Additionally, teachers cannot allocate students to
classes in a way that facilitates sorting because it is prohibited by the law. Students are allocated
to classes based on alphabetical order and they cannot switch classes within the school. Teachers
have neither direct nor indirect financial incentives to react to the social comparison information.
Teachers’ compensation is not linked to teachers’ quality nor is it a function of school-based perfor-
mance: it is based on years of teaching experience and level of education attained. Also, schools’
financing is not affected by their students’ success in the national exams.
2.5.1 Mechanism 1: Priors- Positive Vs Negative Surprise
In this section, we examine whether students respond to the specific type of feedback that they
get. Students might not only compare themselves with their class, school or cohort but they may
also compare their own relative performance in different periods in time. We exploit within-school
24Parents have to submit an application to the local authority with proof of address
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variation in the 134 senior high schools and we restrict this part of the analysis to the feedback
years.
A recent paper by Azmat, Bagues, Cabrales, and Iriberri (2015) highlights the importance of
students’ priors, when evaluating the effects of feedback. The authors provide relative performance
information to university students, and that decreases their short-term performance. After conduct-
ing a survey, the authors find that students tend to be under-confident and the provision of feedback
only increases their self-reported satisfaction.
Although we do not observe students’ exact priors, we assume that their priors will be a func-
tion of their tenth-grade performance. In the feedback regime, students update their priors using
the eleventh-grade performance. If a student receives information that he is in a higher decile in
the eleventh grade than in the tenth grade, then the student receives a positive shock, that can be
translated into a “positive surprise”. On the other hand, if the student discovers that he is in a
lower decile in the eleventh grade than in the tenth grade, then this student receives a “negative
surprise”. Intuitively, students who receive a positive surprise in the eleventh grade might increase
their expectations of themselves and exert more effort in the twelfth grade, whereas they might
reduce their effort if they receive a negative surprise. In Figure 12, we graph the effect on the
twelfth-grade rank for each combination of deciles in tenth and eleventh grade.
The horizontal axis represents the eleventh-grade rank of students, and the vertical axis repre-
sents the tenth-grade rank. Different colours express different magnitudes of the treatment effects
on the twelfth-grade rank. The diagonal starting from zero towards the right upper edge of the
box, represents the case of ”no value feedback”: those students whose eleventh-grade percentile
rank equals their tenth-grade percentile rank. The treatment effect is positive for most students
experiencing a positive surprise. These are students who are on the right of the diagonal of ”no
value feedback”. On the left of the diagonal, feedback effects are mainly negative, meaning that
students’ twelfth grade rank declines when they receive a negative surprise.
A concern here is that students might not be aware of their tenth grade percentile rank, espe-
cially if they attend a school with more than one class. However, the analysis here uses deciles of
performance and not percentiles, allowing students to have priors that do not accurately express
their exact tenth grade rank.
2.5.2 Mechanism 2: School quality revelation
An alternative mechanism could be that students use the information obtained by the publica-
tion of their scores to infer the quality of their senior high school.25Students who take the eleventh
25We measure school quality based on the schools’ average national exam performance in the twelfth grade from
2003 to 2009. Then we construct a rank measure for school quality that varies from zero to one. The average quality
of the schools in our sample is 0.52 (sd 0.21, min, 0.018 and max. 0.985) which means that our school sample is of a
representative quality.
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grade national exams discover their school rank and their national rank, and the comparison of the
two ranks reveals information about the quality of the school. If a student discovers that his na-
tional rank is greater than the school rank then his school is of good quality. Conversely the school
is of lower quality if the national rank is lower than the school rank. The revelation of the school
quality in the eleventh grade might affect students’ choice of effort in the twelfth grade. Thus, we
exploit the across schools variation in quality to identify the effect of feedback on students’ rank
nationwide.
In Figure 13, we produce the treatment lines separately for students who discover that the
school they attend is worse (on the left) and better (on the right) than the average quality school.
In Figure 14, we repeat the same exercise and we produce these figures using the standardised
national exam score.26 The average effect for students who realise that they attend a worse-than-
average quality school is negative, whereas it is positive for those who realise that they attend a
better-than-average quality school.
Starting with the bottom of the prior performance distribution, we observe that low achieving
students in good schools do better that those in lower quality schools. Surprisingly, there is a
huge increase in the national rank for the top students in the worse schools and this increase even
offsets the increase in the national rank of the top students in good schools. There are two possible
explanations: first, high performing students in the low quality schools take the eleventh grade
national exams and when they receive feedback, they realise that they are actually exceptional on
a national scale. Thus they might decide to exert more effort in the next time period, so feedback
acts as a motivation boost for these students.
Second, the realisation of their national rank acts as a rude awakening for these students who
might initially have a wrong perception about the national competition and about their school’s
quality. These students might be the top students in their class or school but they now learn that
they are behind. In the next time period, they exert more effort to catch up with the national
standards.
If students realise the quality of the high school through the eleventh grade national exams,
then the response to the feedback would be more consistent across the school group. For example,
if students from all parts of the performance distribution in school X discover that their school is
of low quality and they are concerned with university admission, they might all exert more effort
to catch up with national standards.
2.5.3 Mechanism 3: Parental investment
Another possible mechanism is that parents decide to invest more or less in students based
on the eleventh grade results. Parents may start devoting more time helping the child with the
26 Standardised within each year with zero mean and a standard deviation of one.
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homework or they may invest in external support (such as supplementary material/books, private
tutors etc). It is true that there might be variation in family income within the school and the
neighborhood income represents the average income in each region. We observe considerable
differences in neighborhood income.27
In Figure 15, we draw the treatment lines for the bottom and the top quintile of neighbordhood
income. We run specification (2b) separately for the top and the bottom quintiles of neighborhood
income. This may not fully reflect the family income but we examine the effects of feedback across
regions by average reported income. A wealthy family may have the financial resources to invest
in the child and thus the student may improve his performance in the subsequent year exam. On
the other hand, families from low income neighborhoods may not be able to pay enough to fur-
ther support the student. In Figure 16, we observe that disclosing rankings increases the average
subsequent national rank for students coming from the highest-income neighborhoods. The aver-
age effect on the subsequent national rank for students from the lowest-income neighborhoods is
negative. In high-income neighborhoods the positive effects of feedback hold for students above
the 40th percentile while only students above the 60th percentile from low income neighborhoods
benefit from feedback. If parental investment was the only driver of the findings, then we would ex-
pect students from highest-income neighborhoods to improve at all parts of the prior-performance
distribution. That implies that there might be, to some extent, differential parental investment in
students by family income (proxied by neighborhood income) but that cannot fully generate our
results.
2.5.4 Mechanism 4: Practice
It could be argued that students can accurately place themselves within their class, even if they
are not explicitly informed about their rank. This is likely to occur due to repeated interactions
among classmates throughout high school. However, here students receive new information that
is broader. Consider the within school rank: students receive information about how well they
did within their school. In Figure 16, we report the treatment lines for students in schools of
different capacity in the eleventh grade. We make four broad categorisations. First, we consider
schools with only one class where it is likely that students already know their relative standing
and the social comparison information has no extra value (Panel A). Nevertheless, in a school
with only two classes students might know their relative performance in their class but not in the
whole school. Thus, we see that there is a small positive feedback effect on students who are
above the 40th percentile and a small negative effect on those below it (Panel B). Additionally,
the treatment lines become steeper when we consider schools with three classes (Panel C). In this
case, the information is much broader than that which students can collect from interaction with
27mean: 23,517 standard deviation: 8,609 min.:13,005 max.: 66,521
89
their classmates. This is even more pronounced when we look at students in schools with more
than three classes (Panel D). Summary statistics about the capacity of schools in our sample are
presented in Table 6. Figure 16 shows that the effect of feedback depends on whether the additional
information is actually informative about someone’s relative performance.
That could allay the concern that the eleventh grade national exam might provide students with
experience or training instead of information about their relative performance. School exams in the
eleventh grade have the same format as national exams in the eleventh grade and the past papers are
available in both regimes. Students practice on past questions and are aware of the structure and
the types of questions in both cases. If students were experienced from sitting the eleventh grade
national exams, then the experience or training effect would not vary by the size of the school. In
other words, if that was the mechanism then students in small schools would have no reason to
react differently than students in regular schools.
2.5.5 Mechanism 5: Learning about own ability
Another possibility is that students have imperfect information about their own ability and they
compare their own absolute score with the average school/cohort score to infer their own ability.
We adapt a theoretical model proposed by Ertac 2005.28 In the non-feedback regime, students in the
eleventh grade sit school exams and they receive information about their own absolute performance
only. In the feedback regime, they receive information about their own performance, but also about
the school and cohort average performances.
Students take exams in two time periods; the eleventh and the twelfth grade.
Period 1: This is the learning stage. The eleventh grade own performance provides students
with some information about their ability (and the easiness of the exam). This performance acts
as a private signal si for the student. In the feedback regime, students also observe the average
score in the school or nationwide s¯ = {s¯school, s¯cohort} which is the average signal in the school
and the country respectively. In the feedback regime student i may compare his own signal with
the average signal (in the school and/or in the cohort) and that may affect student’s perceived belief
about his own ability. That could, in turn, determine the amount of effort he decides to exert in the
second period. The amount of effort students decide to exert in the twelfth grade affects their final
year’s scores.
Period 2: Following the realisation of the signals, in the second period students choose the
effort to exert (ei). Students’ objective is to maximize the second period performance (qi) after
choosing the effort to exert. Assuming that the performance production is a linear function in
28Ertac 2005 presents a principal-multiple agents model where agents have imperfect information about their abili-
ties under multiple types of contracts. The model is also used by Azmat and Iriberri 2010. The natural experiment they
study gives students information about the average class grade, while here the social comparison information refers to
the average school and cohort grade.
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effort and that effort and ability are complements29 in the performance production function30 it
follows that: qi = eiαi. There is also a cost associated with the effort exerted that is c(ei) and is
increasing in effort and convex. 31 In the absence of the social comparison information students
receive only the private signal and they maximise:
uNF = E[pi(αi, ei)− c(ei)|si] = E[αi|si]ei − c(ei)
and the F.O.C simplifies to E[αi|si]− c′(eNF∗i ) = 0 (1)
In the feedback regime where social comparison information is provided the student observes
the average signal (which could be either the school average signal or the cohort average signal)
and maximises:
uF = E[pi(αi, ei)− c(ei)|si, s¯] = E[αi|si, s¯]ei − c(ei)
and the F.O.C simplifies to E[αi|si, s¯]− c′(eF∗i ) = 0 (2)
The proof can be found in the web appendix and it comes from the comparison of equations (1)
and (2). We also assume that the private signal is given by si = αi+cfori = 1, 2, ... and it depends
on student’s i ability level (αi) and a shock that is common to all students32 ie. the easiness of the
exam (c). Let us summarize now the main hypothesis about the effect of the eleventh grade social
comparison information on the twelfth grade performance.
Null Hypothesis: Students do not react to the social comparison information
That would suggest that students are not uncertain about their ability or that students have already
figured out their relative performance information and the explicit addition of it is redundant or
that the private signal that students get in the feedback regime equals the average signal.
Alternative Hypothesis: Positive effect for high ability students and negative effect for low
ability students
29 Notice here that there is no pass-fail scheme and students do not try to achieve a performance threshold. Uni-
versity cut-offs are determined endogenously based on demand and pre-specified supply of seats. In other words, the
model makes these predictions based on the fact that ability and effort are complements in the production function. In
a different setting where university cut-offs are pre-determined, effort and ability could be substitutes in the produc-
tion function. In that case, a student who is above average in the eleventh grade may choose to exert less effort in the
twelfth grade in order to achieve a specific performance threshold.
30 dqi
dαidei
> 0
31(c′(ei) > 0, c′′(ei) > 0, c′(0) = c′′(0) = 0)
32In the school or the cohort depending on the feedback or non-feedback regime.
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That would suggest that students will react differently to feedback. Based on the model, high
ability students will perform better when the social comparison information is provided. On the
other hand, low ability students will perform worse when the social comparison information is
provided. Our findings support the alternative hypothesis, implying that students whose eleventh
grade absolute score is above the school/cohort average score, might be encouraged by their rela-
tive performance and that makes them exert a higher amount of effort in the twelfth grade. On the
other hand, students who realise that they score below the school/cohort average might be discour-
aged by that and exert a lower amount of effort in the twelfth grade. This channel highlights the
importance of non-cognitive skills on educational outcomes and especially self-perception about
own ability and confidence. The importance of non-cognitive skills is well established in the lit-
erature (Brunello and Schlotter 2011, Heckman et al. 2006, Kautz, Heckman, Diris, Weel, and
Borghans 2014)
2.6 Threats to identification
Attrition
In our attempt to evaluate the impact of feedback on different performance groups, the problem
of attrition cannot be ignored. If attrition is random and affects different performance groups in
a similar way in both regimes, then the estimates remain unbiased. Differential attrition here
could arise because students from the lowest percentiles are more likely to drop out from school in
comparison to students from the highest percentiles, when they realise their relative performance.
What could bias our estimates, is if differential attrition follows the abolition of feedback.33 In
Figure 17, we observe that attrition rates differ for each quintile of prior performance but the
attrition rates following the abolition of feedback do not change dramatically compared to previous
years.
Notice here that students drop from our sample either because they drop out from school or
they move to a different school. The unique student code that identifies students across grades
within a school changes if the student switches to another school. We cannot follow students who
move to a different school.
Exploiting within school variation, we use the following specification to check for differential
attrition that changes with feedback:
Drop− out12−10isc = α + βquintileFeedbackc ∗Quintiles10isc + λquintileQuintiles10isc
+ψFeedbackc +X
′γ + θc + ϕs + isc
Table 11 reports OLS results. The attrition rate is larger for the lowest quintile than any other,
compared to the third quintile, when feedback is provided. But most importantly, none of the
33 The first affected cohort for which feedback is abolished is the cohort that was in the twelfth grade in 2006. Thus,
this cohort was in the tenth grade in 2004. This is the first cohort that did not sit national exams in the eleventh grade.
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coefficients of interest are statistically significant. This implies that there is differential attrition,
but it does not vary with feedback policies.
Robustness checks
In this section, we construct robustness exercises to complement our main analysis.
One concern might be that the change in the variation of performance over time is caused
by time trends and not the provision of ranks. Exploiting the within school variation 34, we run
specification (2b) but without pooling feedback and non-feedback years together. Instead, we just
compare every pair of consecutive years in the sample. We present the placebo treatment lines
in Figure 18. Panel A compares the cohort 2003 to the 2004, as if feedback was abolished in
2004. We find similar cohort behavior from 2003 to 2005 as the treatment lines are flat for these
pairs of years. The only pair of years that we expect to find a differential response of cohorts is
2005-2006 (the year of the reform). Panel C corresponds to the actual reform and we observe
that the treatment effects are negative for all percentiles below the 50th percentile and positive
above it. For every other pair of years, we expect to find similar cohort behaviour. We find no
evidence that other time specific factors could generate our results or drive ours results. Regarding
any policy anticipation effects, the reform was announced in December of 2003-2004. We find
very small treatment effects in Panel D, which is the first non-treated cohort. Students in the first
non-feedback cohort might observe how last year’s peers of similar tenth grade performance did
and use this information to slightly adjust their behavior. Again after 2007, the curve is almost flat
throughout the ability distribution implying a similar cohort behavior.
We conduct some other placebo exercises to verify that the effect does not depend on the num-
bers of subjects examined. In Figure 19, we draw the treatment lines for each subject separately.
Before 2005, students take national exams on five core or general subjects (Modern Greek, Math-
ematics, History, Biology and Physics). From 2005 onwards, two core subjects are examined at a
national level whereas the other three core subjects are examined at a school level. Students take
national exams on Modern Greek which is the only compulsory core subject in both regimes. In the
non-feedback regime, students choose the second core subject on which they take national exams
among the options of: Mathematics, History, Biology and Physics and they sit school exams on
the other three remaining subjects35. Panel D presents the feedback line in Modern Greek, which
is compulsory examined at a national level in both regimes. We observe that the treatment lines
follow a similar pattern for all subjects indicating that the number of subjects examined does not
drive our results.
In Table 1, we calculate the twelfth grade rank based on different subjects. In column (1) we
34very similar results if we exploit the across schools variation.
35Around 80% of students choose to take national exams on Mathematics together with the compulsory Modern
Greek subject. These students sit school exams on: History, Biology and Physics.
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find the effect of feedback on the final year rank that takes into account the Electives or Track
subjects on top of the core subjects36 and the results are very similar to those reported so far. In
column (2) we take into account the effect of feedback on students’ performance in Modern Greek
which is a common subject in both regimes and takes a special weight in the calculation of the
university admission grade. Notice, that in the non-feedback regime two subjects are examined
nationally and three within the school. In column (3) we calculate the twelfth year’s rank based on
the scores in the national exams: five subjects in the feedback regime and the two subjects in the
non-feedback regime. Results remain very similar. Feedback effects remain positive for the top
quintiles of prior performance, whereas it is negative for the bottom quintiles of prior performance.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the effects of providing information on a student’s rank on the
student’s short- and long-term outcomes. Knowing one’s rank may affect investment decisions
and, thus, later productivity. Following an unexpected policy change that took place in Greece, we
carried out a large-scale, primary data-collection process. Using unique, detailed data on students’
performance throughout senior high school and school quality data, we examine the effects of
receiving information about the relative performance of students within their own school and across
the nation.
We find that disclosing information on rankings has a positive effect on high-achieving stu-
dents’ short- and long- term outcomes. In particular, we find the following results for high-
achieving students: Feedback information improves their subsequent performance by 0.15 of a
standard deviation; they enroll into more selective university departments by 0.15 of a standard
deviation, and their expected annual earnings increase by 0.17 of a standard deviation. The effects
on low achieving students are negative: Their subsequent performance drops by 0.3 standard de-
viations; they are admitted to university departments which are less selective by 0.18 of a standard
deviation, and their expected annual earnings decrease by 0.20 of a standard deviation. We also
find that the results are more pronounced for females, indicating greater sensitivity to feedback.
Our results show that, absent feedback on rankings, high-achieving students are more likely to re-
take the exams. The resulting delay of the most-able students into university and/or labor market
is an important loss of human capital for society.
We also find suggestive evidence that feedback encourages students from low-income neigh-
borhoods to enroll in university and to study in more selective programs. This may, in the long
run, reduce income inequality.
We outline several potential mechanisms that may explain why students react to the provision
of feedback: 1) priors of students, 2) school quality revelation, 3) parental investment, 4) practice,
36Students sit national exams in four Elective subjects. So the overall rank in calculated based on nine subjects.
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and 5) learning about own ability. The last mechanism highlights the importance of non-cognitive
skills such as self-perception about one’s own ability and confidence.
Our findings have important policy implications. Providing rankings is a low-cost instrument
that has the potential to affect not only students’ high school performance but also labour market
outcomes. The relative nature of the above mentioned results restricts the broad implementation of
providing feedback, but makes it very important in a competitive process. If the social information
is provided and parents can choose the best school for their child, then the relative position of
the student among his school peers cannot be ignored. A crucial question concerns the social
information transparency and future research is needed to understand which mechanism drives the
effects. Our analysis highlights the importance of knowing one’s rank on high-stake exams in
influencing scholastic and labour market outcomes, and we believe that the rank could be a new
factor in the education production function.
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Figure 2.1: Map of schools in the sample
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Figure 2.2: Timing
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Figure 2.3: Announcement of results
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Figure 2.4: Announcement of school results-Zoom in
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Figure 2.5: Time trends for twelfth grade rank nationwide
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Figure 2.6: Time trends for twelfth grade rank within the school
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Figure 2.7: Treatment effects on the rank nationwide conditional on prior performance
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Figure 2.8: Treatment effects on the rank within the school in incentivized subjects conditional on
prior performance
41
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Figure 2.9: Treatment effects on the rank within the school in non-incentivized subjects conditional
on prior performance
42
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Figure 2.10: Treatment effects on the standardised score conditional on prior performance
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Figure 2.11: Treatment effects on the rank within the school by gender conditional on prior per-
formance
44
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Figure 2.12: Treatment effects on the selectiveness/prestigiousness position and rank of the pro-
gram admitted conditional on prior performance
45
107
Figure 2.13: Treatment effects on the annual expected earnings
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Figure 2.14: Positive and Negative Surprise
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Figure 2.15: Treatment effects on the rank nationwide by school quality conditional on prior per-
formance
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Figure 2.16: Treatment effects on the standardised score by school quality conditional on prior
performance
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Figure 2.17: Treatment effects on twelfth grade national rank for the bottom and top quintiles of
neighborhood income
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Figure 2.18: Treatment effects on the rank within the school conditional on prior performance for
schools of different capacity
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Figure 2.19: Drop out rates for each quintile of students’ prior performance
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Figure 2.20: Placebo Tests
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Figure 2.21: Feedback effects on twelfth grade rank for each subject separately
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics in twelfth grade
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Student Characteristics
Age 17.875 0.466 17 27
Early enrollment 0.167 0.373 0 1
Female 0.566 0.496 0 1
School cohort size 78.518 31.17 10 170
School GPA 85.930 10.186 49.44 100
National exam grade 62.843 19.362 7.550 98.857
Cohort size 63,186 8,710 50,061 71,796
Retake the national exam 0.115 0.319 0 1
Specialty Characteristics
Specialty:Classics 0.359 0.48 0 1
Specialty:Exact Sciences 0.164 0.371 0 1
Specialty:Information Technology 0.477 0.499 0 1
School Characteristics
Private School 0.039 0.193 0 1
Experimental School 0.061 0.24 0 1
Public School 0.9 0.3 0 1
Urban 0.973 0.161 0 1
logIncome(in 2009 Euro) 9.999 0.270 9.473 11.105
University Admission
Admitted 0.823 0.381 0 1
College district different 0.677 0.468 0 1
from school district
Number of university departments 8.293 10.543 1 242
Rank of admitted college 24.699 21.618 1 254
in preference list
Places in tertiary education 60,960 6,268 52,450 68,136
Note: 45,746 obs. 7 cohorts. The variable ”places in tertiary education” is calculated as the average
across admitted students.
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Table 2.2: Sample and Population
Sample Population
(134schools) (1189schools) Difference
Variable Mean Mean (b/s.e.)
Student Characteristics
Age 17.875 17.892 -0.017***
(0.003)
Early enrollment 0.167 0.167 -0.0004
(0.002)
Female 0.566 0.565 0.002
(0.003)
School cohort size 78.518 75.358 3.160***
(0.197)
Specialty: Classics 0.359 0.366 -0.007
(0.004)
Specialty: Exact Sciences 0.164 0.159 0.005
(0.002)*
Specialty: Information Techno- 0.477 0.475 0.002
logy (0.003)
School Characteristics
Private school 0.039 0.080 -0.041***
(0.001)
Public schools 0.900 0.901 -0.001
(0.002)
Experimental school 0.061 0.019 0.042***
(0.001)
Urban 0.973 0.892 0.082***
(0.002)
logIncome (in 2009Euro, annual) 9.999 9.938 0.060***
(0.001)
Note: 45,746 obs. in sample and 431,469 obs. in population. There are in total
1,323 senior high schools in operation. Evening schools are excluded from the
sample and the population.
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Table 2.3: Treatment and Control Group
Feedback No Feedback Difference
Variable Mean Mean (b/s.e.)
Student Characteristics
Age 17.835 17.909 0.074***
(0.004)
Early enrollment 0.209 0.129 -0.080***
(0.004)
Female 0.553 0.579 0.026***
(0.005)
School cohort size 88.083 70.030 18.053***
(0.288)
Specialty: Classics 0.344 0.377 0.033***
(0.004)
Specialty: Exact Sciences 0.176 0.154 -0.022***
(0.004)
Specialty: Information Techno- 0.480 0.469 -0.011**
logy (0.005)
School Characteristics
Private school 0.037 0.037 0.0003
(0.002)
Public schools 0.905 0.897 -0.008
(0.005)
Experimental school 0.058 0.066 0.007
(0.005)
Urban 0.972 0.974 0.002
(0.002)
logIncome (in 2009Euro,annual) 9.988 10.005 0.017***
(0.003)
Note: 21,965 obs. in treatment group and 23,781 obs. in control group. The
feedback period is the pooled period from 2003 to 2005 while the non-feedback
period consists of the pooled period from 2006 to 2009.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results: Rank nationwide
Dependent Variable: Rank nationwide in incentivized subjects
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Feedback*quintile5 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Feedback*quintile4 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Feedback*quintile2 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile1 -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.079***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Feedback 0.009*** 0.009 -0.001
(0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
quintile5 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.251***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
quintile4 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.102***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
quintile2 -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.093***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
quintile1 -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.192***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Early enrollment -0.006** -0.007** -0.006*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Specialty: Science 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Specialty: Classics -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log Income 0.055***
(0.003)
Experimental school 0.029***
(0.004)
Private school 0.145***
(0.004)
Urban 0.021***
(0.004)
Year FE. no no yes
School FE. no yes yes
Observations 45,746 45,746 45,746
R squared 0.635 0.666 0.675
No of schools 134 134 134
Note: A constant is also included. Clusters at school
level. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and
1% level respectively.
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Table 2.5: Rank within the school in incentivized and non-
incentivized subject
Dependent Variable: School Rank in incentivized and non-incentivized subjects
Incentivized subjects Non-Incentiv. subjects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback*quintile5 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Feedback*quintile4 0.040*** 0.040*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Feedback*quintile2 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Feedback*quintile1 -0.079*** -0.079*** 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Feedback 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
quintile5 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.256*** 0.256***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
quintile4 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.105***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
quintile2 -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.095***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
quintile1 -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.200***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Female -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Age -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Early enrollment -0.006* -0.006* 0.006 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Specialty: Science 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Specialty: Classics -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Log Income 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.007 0.007
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Experimental school -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Private school -0.003 -0.004 0.030 0.032
(0.003) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018)
Urban -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year FE. no yes no yes
Observations 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
R squared 0.674 0.675 0.542 0.543
No of schools 134 134 134 134
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school level. A constant is also included.
*,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results : Differential Response by Gender
Dependent Variable: Rank in twelfth grade
Rank within the school Rank nationwide
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female*Feedback -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Female 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Feedback 0.009*** 0.002 0.009 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Speciality in Science 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.196***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Speciality in Classics -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.040***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Age -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.060*** -0.060***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Early enrollment -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Income -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Private -0.015* -0.015* 0.134*** 0.134***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
Experimental -0.015** -0.015** 0.017 0.017
(0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018)
Urban -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16
N 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
Year FE X X
No of schools 134 134 134 134
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school level. A constant is also included.
*,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. The rank
in the twelfth grade here takes into account only the incentivized subjects. It is
calculated within the school for columns (1) and (2) and across schools in columns
(3) and (4)
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Table 2.7: Capacity of schools
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Schools with one class
Public 0.899 0.302 0 1
Private 0.101 0.301 0 1
Experimental 0 0 0 0
Urban 0.378 0.485 0 1
Class size 18.130 5.717 10 29
No of schools 14
No of students 522
Schools with two classes
Public 0.932 0.252 0 1
Private 0 0 0 0
Experimental 0.068 0.252 0 1
Urban 0.832 0.375 0 1
Class size 16.000 4.739 10 27
No of schools 38
No of students 3,709
Schools with three classes
Public 0.941 0.235 0 1
Private 0.053 0.223 0 1
Experimental 0.006 0.077 0 1
Urban 0.986 0.115 0 1
Class size 18.211 4.998 10 32
No of schools 63
No of students 9,959
Schools with three classes
Public 0.881 0.324 0 1
Private 0.035 0.184 0 1
Experimental 0.084 0.277 0 1
Urban 1 0 0 1
Class size 20.072 6.973 10 33
No of schools 74
No of students 26,354
Note: 111 senior high schools provided us with the eleventh and twelve grade classroom
information. The number of classes in a school may not be stable across years. Some
schools may expand and some others may shrink in some years.
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Table 2.8: Loss of labor force participants
Year Students Retaking Potential Impact on Labour Market
2003 7925 0.167%
2004 7223 0.150%
2005 6387 0.131%
2006 10421 0.213%
2007 6642 0.135%
2008 5730 0.116%
2009 4576 0.092%
2010 7680 0.153%
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Table 2.9: Decision to Retake and Feedback
Dependent Variable: Repeat the national exams
LPM Probit Logit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback* Misplace-
ment
0.058 0.059 0.345 0.602
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.092)*** (0.181)***
Feedback 0.012 0.019 0.070 0.131
(0.006)* (0.007)** (0.036)* (0.074)*
Misplacement -0.014 -0.015 -0.071 -0.099
(0.014) (0.015) (0.077) (0.142)
Age -0.014 -0.019 -0.076 -0.157
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.039)* (0.062)**
Early Enrolled -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.033
(0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.082)
Female -0.007 -0.007 -0.044 -0.073
(0.003)* (0.004)* (0.020)* (0.038)*
Specialization in Clas-
sics
-0.020 -0.018 -0.113 -0.200
(0.004)*** (0.007)* (0.024)*** (0.046)***
Specialization in Sci-
ence
0.013 0.016 0.090 0.169
(0.005)** (0.004)*** (0.026)*** (0.049)***
District Unemployment 0.005 0.002 0.025 0.046
(0.002)** (0.002) (0.012)* (0.019)**
If admitted in first place -0.212 -0.218 -1.041 -1.964
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.035)*** (0.070)***
Internal Migration 0.064 0.072 0.445 0.889
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.037)*** (0.077)***
logIncome -0.009
(0.011)
Urban 0.024
(0.013)*
Private -0.056
(0.007)**
Public -0.039
(0.009)***
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
Log likelihood -13,432 -13,439
School FE X X X
Year FE X X X X
N 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
Note: A constant is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the school
level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
125
Table 2.10: Decision to Retake, Feedback and Misplacement
Dependent Variable: Repeat the national exams
LPM Probit Logit
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Feedback -0.031 -0.002 -0.007 -0.017
(0.007)*** (0.008) (0.047) (0.090)
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 5 0.045 0.040 0.219 0.412
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.050)*** (0.095)***
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 4 0.023 0.023 0.120 0.231
(0.010)** (0.009)** (0.049)** (0.095)**
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 2 0.004 0.007 0.049 0.103
(0.010) (0.011) (0.054) (0.101)
Feedback* Misplacement Quintile 1 -0.034 -0.031 -0.151 -0.274
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.052)*** (0.098)***
Misplacement Quintile 5 -0.017 -0.018 -0.103 -0.184
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.038)*** (0.073)**
Misplacement Quintile 4 -0.025 -0.025 -0.139 -0.262
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.038)*** (0.072)***
Misplacement Quintile 2 0.017 0.016 0.076 0.143
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.039)* (0.073)**
Misplacement Quintile 1 0.030 0.031 0.148 0.273
(0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.043)*** (0.080)***
Female -0.010 -0.010 -0.056 -0.105
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.020)*** (0.037)***
Age 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.035) (0.067)
Early Enrolled 0.011 0.009 0.047 0.087
(0.008) (0.008) (0.041) (0.078)
Unemployment 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.020
(0.001)*** (0.002) (0.011) (0.021)
Internal migration -0.024 -0.022 -0.109 -0.211
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.038)*** (0.075)***
Specialization in Science -0.007 -0.004 -0.018 -0.036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.048)
Specialization in Classics -0.018 -0.017 -0.093 -0.175
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)*** (0.045)***
Private -0.087
(0.011)***
Public -0.040
(0.009)***
LogIncome -0.033
(0.008)***
Urban 0.006
(0.010)
R2 or pseudo-R squared 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
Log likelihood -14,062 -14,063
School FE X X X
Year FE X X X X
N 45,746 45,746 45,746 45,746
Note: A constant is also included. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Estimation results : Drop out
Dependent Variable: Dummy for drop out
Specifications
Variable (1) (2)
Feedback*quintile5 0.009 0.010
(0.007) (0.007)
Feedback*quintile4 0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Feedback*quintile2 0.009 0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Feedback*quintile1 0.013 0.014
(0.015) (0.016)
Feedback 0.017 0.041
(0.019) (0.033)
quintile5 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
quintile4 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
quintile2 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.006)
quintile1 0.153*** 0.153***
(0.003) (0.014)
Female -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.004)
Absences10 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Year FE. no yes
Observations 56,041 56,041
R squared 0.130 0.203
No of schools 134 134
Note: A constant is also included. Clusters at school
level. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 10%,5% and
1% level respectively. Quintiles are constructed based on
the school performance in tenth grade used.
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Table 2.13: Estimation results: Different outcome variables
Dependent Variable: Rank in twelfth grade
Specifications
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Feedback*quintile5 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.050***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile4 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile2 -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Feedback*quintile1 -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Feedback 0.002 0.008 -0.0004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile5 0.257*** 0.247*** 0.245***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile4 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.107***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile2 -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.091***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
quintile1 -0.207*** -0.231*** -0.210***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Female -0.019*** 0.030*** -0.014 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Early Enrollment 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Specialty: Science 0.006*** 0.019*** * 0.023***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Specialty: Classics 0.010*** 0.098*** -0.059
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 45,746 45,746 45,746
R squared 0.661 0.674 0.625
No of schools 134 134 134
Note: A constant is also included. The outcome in the first column is the rank calculated based
on the five core subjects and the four Track subjects. The outcome in the second column is the
rank in Modern Greek. The outcome variable in the third column is calculated based on five
subjects in the feedback regime and two subjects in the non-feedback regime. Standard errors
clustered at the school level. Year fixed effects included. Clusters at school level. *,**,***
denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN COLLEGE ENROLLMENT AND ACADEMIC MOBILITY
3.1 Introduction
In the recent years the literature on the role of social interactions in economic behavior has ex-
panded rapidly. This doesn’t come as surprise when one thinks the importance of those effects in
every day decision-making. The basis of decision-making though in almost every context is infor-
mation. Humans are social beings and we naturally collect information through social interactions
in order to inform our goals and choices. This is even more pronounced among adolescents. In de-
velopmental science, it has been widely argued that adolescents and young adults regularly mimic
the choices and behavior of role models in their environment (Bell (1970)).
Brock and Durlauf (2001) define social interactions as the idea that an individual’s marginal
utility with respect to other individuals’ choices in his reference group is positive. The desire to
conform induces prevalent patterns of behavior even among agents with heterogeneous tastes over
externalities from other individuals’ choices (Bernheim (1994)). Social interactions within a ref-
erence group have been shown to affect students’ achievement. However, there is little evidence
on the effect of social interactions on the decisions of college enrollment and academic mobility.
Moreover, social interactions can explain variation in choices across groups with similar character-
istics. For example, Schelling (1973) provide early evidence of social interactions in binary choice
in a profusion of contexts such as driving style and athletic play. Intuitively, conformity causes
social interactions to be interconnected with neighborhood effects. Physical proximity amplifies
the interplay of utility spillovers from other agents’ choices and the combined effect becomes area
specific. In an educational context, Garner and Raudenbush (1991) provide evidence of a positive
relation between neighborhood quality and educational attainment.
There is evidence that peers’ decision affect scholastic performance in elementary, middle and
high school but also during college. Hoxby (2000a) examines the effect of social interaction in
grade school and finds that students who were randomly assigned to classes with students who have
high reading scores relative to the school and grade, received higher reading scores. Hanushek,
Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2003) find that peer achievement has a positive effect on achieve-
ment growth. In particular, 0.1 standard deviation increase in peer average achievement leads to
a 0.02 increase in student’s performance. Zimmerman (2003b) examines the effect of social in-
teraction using freshmens’ SAT score. He finds strong positive social interaction effects among
roommates at almost all parts of the ability distribution. Cipollone and Alfonso (2007) find strong
social interactions inter alia the decision to stay longer in school. When men were exempted from
the compulsory military services -due to an earthquake- and stayed longer in school, the grad-
uation rates of young women in the affected areas rose by about 2 percentage points. Fletcher
(2006) using survey data, finds strong evidence of social interactions college preferences and col-
lege enrollment. Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2007) find that ones’ behavior influences the
educational decision while in college, indicating the importance of social interaction even at a later
stage of someone’s academic life. Sacerdote (2011) examines social interaction effects at the room
and accommodation level where students are randomly assigned. He does not find any significant
influence of peers.
In this paper we examine the effect of social interactions on the decisions of adolescents and
young adults regarding college enrollment and academic mobility. We use a new dataset from
Greece that contains information on exam scores, college enrollment and educational mobility for
every student in six cohorts. We exploit the particular institutional setting in Greece, in which
schools are build very close to each other. This setting allows for rich variation of school char-
acteristics within a relatively contained geographical area. We exploit this exogenous variation in
group characteristics over time and space to address the endogenous nature of the social interaction
groups. The social interaction effects are defined as contextual interactions that induce different
mappings from individual characteristics to outcomes (Bryk and Raudenbush (2001)). Reference
groups are viewed as ecologies in which the social backgrounds affect individual choices of other-
wise similar agents (Raudenbush and Sampson (1999)).
Similar age peers in one’s vicinity consist a natural reference group that provide valuable and
otherwise costly information, necessary in academic decision making. We widen the reference
group and examine social interactions with respect to a series of reference groups: same-cohort
school peers, different-cohort school peers, same-cohort peers in the neighborhood and different-
cohort peers in the neighborhood.
There are particular advantages in having the universe of high school graduates for a country.
First, we can observe the behaviour of all students regarding their education decisions and not only
of specific groups of students. Second, we are able to observe different reference groups. A student
may be affected by the decisions of same age or older peers in his school and neighborhood. We
contribute to the literature by comparing the size of the social interaction effects across distance in
space and age.
Empirical analysis of social interactions on students’ decisions has been open to question be-
cause of the difficulties in disentangling these effects from other confounding influences.1. We use
1 The existing literature that deals with identification of the social comparison effects use either laboratory exper-
iments (Armin and Andrea (2006)), natural experiments (Zimmerman (2003b)), quasi-experimental designs (Hoxby
(2000a)), or fixed effects (Hanushek et al. (2003)
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an instrumental variable approach and we exploit spatial and time variation to combat potential
endogeneity problems and the well known ”reflection-problem” (Manski (1993), Manski (2000)).
There are two sources of potential endogeneity: Self selection into social groups and common
shocks that affect every member of a social group. Reflection may arise from reverse causality be-
tween the outcomes of members in the same groups and their decisions are simultaneous. In other
words, it is difficult to disentangle if one’s actions are the cause or the effect of his peers’ influence.
These challenges are standard in the social interactions literature. The institutional setting behind
our study refrains students from endogenously select their peers in school, facilitating the validity
of the identification strategy. Moreover, the geographical density of schools allows us to define
social groups wider than a student’s schoolmates. Motivating from the idea of role modelship, we
battle the simultaneity challenge by investigating social interactions between peers in consecutive
cohorts.
By using multiple cohorts and conditioning on school and neighbourhood fixed effects as well
as school-and neighborhood- specific time trends we are able to control for unobserved time-
varying factors that might confound peer effects in schools and neighbourhoods. We use an in-
strumental variable approach to combat endogeneity and reflection. We show that within schools
and neighbourhoods, there is considerable cohort-to-cohort variation in the proportion of female
students that can be attributed to random factors.
We find positive spillover effects between one’s decision to enrol in college and that of their
peers. More specifically, the results found here indicate that students who attend a high school with
a hundred percent more schoolmates who enrol in college are 12.6 percent more likely to attend
college. We also find positive spillovers regarding the decision of educational mobility. Students
are 10.7 percent more likely to move to a different city to study if their older peers in school do so,
a hundred percent more often. We find that these externalities decrease with the size of reference
group.
The policy implications of social interactions can be indirect. The skills and resources that
characterise a reference group are usually fixed. As a consequence, an improvement in someone’s
group characteristics means an equivalent deterioration in someone else’s group attributes. Some
may argue that the redistribution in favor of disadvantaged students can act as a boost in their
scholastic outcomes, when the redistribution comes from more advantaged areas where students
might depend less on their peers’ quality. For example, Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005) suggest
that the existence of social interaction effects supports claims against school vouchers. This is
because, the best students leaving public schools can be detrimental to the students left behind.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the unique dataset used and the in-
stitutional setting related to college admission. The empirical strategy used to identify social in-
teractions is analysed in Section 3. We present and discuss the results in college enrollment and
educational mobility in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
133
3.2 Data and Institutional Setting
3.2.1 How are students admitted to college
The transition from high school to post-secondary education in Greece is based on an unusually
systematic and transparent allocation of student to university departments2 In particular, every
high school student who completes the twelfth grade receives an admission score, which is the
only criterion for university admission and weights: (i) her performance in national twelfth grade
exams 3 (ii) her grade twelve within school performance which is a combined score for homework
and midterm exams in each subject.
After receiving their admission scores, students are required to submit a list of ranked choices
of specific departments in universities that are relevant to their twelve grade track. For example,
students outside the Classics track cannot list Law schools. Each university department generally
offers one major of bachelor degree and no minor specializations can be declared. Every university
department admits a pre-specified number of students. A computerized system at the Ministry of
Education ranks students by their admission score and assigns the highest ranked student to her
preferred choice. It then moves to the next student and assigns her to the first department in her list
in which there is an available place, and so and so forth. In this context, students have incentives
to truthfully reveal their preferences.
University departments must enrol the students assigned to them by the Ministry of Education.
The Ministry of Education announces the score of the last admitted student in each university
department. The last admitted students in more prestigious departments have generally higher
scores in comparison to those in less prestigious ones. Once a student admitted they cannot transfer
to a different major. College education is completely publicly funded and every student is exempted
for college fees. Private donations to colleges are against the law.
3.2.2 Data
For the empirical analysis we construct a unique dataset of all students graduating from high
school in Greece from 2003 to 2009. We obtain the information from various sources:
1. Administrative data from the Hellenic Ministry of Education containing course taking infor-
mation and exam grades in the final year, gender, year of birth, graduation year and college
2Every tertiary education institute in Greece is public as free education is a constitutional right. Degrees awarded
by private colleges are not recognized by the state.
3The twelfth grade exams are written exams administered nationally only once every year and last from late May
to early June. The exams are proctored and marked externally. Exam markers do not observe the name, school, or even
the city of the student whose paper they grade. Students usually take six component exams, with a combination of
common subjects(Language, Mathematics, Physics, Biology or History) and four compulsory track-specific subjects
and one elective exam. There are three tracks: Classics, Natural Sciences and Technical Studies. The overall score is
the unweighted average of these scores. Students who fail are allowed to retake the exam the next year. In addition,
students are not allowed to take the national exams early.
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admission information. In addition, the total number of places in tertiary education in each
year is provided.
2. School specific information such as name of school, type of school (private, public4, exper-
imental5), geographical coordinates and name of prefecture it belongs to6. There are 1319
high schools in Greece7.
3. The Ministry of Finance provided us with average net income information at the postcode of
the school in 2009 Euro.
4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs provided us with urban density information. Urban areas
are those with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
5. Geographical coordinates for every tertiary education institute in Greece. There are fifty five
college campuses. Not all campuses offer the same majors.
The median distance of a school from each nearest neighbouring school is 0.32 miles.8 We
use cluster analysis to define and construct neighborhoods within a mile from each school. We
construct 406 clusters that cover the whole country. Every cluster is a neighborhood that contains
all twelve-grade students who attend any other high school within a mile (1.06 miles) radius from
one’s high school9. Figures 1 maps all high schools and tertiary education institutes in our dataset.
Our analysis uses information regarding characteristics and choices of older school peers. Be-
cause of this, we use data on student cohorts from 2004 to 200910 Furthermore, our discussion of
academic mobility refers to the decisions of students to move to a different prefecture in order to
study, given they were admitted to some college. Thus, for this part, we focus only on admitted
4Students are assigned to public schools according to a school district system
5Admission to experimental schools is based on a lottery
6There are fifty two prefectures in Greece. prefectures are classified by the Hellenic National Statistical Authority
7Of which, 112 are private, and 1207 public. Of those 1207 public schools, 23 are experimental. There are
no private experimental schools in Greece. 74 evening high schools for employed people of usually older age are
excluded from our analysis
8Mean of distance from nearest neighbour: 1.85 miles. Standard deviation: 18.37 miles. 25th percentile:0.07
miles. 75th percentile: 0.77 miles.
9We exploit the fact that many schools were built very close to each other in most urban settings in Greece. This
is more prevalent in Attica, the region surrounding the city of Athens, the capital of Greece. To give an example,
in the cartier of Grava in Athens, there are six high schools next to each other along with several elementary and
middle schools that form a humongous school building complex. According to the 2001 census, Attica holds around
36 percent of the total population.
10The first cohort in our sample, 2003 (size: 59,102 obs.), is used as a reference group for the 2004 cohort.
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students11. Lastly, we drop 35,808 obs. for which the group of schoolmates overlapped perfectly
with the social group of their neighborhood. This exclusion allows us to compare spillover effects
from social groups of various sizes. We consolidate our sample by dropping observations with
missing values.
Table 4.11 describes our pooled data across cohorts. Fifty seven percent are females. Ninety
percent of the students reside in urban areas. More than 90 % of schools are public. Although,
mean postcode income among private schools is significantly higher compared to public schools,
mean national exam score doesn’t seem to differ much. Experimental schools are in more affluent
areas in comparison to other public schools as revealed by their higher mean postcode income.
The mean national exam score of students attending experimental schools is much higher than the
score achieved by students in private or public schools. Each neighbourhood contains on average
4 schools and 929 student observations.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
We start off by defining one’s reference group as his same-cohort school peers. We investigate
the hypothesis that social or collective behaviour patterns drive individual preferences because
agents derive utility from conformity or provide access to information.
In particular, we investigate whether a student’s decision to enrol in college depends on the
decision of his peers in school by using the following regression:
IfEnrolledi,s,t = α + γIfEnrolledi−1,s,t + βXi,s,t + κTt + µSs + pisyear + ist(1)
where IfEnrolledi,s,t takes the value one if student i in school s and year t enrols into college
and IfEnrolledi−1,s,t is the fraction of all other students except of student i in school s and year
t, who enrol into college. So, we regress a student’s i decision to enrol in college on the mean
enrollment of his peers in school s in year t and other controls. Our covariates include a dummy
for being female, a student’s admission score, dummies for chosen track in the senior year of
high school, dummies for the school each student attended, school specific time trends and year
dummies. To control for time-varying unobserved factors that may be correlated with mean college
enrolment we include a full set of school-specific linear time trends.
The main coefficient of interest is γ, which captures how the mean enrollment of one’s school
peers affects his decision to enrol in college. Initially, we employ ordinary least squares to estimate
peer effects in education decisions. There are at least two sources of potential bias here: (1)
endogeneity and (2) the reflection problem (Manski (1993), Manski (2000)).
11In the academic mobility analysis we exclude 60,356 students who did not enrol in college
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Firstly, in many settings individuals self-select themselves into a specific group of peers that
generates endogeneity issues if the variables that are responsible for this choice are not fully ob-
servable. Students who choose to attend the same high schools might share the same observed
and unobserved characteristics. In this case, if we find a relationship between the observed char-
acteristics and the outcome variable it might not be causal. This could be coming from the fact
that unobserved characteristics might also affect the outcome variables. This potential unobserved
heterogeneity that drives selection into social groups may bias our estimates. Nevertheless, self
selection of students into schools is restricted in our setting because students are assigned to public
schools12 based on geographical criteria and they cannot choose their school peers endogenously,
by construction. Therefore, social group membership is as good as random, since it does not
depend on observables.
Endogeneity may also result from unobserved common group effects, such as teacher and
school quality, that affect every student in a social group and render the identification of social
interactions challenging. We contribute to the literature by mitigating the endogeneity challenge
that stems from common group shocks. We take advantage of a special institutional setting with
rich spatial and over time variation in school characteristics. We use cluster analysis to construct
geographical units wider than the school district; namely neighborhoods. Those geographical
units are big enough to allow for school diversity but also compact enough to capture common
behavioral patterns in the area. In particular, we exploit our special institutional setting to identify
same-cohort peers who do not attend the same school. We identify same-cohort peers who live
in 1 mile radius and attend different schools. We call this group of same-cohort peers who live
very close to each other ”neighbours”. In addition to their same-cohort schoolmates, students
are likely to interact with their same-cohort neighbours and they might also be affected by their
decisions. A students’ neighbours attend different schools and face different school environments.
In each neighbourhood, there are students who attend on average four different schools (Table 1).
The basic idea here is to compare students’ decisions from consecutive cohorts who have similar
characteristics and face the same neighbourhood environment but attend different school, except
for the fact that one cohort has more female students than the other. Thus, it becomes feasible to
isolate the impact of a peer group from the impact of each student’s school itself.
Second, reflection may arise because we cannot distinguish whether someone’s action is the
cause or the effect of his peers’ outcomes. In other words, one’s decision is simultaneous with
that of his peers. We battle the simultaneity challenge by using as an IV the time lagged gender
composition in the school and neighborhood level. So we compare the decisions of students from
consecutive cohorts who had more one-cohort-older peers in their school or neighbourhood who
enrolled in college. To build some intuition here, peers one-cohort-older might provide information
1292 % of students in our sample attend public or public experimental schools
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to younger peers about the costs and the benefits of attending college or migrating to another city
or they might function as ”role models”.
Estimating equation (1) using OLS will lead to biased results. In order to address these con-
cerns we propose the proportion of girls in someone’s reference group in the previous period as a
source of variation for mean enrollment in college. The intuition is that an individual’s academic
decision may be related with their gender, but not the gender composition of their environment.
This satisfies the exclusion restriction for the validity of our instrument.
We control for unobserved characteristics of schools, students and neighbors that are corre-
lated with the percentage of females that could also be correlated with students’ performance by
exploiting variation in the gender composition across consecutive years within the same school
and neighbourhood. By using multiple cohorts and controlling for school fixed effects, we take
into account unobserved factors that might invalidate the school and neighbourhood peer effects
analysis.
The first stage regressions are:
IfEnrolled−i,g,t = φ1 + κ1IfFemale−i,g,t + +β1Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + pi1gyear + e1,−i,g,t(2)
IfEnrolled−i,g,t−1 = φ2 + κ2IfFemale−i,g,t-1 + +β2Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + pi2gyear + e2,−i,g,t−1(3)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}}
where IfFemale−i,g,t and IfFemale−i,g,t−1 is the proportion of females in geographical unit
g (school and neighborhood) and year t and year t-1 respectively. The basic idea here is to compare
the collective decisions of students (to enrol in college and migrate to another city to pursue tertiary
education) from consecutive years who have similar characteristics but the percentage of female
peers varies from one year to another. Using the proportion of girls in someone’s last year’s refer-
ence group as an IV relies on the assumption that this proportion has no other effect on someone’s
decision to enrol in college than through its effect on last year’s mean college enrollment and thus
this year’s someone decision to enrol in college.
The second stage regressions are as follows:
IfEnrolledigt = δ1 + κ1IfEnrolled−i,g,t + ψ1Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + λ1gyear + 1ist(4)
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IfEnrolledigt = δ2 + κ2IfEnrolled−i,g,t-1 + ψ2Xi,g,t + Tt + Sg + λ2gyear + 2ist(5)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}}
Our key identifying assumption requires that changes in the proportion of female peers within a
school and within a neighborhood are not correlated with changes in unobserved factors that could
affect students’ decisions. In particular, it is required that changes in the proportion of females
within schools and neighbourhoods are not associated with changes in student characteristics ie.
age, ethnicity income, parental education. We also provide evidence that these changes in the
proportion of girls within a school and within a neighbourhood are not correlated with changes in
school enrolment.
Notice that we exploit within school and within neighbourhood variation from one cohort to
another. Our analysis does not look at differences in the percentage of females across schools or
neighbourhoods. Additionally, we look at the effect of one’s peers on their decision to enrol in
college and migrate to another city. To do this, we control for one’s performance in the senior year
national exams.
The fact that students are assigned to schools based on distance alleviates the concern that
students respond to these random shocks in gender composition by switching to another school.
Students need to provide adequate evidence of residence in a given region in order to have access
to the closest in terms of distance school. But even if students could switch schools, then it would
be very difficult to choose the destination school based on the percentage of girls in this school for
the following reason: the average percentage of female peers by school or neighbourhoods is not
publicly known. But even if it was known it would be difficult to know the percentage of females
for a cohort that enters the school in a specific year. Additionally, leaving a school should not be
correlated to the percentage of female students in this school. It is important to note that any factor
affecting the proportion of girls in all geographic units in the same way, such as a female fertility
decline 17 years before, will be captured by year fixed effects and would thus not invalidate the
identification strategy. We include school or neighbourhood fixed effects to control for school or
neighbourhood-invariant unobserved factors respectively. One could be worried that time-varying
factors ie. better teachers in some years or a new college in the neighbourhood could affect mean
enrolment. To address this concern, we include school- or neighbourhood-specific time trends to
control for time-varying factors that could be correlated with changes in the fraction of enrolled
students in one’s reference group.
Next, we turn to academic mobility. We believe that there might exist social interaction effects
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in the decision to migrate. We model a person’s decision to move to a different city in order to
pursue tertiary education, given that they were admitted to some college. This decision is a function
of the average decision in one’s environment as specified in our regression model:
IfMigrateigt = α1 + γ1IfMigrate−i,g,t + β1Xi,g,t + κ1Tt + µ1Ss + φ1gyear + 1ist(6)
IfMigrateigt = α2 + γ2IfMigrate−i,g,t−1 + β2Xi,g,t + κ2Tt + µ2Ss + φ2gyear + 2ist(7)
where IfMigrateigt is the decision of student i in geographical unit g and year t and t-1 re-
spectively to migrate in a different city in order to study, conditional on being accepted to college.
IfMigrate−i,g,t and IfMigrate−i,g,t−1 are the fractions of students except of student i who mi-
grated to a different city in order to study in geographical unit g and year t and t-1 respectively.
We include year fixed effects in order to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that
could affect the migration decision. When we exploit the within school cohort-to-cohort change
in the percentage of female students, we include school fixed effects. When we do the analysis at
the neighborhood level, we include neighborhood fixed effects and we exploit the differences in
school characteristics in a given year within each neighborhood.
We use an instrumental variable approach in order to estimate the effect of social interaction
on the decision of students to move to another city to attend college. Again gender composition
seems a likely candidate for an instrumental variable. The proportion of females in a geographical
unit g may create an environment more conducive to collective migration as exhibited by average
patterns of behavior but it has no direct effect on an individual’s decision to migrate.
The first stage regressions is as follows:
IfMigrate−i,g,t = φ+ κIfFemale−i,g,t + βXi,g,t + κTt + µSg + ei,g,t(8)
IfMigrate−i,g,t = φ+ κIfFemale−i,g,t−1 + βXi,g,t + κTt + µSg + ei,g,t(9)
g ∈ {{school}, {neighborhood}}
Our main specifications are estimated at the neighborhood level. When estimated at the geo-
graphical units of neighborhood, these specifications address both the endogeneity and simultane-
ity issues.
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Potential threats to our analysis may include the following: Actual networks may be very
different from ecologies in one’s vicinity. In addition, social media may allow for peer effects that
are independent of proximity and render our analysis of spatial social interactions irrelevant. This
is less of a fear though as internet penetration is relatively low in Greece 13. Parents, relatives and
much older individuals in a student’s environment may influence his/her academic decisions more
than his/her same-cohort or one year older peers within his school and/or within his neighborhood
.
3.4 Validity of Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy requires that fluctuations in the proportion of female students within
a school and within a neighborhood should not be correlated with other cohort-to-cohort changes
that could affect students’ education decisions. In particular, we check if changes in the propor-
tion of female students within a school and within a neighborhood are correlated with changes in
students’ observable characteristics. For the universe of students (N=355,808 students) the only
characteristics we know are: the age of students and if a student enrolled early in school. This is
the case if a student is born in the first quarter of his birth year.
However for a smaller sample of 45 schools (observations=18,670 )we also know the ethnicity
of students. In Table 3.4 , we present some evidence that the schools in the smaller sample have
no different characteristics compared to the whole population. We cannot implement the whole
analysis based on this smaller sample because we need the universe of students and schools in
order to construct the neighbourhoods and exploit within neighbourhood variation. We use this
smaller sample of schools to check if changes in the proportion of girls are correlated with changes
in students’ ethnicity.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide evidence on the balancing tests for the whole sample and the sub-
sample of the 45 schools. Table 3.2 reports the estimated coefficients from the OLS regression and
a within school regression (school fixed effects) of students’ characteristics on the proportion of
females in each school. We also report the estimated coefficients from a within school regression
with school specific time trends (columns (3) and (6). Table 3.3 reports the estimated coefficients
from the within neighbourhood regression (neighborhood fixed effects) with and without adding
neighbourhood linear time trends. Again the OLS estimates are reported as a point of comparison.
As we notice from these two tables, the proportion of females is not related to most of the
students’ characteristics, both in the OLS and the within school/ neighborhood regressions. There
are some exceptions in the OLS and within school regression. In particular, the proportion of fe-
males within a school seems to be negatively correlated with the proportion of students with Polish
13This is more understandable when one takes into account that Greece has 227 inhabited islands, most of which are
quite far from the mainland and have outdated telecommunications infrastructure (Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou
(EOT), ”Greek islands”, April 2012).
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and Bulgarian origin, however these correlations are reduced and become statistically insignificant
when we add school linear time trends. Within neighbourhoods we find no association between
the proportion of females within a neighborhood and students’ observed characteristics. All the
regressions include year fixed effects. These results suggest that cohort-to-cohort changes in the
proportion of female students within a school and within a neighborhood seem to be uncorrelated
with changes in students’ observed characteristics.
We also examine whether changes in the proportion of female students within a school and
within a neighborhood are related to changes in the logarithm of school enrollment. As reported in
the first row of Table 3.2 there seem to be a negative association between changes in the proportion
of females within a school and changes in the logarithm of school enrolment. Both, the OLS
and within school regressions produce negative and statistically significant at 10% coefficients.
However, this correlation largely reduces and becomes insignificant when school specific time
trends are added.
One could still have concerns that students might react to the unpredicted changes in gender
compositions. Although students are assigned to schools based on geographical characteristics
and it is not easy to switch school, one could still be worried that students might drop out from or
switch to another school after being exposed to this information. For example, students who are
in schools where the proportion of girls is high/low could drop out. Or transfers of students could
be observed that might be correlated to the observed proportion of females in a given school. We
address this concern by looking at the correlation between the proportion of female students in a
school and the probability that a student drops out from or switch to another school in that year.
We use the smaller sample of schools because only for these schools we have data for multiple
years and we can identify students who drop out and transfers.
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the student drops out
from school or if the student is transferred to this school at the beginning of the school year. Table
5 reports the outcome means and the regression estimates separately for boys and girls. The first
row in each panel indicates that students’ mobility from and to a school in low. Approximately
8% of boys and girls drop out from school in the twelfth grade and around 6-8% of boys and girls
respectively transfer to another school at the beginning of the twelfth grade. The second row in
each panel reports the regression estimates when school linear trends as well as school and time
fixed effects are added. All estimates are small and statistically insignificant. Overall, changes in
the proportion of females within a school seem to be uncorrelated with students’ mobility across
schools and drop out rates.
3.5 Results and Discussion
Table 3.6 shows the linear probability model estimates for the decision to enrol in college.
Columns (1) and (2) report the effects of the proportion of enrolled students in year t on a student’s
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decision to enrol in college in year t. Columns (3) and (4) report the effects of the proportion
of enrolled students in year t-1 on a student’s decision to enrol in college in year t. Each cell in
the first and second row in Table 3.6 shows the estimated coefficient from a separate regression.
The estimates presented are based on four different specifications. All specifications include track
and year fixed effects. Columns (1) and (3) include school fixed effects and school specific linear
trends. Columns (2) and (4) include neighbourhood and neighbourhood specific linear trends. In
all specifications we control for a student’s gender and admission score. We also include a dummy
for students who were born in the first quarter of each year, following Angrist and Krueger (1992),
who found significant differences in school outcomes for those students.
The coefficients of interest are positive in year t and statistically significant, revealing strong
positive externalities at all levels. An increase of a hundred percent in the proportion of same-age
school peers who enrol in college increases one’s probability of enrol in college by 8.6 percent,
ceteris paribus. This effect decreases at the neighborhood level. In particular, an increase of a
hundred percent in the proportion of same-age neighbours who enrol in college increases one’s
probability of enrol in college by 4.3 percent, ceteris paribus. Coefficients of interest are negative
for year t-1 and not very precise.
However, OLS estimates are likely to be bias due to endogeneity issues and the reflection
problem. To address these but also further potential unobserved heterogeneity issues, we employ
the novel identification strategy of relying on variation in gender composition to explain differences
in mean college enrollment in school and neighborhood level. We use an instrumental variable
approach to explore social interactions in space and time. Our instrument, gender composition, is
likely to affect mean college enrollment since female-heavy school environments are found to be
less disruptive and less violent (Lavy and Schlosser (2011)).
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report first and second stage estimates, respectively. Both tables distinguish
between social interactions among same-age peers and one-cohort-older peers. Each cell in the
first and second row in Table 3.7 shows the estimated coefficient from a separate regression. In our
setup, the proportion of girls is a strong predictor of mean enrollment as all first stage estimates are
positive and statistically significant at 1%. As we observe in Table 3.7, our instrument is a better
predictor of mean enrollment at the school rather than the neighborhood level. In particular, an
increase of a hundred percent in the proportion of same-age girls within a school increases mean
enrollment by 13.3 % whereas an increase of a hundred percent in the proportion of same-age
girls within a neighborhood increases mean enrollment by 8.5%. When we consider last year’s
proportion of girls then the coefficient of interest declines. In particular, a 100% increase in the
percentage of girls in the previous cohort within a school increases this year’s mean enrollment by
12.3 %. Furthermore, mean college enrollement within a neighborhood increases by 10.2% if the
percentage of girls in the previous year increases by 100%.
Moreover, the model is just identified as we have one instrumental variable and one endogenous
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variable. Stock and Yogo (2002) characterize instruments to be weak not only if they lead to biased
IV results but also if hypothesis tests of IV parameters suffer from considerable size distortions.
They propose values of the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic for which a
Wald test at the 5 percent level will have an actual rejection rate of less than 10 percent. In our
case the critical value is 16.38 which is always below the first stage Cragg-Donald statistic we
find for the school and neighborhood regressions regarding college enrollment (32.01 and 34.09
respectively) and academic mobility (582.42, 2,849 for the school and neighborhood respectively).
So we do not face a weak instrument problem.
Our second stage estimates suggest positive social interactions in education decisions through
space and time, with the size of the effect depending on the size of the reference group. Each cell
in the first and second row in Table 3.8 shows the estimated coefficient from a separate regression.
In Table 3.8, we observe that a hundred percent increase in the proportion of students who enrol in
college within one’s school in a given year, increases a student’s probability to enrol in college by
12.6 % in the same year. Similarly, a student is 7% more likely to enrol in college in a given year if
the proportion of students who enrol in college in his neighborhood increases by a hundred percent
in that year. We find positive and significant spillover effects among peers in consecutive cohorts.
Intuitively, social interactions among students of consecutive cohorts are important, as older peers
may function as role models or may provide access to information. We find that a hundred percent
increase in the proportion of students attending college within one’s school or within one’s neigh-
borhood a year before, increases his probability of enrolling in college by 29.1% or 9.6 % percent
respectively. Year and track fixed effects are included in all specification. When we exploit within
school variation, we control for school fixed effects and school specific time trends. When we
use within neighborhood variation, we control for neighborhood and neighborhood specific time
trends.
Moreover, we explore social interactions in the decision to study in a different city. Educational
mobility is found in the literature to be greatly affected by social norms, labor market structure and
income (Tremblay (2005)). We focus on those students who enrol in college between 2004 and
2009 (sample size: 355,808). Our models include controls for school or neighbourhood, year and
area unobserved time-invariant characteristics. We begin our analysis by estimating specifications
(6) and (7) using standard OLS. Our estimates reveal positive social interactions among same-
cohort peers and smaller positive externalities coming from students in the previous cohort. Table
3.10 reports the effects of the proportions of migrated students on the decision to migrate of same-
cohort or one-cohort-older students.
The linear probability model coefficients are biased due to reflection and endogeneity and they
show a negative relationship between mean migration and a student’s decision to migrate to an-
other city. Thus we use the proportion of female peers in one’s reference group as an instrumental
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variable. Table 3.11 reports first stage estimates. Each column is coming from a separate regres-
sion. All coefficients of interest are positive and statistically significant. Again the percentage of
female students is a better predictor for the mean migration within a school rather than within a
neighbourhood. Ou first stage estimates suggest that changes in the percentage of female peers
have significant effects on mean migration in school and neighbourhood among same-cohort stu-
dents but also in consecutive cohorts. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) are higher than the
estimates in columns (3 and (4) respectively implying that the effects are stronger in year t rather
than t-1.
Our second stage estimates are reported in Table 3.9. Each column in based on a separate
regression. The coefficients of interest are all positive. Our findings suggest significant positive
externalities among same-cohort students but significant and smaller positive externalities among
students in consecutive cohorts.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated the effects of social interactions on a student’s education de-
cisions of college enrollment and academic mobility. Despite the vast literature on the topic, two
crucial identification challenges remain: common correlated group effects and simultaneity.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we propose a new approach in alleviating
challenges in identifying spillover effects by using time lagged group characteristics. Second, we
provide evidence on social interactions using a special institutional setting that allows for spatial
variation of group characteristics. So far, the existing literature on social interactions has focused
almost exclusively on scholastic performance. The only exemptions to our knowledge are Sac-
erdote (2011) who identify the effect of social interactions on drinking, drug use, and criminal
behavior and Giorgi et al. (2007) who finds significant effects on the choice of college major.
When social interactions are not taken into account, educational treatments may result in mis-
allocation of resources and may fall short of policy goals. Our results aim to inform public policies
that target ability mismatch.
We employ instrumental variable techniques to estimate utility linkages at different space and
time levels. We battle the reflection problem and the endogeneity issues by using time lagged
school and neighborhood student gender compostion as an instrument. Using repeated cross-
sectional data, we exploit within-school and within-neighborhood cohort-to-cohort variation to
examine the effect of random changes in gender composition on mean college enrollment. Then
we look at the effect on a student’s decision to enrol in college.
We find that the choices of a student’s peers affect their decision to enrol in college and mi-
grate to another city to pursue tertiary education. We use a novel dataset from Greece that contains
the universe of high school graduates from 2004 to 2009. We focus our analysis on four refer-
ence groups: same-cohort peers in school, one-cohort-older peers in school, same-cohort peers in
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neighbourhood and one-cohort-older peers in neighbourhood.
Our evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals derive utility from conformity or have
access to information, with the size of the externality decreasing in space distance. Our results
show that one is more likely to enrol in college and move to another city to pursue post secondary
education when many of his peers make the same choices. A hundred percent increase in the
percentage of one-cohort-older peers within a school and within a neighborhood who enrolled in
college increases a student’s probability of college enrollment by 29.1 and 9.6 percent, respectively.
In addition, a hundred percent increase in the percentage of same-cohort students who enrol in
college within a school and within a neighborhood increases one’s own probability to enrol in
college by 12.6 and 7 percent respectively.
While our paper has examined several important determinants of college enrollment and mi-
gration decision, several avenues of future research remain. Understanding the mechanism that
underlies social interactions is the next big question in the literature. Future research could push
forward the front of understanding the mechanism that underlies social interactions.
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Figure 3.1: Map of schools
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Individual Level
First quarter of birth 0.16 0.368 0 1 355,808
Female 0.567 0.495 0 1 355,808
National Exams Score 13.16 4.062 0.52 19.95 355,808
If enrolled 0.812 0.391 0 1 355,808
Mobile students 0.748 0.434 0 1 260,472
Specialty in Classics 0.365 0.481 0 1 355,808
Specialty in Natural Science 0.154 0.361 0 1 355,808
Specialty in Technical Studies 0.484 0.5 0 1 355,808
Postcode Income (Euro, 2009) 29,464 8,441 9,573 122,879 355,808
Aggregate Enrollment 60,206 6,372 52,450 68,136 355,808
Panel B: School Level
Private 0.081 0.266 0 1 1,319
Income if private (Euro, 2009) 30,575 18,378 16,085 122,879 1,319
National score if private 13.69 2.70 4.7 17.34 1,319
Experimental 0.022 0.149 0 1 1,319
Income if experimental (Euro, 2009) 29,754 14,775 17,583 74,798 1,319
National score if experimental 14.40 1.00 12.23 16.17 1,319
Public 0.89 0.31 0 1 1,319
Income if public (Euro, 2009) 19,327 5,565 9,573 74,798 1,319
National score if public 12.26 1.56 2.97 16.36 1,319
Urban 0.898 0.301 0 1 1,319
Distance to nearest college 10.871 24.083 0.105 1095.452 1,319
campus(in miles)
No of students in each school 46 34 0.16 179 1,319
Panel C: Neighborhood Level
No of schools in each neighborhood 4.449 5.014 2 35 250
No of students in each neighborhood 929.291 1,246.298 8 10,559 250
Note: Data span six cohorts 2004-2009 of 60.119 students on average. Number of schools: 1319.
Among those 413 high schools are in Athens or the surrounding suburbs. The national exam score
ranges from 0 to 20. Mobile students are those who move to a different city in order to study.
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Table 3.2: BALANCING TESTS FOR PROP. OF FEMALES WITHIN SCHOOL
WHOLE SAMPLE SMALLER SAMPLE
OLS School FE School FE OLS School FE School FE
+school linear +school linear
time trends time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logEnrollment -0.075 -0.074 0.004 -0.125 -0.125 0.006
(0.036)* (0.036)* (0.024) (0.053)* (0.054)* (0.048)
EarlyEnrollment -0.002 0.005 0.0009 -0.003 -0.006 0.0010
(0.019) (0.019) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001)
Age -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
Ethnicity
Greece 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Albany 0.004 0.004 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Bulgaria -0.060 -0.060 -0.033
(0.027)* (0.027)* (0.022)
Italy -0.010 -0.010 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006)
Russia -0.012 -0.012 0.011
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017)
Poland -0.054 -0.054 -0.022
(0.024)* (0.024)* (0.019)
Ukraine -0.003 -0.003 0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
N 355,808 355,808 355,808 18,670 18,670 18,670
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the school level. A constant is also included. *,**,*** denotes
significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. The table reports OLS and school fixed effects
estimates from separate regressions. Columns (3) and (6) report school fixed effects estimates having
added school linear time trends. Year dummies are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.3: BALANCING TESTS FOR PROP. OF FEMALES IN NEIGHBOURHOOD
WHOLE SAMPLE SMALLER SAMPLE
OLS neighb. FE neighb. FE+ OLS neighb.FE neighb. FE+
neighb. linear neighb. linear
time trends time trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logEnrollment -0.081 -0.080 0.002 -0.089 -0.089 0.003
(0.048) (0.050) (0.035) (0.050) (0.055) (0.031)
EarlyEnrollment 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.023)
Age 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Ethnicity
Greece 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Albany -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Bulgaria 0.002 0.002 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Italy -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Russia 0.005 0.005 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Poland -0.002 -0.002 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004)
Ukraine -0.010 -0.010 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
N 355,808 355,808 355,808 18,670 18,670 18,670
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. A constant is also included. *,**,***
denotes significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively. The table reports OLS and
neighborhood fixed effects estimates from separate regressions. Columns (3) and (6) report
neighborhood fixed effects estimates having added neighborhood linear time trends. Year dummies
are included in all regressions.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for smaller sample and population
Smaller Sample Population
Mean Mean Difference Std. Dev.
log Postcode income 9.962 9.968 0.006 (0.014)
Private school 0.080 0.081 -0.001 (0.001)
Public school 0.897 0.899 -0.002 (0.003)
Experimental school 0.020 0.022 0.002 (0.003)
Urban 0.899 0.898 0.001 (0.001)
Note: 18,670 obs. in smaller sample and 355,808 obs. in population. 45 schools
in sample, 1319 schools in population. Evening schools are excluded from the
sample and the population
Table 3.5: Estimation results : Drop out and Transfers
Dependent Variable: Dummy for drop out and Transfers
(1) (2)
Variable (Males) (Females)
Drop out
Outcome mean 0.080 0.078
Regression estimates 0.060 0.020
(0.046) (0.038)
Transfers
Outcome mean 0.068 0.075
Regression estimates 0.020 -0.052
(0.075) (0.071)
Note: The table reports means of the dependent vari-
able (first row) and estimates (second row) for the ef-
fects of the proportion of females on the probability that
a student leaves school the following year. We use the
smaller sample here of 45 schools. Clusters at school
level. All regressions include controls for student char-
acteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the school
level. All regressions include school fixed effects, year
fixed effects and school linear time trends.
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CHAPTER 4
WHICH DEGREES DO STUDENTS PREFER DURING RECESSIONS?
4.1 Introduction
Students may alter their decisions regarding post-secondary education during economic tur-
moil. The consequences of graduating in a recession are associated with long-term, negative effects
on earnings (Kahn 2010; Wee 2013; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). Previous studies
have shown that economic fluctuations affect human capital investment including college enroll-
ment (Hershbein 2012), college completion (Kahn 2010) and graduate school attendance (Bedard
and Herman 2008; Johnson 2013). The business cycle rearranges the production factors within an
economy, causing some sectors to prosper and others to shrink. The short- run oscillations in the
growth of various sectors change the available job opportunities, and therefore, the popularity of
different college majors. Economic turmoil might affect the labor- market prospects of different
professions in different ways, and thus, influence college applicants’ expected returns from the
related college majors. These differences could be large. For example, Joseph, Blom, and Meghir
(2012) show that the income gap of students specializing in different majors could be as large as
the income gap between high school and college graduates.
The choice of college major is a good predictor of future earnings. During a recession, students
might re-consider their expectations about future career paths and the earnings potential associated
with a specific college major. Thus, switching majors could imply significant changes in a student’s
lifetime income. A large literature focuses on understanding which factors may affect students’
choice of college major (Montmarquettea, Cannings, and Mahseredjianc 2002; Arcidiacono, Hotz,
and Songman 2010; Beffy, Fougre, and Maurel 2011; Dickson 2010; Wiswall and Zafar 2011;
Porter and Umbach 2006). This literature has examined how students form expectations about
earnings and career prospects associated with a specific college majors, and how these expectations
affect students’ educational choices. This literature has largely focused on a static framework, or
has been based on the analysis on a single cohort. However, the effect of the business cycle on
students’ preferences for the field of study or the major they select has received little attention. In
this paper, we use new data on admission applications received by the universe of undergraduate
degree programs in Greece that span seven rounds of admission cohorts to examine the following
two research questions: Do changes in unemployment affect college applicants’ preferences for
selected university fields? Do these differences in students’ preferences affect college admission
thresholds?
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we examine if the business cycle affects
students’ self-reported preferences for certain university degrees and majors. We proxy business-
cycle fluctuations with a job-insecurity index associated with university degrees, and with the
unemployment rate. Second, we undertake what we believe to be the first analysis of data on the
universe of college applications and all public tertiary education institutions for an entire country,
rather than for applications to departments of a specific university. Our data encompass degree
applications submitted by every student who decides to pursue tertiary education nationwide over
a period of seven years. Because the Greek system asks students to submit college applications in
order of preferences, that specify the desired field of study at a specific university, we know how
students rank their degree applications. In particular, we know which application is a student’s
top-, second-, third-, and later-choice indicating most, second-, third-, and later-most preferred
degree choices. Third, we believe our work is the first to examine the effect of students’ degree
preferences on degree’s entry requirement (i.e. admission threshold). Our analysis controls for
field, campus city, time and university unobserved heterogeneity.
The crisis in Greece represents one of most severe economic events in the developed world
since the Great Depression. Although Greece’s GDP had started to decline in 2008, austerity mea-
sures taken in late 2009 resulted in a very abrupt and deep deceleration of the economy. Two
characteristics of the Greek crisis made the downturn distinct in modern times: First, Greece expe-
rienced the most severe drop in GDP of any developed country not involved in a war. Second, the
Greek recession was so widespread that if affected virtually every industry and every profession.
In this paper, we explore the short-run impact of a recent financial crisis on the demand for
post-secondary education in Greece. As the economic conditions deteriorate, people might adjust
their education decisions. Preliminary figures from the OECD suggest that the crisis led more
young adults to seek for post-secondary education. According to the OECD (2016), the share
of the Greek population ages 25 to 34 with a post-secondary degree grew from 32.5 percent in
2011 to 40.1 percent in 2015 - a level that nonetheless remained below the OECD average of 42.1
percent. In this paper, we investigate how the crisis altered demand for available college majors,
and changed admission thresholds. We argue that the business-cycle can redistribute degrees in
terms of popularity and difficulty in gaining admission for the degrees (admission thresholds) that
lead to various career prospects.
To examine these effects, we use a novel data set from Greece that includes information on
college applications and admission thresholds for different degrees. In this way, we uncover in-
formation about students’ most preferred subjects/degrees for the period 2005-2011, a time that
preceded and includes the opening chapter of the economic crisis. We deliberately focus on the
early effects of the recession on college application. As the recession progressed, changes in insti-
tutional settings as well as changes in the quality of college education due to financial constraints,
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may have exacerbated the recessions effects. Thus, by focusing on the early years of the reces-
sion we avoid the potential of additional uncertainty due to changes in such possible confounding
factors - key issues that might make disentangling the short-run variation in demand for college
education challenging. Our study is the first one to identify the relationship between youth unem-
ployment and the demand for specific college degrees nationwide, while netting out supply-side
dynamics. By analyzing college applications we are able to examine which fields and degrees are
the most popular at different stages of the business cycle.
Two features of the analysis bear mention: First, this study focuses on the effect of the recession
on students’ preferences over university fields rather than their actual college major enrolment
decisions. In a setting where the supply of university places is exogenously determined and fixed,
we can only examine changes in the popularity of each department rather than changes in the
number of students who actually enrol in each field. Although the actual number of students who
matriculate in each university department each year is relatively stable, the number of applications
each department attracts across years varies significantly. Second, we are able to look at the effect
of unemployment on students’ top choice (most preferred) degree applications, because college
applicants complete an ordered list of preferred university departments (for a field of study at a
specific academic destination). All students are required to report their degree applications with
a ranking of each preference. In our dataset, we observe the order of all applications each degree
attracts. As a results, we are able to provide detailed, stylized facts about the demand for college
education, and specific fields of study that students report as their most-preferred degrees.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the drivers of the decision to apply to college.
Section 5 provides analytical evidence. Section 6 discusses our results. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 The Greek Post-secondary Education System
4.2.1 How do students participate in the college admission process?
College admission in Greece is based on a centralized system, and students are admitted di-
rectly to departments within universities. Many other countries, such as Chile, China, Korea,
Taiwan, and Turkey, use the same or similar centralized application systems for post-secondary
education. Students apply to a major and university simultaneously (e.g. Chemical Engineer-
ing at the University of Athens)1 as part of a centralized, score-based application process. Each
university department in Greece offers a single undergraduate degree program, and transfers to a
different degree are not allowed at any stage. We refer to an institution-major combination as a
1Similar systems include the state university system in California (see http://admission.universityofcalifornia.edu/
how-to-apply/index.html, https://secure.csumentor.edu/support/pdfs/express app.pdf, Chilean universities (Hastings,
Neilson, and Zimmerman 2014) German universities (Braun, Dwenger, and Kubler 2010), and Chinese universities
(Chen and Kesten 2013)
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degree. Most degrees at these institutions require four or five years to complete on time. College
degrees are linked to specific occupations. Access to some occupations is restricted to graduates
with specific college degrees. For example, in order to become a licensed tourist guide in Greece
one must obtain a college degree in History or Archaeology. Thus, preferences over college majors
are strongly related to preferences over occupations.
In Greece, high school graduates and twelfth-grade students who aspire to pursue tertiary ed-
ucation take national exams in May, and their university admission score 2 is the sole criterion for
college admission. The same admission process applies to returning high school graduates.3
Students usually take national exams in five common subjects (Language, Mathematics, Physics,
Biology, History) and four compulsory, track-specific subjects. There are three tracks: Classics,
Natural (or Exact Sciences) and Technical Studies (or Information Technology). Students can ap-
ply to university departments that are relevant to their track. For example, students outside the
Classics track cannot apply to Law schools. Goulas and Megalokonomou (2015) describe the
process in detail. Once the results of the national exams are announced, students are required to
submit a list, ranking in order the university departments to which they would like to be admitted.
The only way a student can avoid this university admission procedure is by not submitting a list of
preferences. This might be the case for students who apply to undergraduate programs abroad.4
4.2.2 How do they apply to specific university departments?
Submitting a ranked list of preferred university department is equivalent to submitting an appli-
cation to each university department in the list. A centralized, computerized system at the Ministry
of Education ranks students by their admission scores, and assigns the highest ranked student
across the country to her top choice. The algorithm then moves to the second-highest ranked
student across the country, and assigns her to the first department in her list in which there is an
available place, and so on. Essentially, college admission functions like a queue where the choicest
university program offers admission to the highest-performing student that has placed this degree
in her preference list.
At the end of this process, every department announces the grade of the student with the lowest
score it admitted in that year. This grade is considered to be the “admission-threshold score” or
“cut-off score” in that year. Each degree has its own admission-threshold score. Students are
2The university admission score combines the national and school exam scores a student receives in twelfth grade.
The national exam scores receive much heavier weight in the calculation of the university admission score than the
school exam results.
3Returning high school graduates could keep their school exam score and retake the national exams any year after
school graduation.
4These students take national exams but they do not submit a preference list. In this way, these students do not
participate in the college application process.
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accepted to specific degrees if and only if their admission score is above the cut-off. Thus, it
is more difficult to gain admission to departments with higher admission thresholds. Each year,
each university department admits a fixed number of applicants every year, as determined by the
Ministry of Education. There is only one admission cycle, conducted every year in July. College
education in Greece is free of charge for undergraduate students, and there are no pre-admission
scholarships that could encourage a student to apply to a certain department instead of another.
Submitting a list is a prerequisite for participating in the university admission process. There
is no room for gains from strategic misreporting of preferences. The ordering of university depart-
ments in the preference list is very important for a student because once a student gains admission
to a specific university department, he cannot enroll in a university department in a lower position.
Students report their preferences prior to the announcement of the degrees’ admission thresholds
and the admission outcomes. When a student completes her preference list, she is aware of previ-
ous years’ threshold scores and the ranking of degrees based on previous years’ threshold values. A
student is aware of her own score and the distribution of national exam scores but she is not aware
of the threshold score of each department in the same year in which she applies. Nevertheless, a
student does have incentives to aspire to university departments that report higher threshold admis-
sion scores in previous years than her own admission score. This is the case because admission
thresholds vary from one year to another, and listing additional university departments does not
involve any financial cost for the student. In this way, students in any given year have incentives to
report potentially all university departments they desire to consider for admission and are relevant
to their tracks.
In general, students have preferences for specific degrees. For example, a student who aspires to
study Economics could potentially list all university departments that offer a degree in Economics
in her preference list. In a framework of cost-less applications, each individual who desires to
study Economics has incentives to include every Economics department in their preference list.
Thus, every department could potentially receive an application from every applicant who desires
to study the same major. Potentially, the only thing that differs from one preference list to the next
applicant’s list is the ordering of degrees. 5
What determines a degree’s admission threshold? The most important determinant is the de-
mand for the specific degree as derived from students’ top choice applications. Receiving many
top choice applications makes the degree more popular and induces a higher competition for the
available seats. In this case, the admission score of the last admitted student (which is equivalent
to the cut-off score) is usually higher when there is more competition. The Ministry of Education
5There might be students that have stronger preferences for a city than a degree. For example, a student might list
degrees that are offered only in Athens and are relevant to his track.
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can also affect the admission threshold by changing the number of available university seats. Re-
ducing the supply of degree seats is an indirect way to accept only the highest-achieving students
who have listed this specific degree. Thus, the admission score of the last admitted student will be
higher, which increases the admission threshold.
Reporting a degree in any position except the top ones in one’s preference list does not neces-
sarily affect a degree’s admission threshold. Students might report degrees in lower positions in
their preference list because they want to make sure that they will gain admission to some degree
course, even if they are not actually committed to enroll. These students might never actually affect
the admission threshold score because they might gain admission to a degree higher on their list,
and so, at that point, they are no longer under consideration for any other degree course, or part
of the process that leads to a degree’s threshold determination. The algorithm that the Ministry of
Education runs provides a unique application outcome6 for each student based on his own ordered
preferences, his admission score, and everyone else’s ordered preferences and admission scores.
Once students’ ordered preferences are submitted, the algorithm produces only one possible admis-
sion outcome for each student. We call this “application outcome” and it is a unique combination
of university department for each student. Students who change their minds after submitting their
preference lists, and thus want to choose a degree course other than the algorithm match have to
reapply for admission the next year. This is the case even if the other degree course is listed in a
lower position that the one allocated to them by the Ministry of Education.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for students who participated in the university admis-
sion process between 2005 and 2011. More than 80 percent of college applicants were admitted to
some degree program. On average, students apply to 24 university departments/degree programs,
and they gain admission to the choice that ranks eighth on their list. As indicated in Figure 1,
the number of degrees students put on the preference list, and the students’ rank for the degree
program to which she ultimately gains admission change slightly across time.7 Almost 70 percent
of admitted students enroll in a university department that is in another city, and 56 percent of
applicants are female students. The average cohort size is 62,257 students. In the period we study,
on average, 60,257 students gain admission to any university department. It is also interesting to
mention that, on average, 89 percent of applicants are new high school graduates, while the other
11 percent have graduated from school in the past and are reapplying for college admission. A
student might reapply to college for two reasons. First, she might not have been accepted to any
university department in the past. Second, she might have previously been accepted to a university
department, but decided to apply for admission to a different degree program.
6The outcome refers to the degree course in which he is allowed to enroll in that given year.
7We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point into our attention
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Figure 4.1: Number of applications and order of the unique application outcome per year
This figure shows the number of degrees students report in their preference lists on average. These
reported degrees are equivalent to degree applications. Students compile a list with any degree
offered in the country they would like to be admitted to. This figure also shows the order of the
unique degree (application outcome) students are accepted.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics on college applicants
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
If admitted 0.815 0.388 0 1
Number of applications 24.661 21.435 1 290
Rank of admitted college in prefer-
ence list
8.041 9.981 1 238
Mobile students 0.699 0.458 0 1
Female 0.565 0.496 0 1
Age 17.98 1.139 15 66
Repeat 0.112 0.316 0 1
Cohort size 62,257 8,896 50,061 70,868
Aggregate Enrollment 60,257 6,799 52,450 69,631
Note: Data span seven cohorts from 2005 to 2011. Number of schools: 1403.
Among those 442 high schools are in Athens or the surrounding suburbs. Mo-
bile students are those who move to a different city in order to study.
4.3 Data
We examine the effect of a recession on college-major preferences by using college applica-
tion data prior to and shortly after the beginning of the recent financial recession. We use a new
and unique data set that contains administrative information from the Ministry of Education on
the number of college applications for the universe of undergraduate degree programs offered in
Greece from 2005 to 2011. We use panel data for the universe of undergraduate degree programs
over a period of seven years. This data set contains college applications by both recent and re-
turning high-school graduates who wish to enroll in tertiary education. In addition, we observe
how many university departments were operating in each year, the fields in which the universities
offered degrees, and the city of the campus location.
Because students report preferences prior to their admission outcomes and their enrolment
decisions, our data on reported preferences are unconditional on college admission. Actual enroll-
ment may change with changes in the number of slots available in each degree program over time.
The Ministry of Education has the entire control over the supply of university seats. We also pull
annual data on youth unemployment from the World Bank statistical reports.
We obtained individual level data from the Ministry of Education for each student who applies
to college from 2005 to 2011. This dataset includes: gender and age of each applicant, the type of
school (public, private, urban) each student attended, if a student is a new high school graduate or
a returning student8, if the student is admitted to some university department, each student’s appli-
cation outcome, number of degrees listed in each student’s preference list and order of application
outcome, students’ annual national exam score, and the supply of seats per year. Figure 2 shows
8We refer to applicants who have previously graduated from high school as “returning students”
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the number of college applicants who apply for college admission from 2005 to 2011. After 2009,
the number of college applicants rises sharply and above the respective increase in new high school
graduates. In Figure 3, we disentangle the pool of college applicants into two groups: new high
school applicants and returning students, and we look at how these two numbers change over time.
There are more returning students after 2009.
Table 2 provides information about the number of university departments operating in each
field and each year. Here, we categorize university study fields into 22 broad, major groups.9
It is interesting to observe that supply of university departments is relatively stable across years
for each field. Over the seven years included in our data, 481 university departments operate for
the complete time frame, and 24 university departments operate for fewer years.10 No university
department closes during the sample period.
Data on the degrees’ admission thresholds are publicly available, and we obtained them from
the Ministry of Education. We were unable to fully match the two datasets because some degree
programs changed their names, some used different university identifiers in certain years, and other
values are missing in the public documents. However, we obtained information on the degree cut-
off score of 2,746 combinations of degrees and years.
4.4 The Argument
In this section we are considering the factors that, in our view, substantially drive education-
related decision making in the period marking the beginning of the recent Greek crisis. This period
offers a particularly interesting window into the decision-making process of applicants because the
degree of economic turmoil is so pronounced that it almost certainly influences the potential pursuit
of post-secondary education, and because these effects are likely to be heterogeneous for different
sectors and professions.
4.4.1 Contextual influences
Our first point concerns contextual influences on the decision to apply to college. We group
students into three categories based on the way the students make education-related decisions. In
Greece, as elsewhere, one group of students come from families that strongly intend to send them
to tertiary education and sometimes push them to pursue a particular academic or professional
path - due to income, attitudes, professional and social status, and other factors. For these children,
preferences regarding college education, in general, and about specific potential college majors
have been formed or induced in advance of the time they actually apply to college. For those
9The are 21 categories and a category named “Other”. In “Other” we put some degrees that are not associated with
any of the remaining 21 categories, for example special religion studies.
10Specifically, one university department operates for six years; two university departments operate for two years;
two university departments operate for four years; three university departments operate for five years; and sixteen
university department operate for three years.
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Table 4.2: # UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OFFERING DEGREES IN VARIOUS FIELDS
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Engineering and computer science 105 105 105 105 110 110 110
Agriculture and forestry 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Economics 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Mathematics and Statistics 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Business and Management 67 67 67 67 70 70 70
Biology 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Other 48 48 50 50 53 53 53
Physics and Earth Science 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Liberal Arts and Humanities 22 23 23 23 23 23 23
Psychology 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Social, Political and European Studies 12 12 12 12 13 13 13
Nursing and other Health 31 31 32 32 36 36 36
Journalism 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Education, Language, History and P.E. 67 67 67 68 68 68 68
Home economics 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Medicine 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Pharmacy 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Law 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Veterinary Science 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Dentistry 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Police and Military 25 25 25 25 24 26 26
Naval Academies 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total # of available degrees 482 483 486 487 502 504 504
# of new high school graduates 70,560 68,067 53,552 52,430 50,061 70,868 69,545
# of college applicants 85,343 82,003 70,759 65,932 63,187 75,904 96,953
Note: The table shows the number of existing university departments in each field and year. The # of college
applicants consists of the # of new high school graduates plus the # of students of returning applicants.
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Figure 4.2: Number of total college applicants and youth unemployment over time
The left figure shows the number of college applicants over time and the right figure shows the
evolution of the youth unemployment rate over time. Sample period: 2005-2011. Source for
unemployment data: World Bank.
individuals, job-market conditions in the particular years involved likely have little or nothing to
do with their predetermined college attendance and choice strategies (which may in itself take into
account employment wages, status, and the like). We call these applicants “ strategic applicants”.
Next, there is a set of students who, either because of attitudes or socio-economic status, are
less committed to a college application strategy, and most likely they respond more strongly to
current information regarding the costs and benefits of college education. Following Nakata and
Mosk (1987) we call the students in this set “marginal applicants”. Between these two groups
is a third category, students who are less committed to attaining a post-secondary education than
the “ strategic” group, but who are not part of the “marginal” group. These “core applicants”
reach a decision over a significant number of years, and, as a result, they are less influenced by
the exact economic conditions for the years in which they apply to college. Such individuals
probably constituted a significant fraction of school-goers in Greece around the beginning of the
recent financial crisis because household income per capita had increased substantially in the two
decades prior to the beginning of the debt crisis in late 2009, when household income per capita
had reached what a peak. Presumably the improvement in real family disposable income played
an important role in allowing the children of these households to pursue college educations. We
believe that changes in the unemployment rate might mainly affect “marginal applicants” and much
less so the third category of applicants.
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Figure 4.3: Number of total college applicants separated into new high school graduates and re-
turning applicants
This figure shows: a) The total number of college applicants, b) The number of new-high school
graduates (who who graduate from high school the year they apply to college) and c) The number
of returning students (those who had graduated in a previous year and they reapply for college
admission).
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4.4.2 Returns to education
Our second argument concerns returns to education. The job market11 in Greece operates es-
sentially like a queue. That is, persons seeking employment for the first time compete for jobs in a
system in which the best-educated person is first in line for the choicest job position. The crisis led
to layoffs and job rationing and overall conditions that increased competition for employment. To
improve their employment prospects, students invest in more years of education; the same may be
true for those who were not students when the crisis began - those who had found a job previously
- possibly shortly - before the crisis, but were forced by payroll cutbacks into unemployment and
ultimately led back towards additional education. Thus, in times of gloomy job market prospects,
we hypothesize, an overall increase in the demand for college education is to be expected, ce-
teris paribus. Moreover, the drop of salaries across industries and job functions brought about by
the crisis altered college applicants’ anticipated post-graduation returns to education overall, and
to specific college degrees. Graduates of all degrees saw their benefits reduced compared to the
pre-crisis era; as a result, candidates began to reconsider each college major’s expected costs and
benefits, causing a reformulation of preferences or education in general as well as among specific
college degrees.
4.4.3 Quality of tertiary education
Our third argument is related to the quality of tertiary education provided during the crisis.
During the first years of the recession, changes in the ratio of students to faculty, research work,
and facilities are unlikely to affect candidates’ decision regarding college application. It was still
very early and the general view was that the crisis will not last long. We are not worried about
price effects related to the direct college costs (e.g., tuition and fees) because students in Greece
do not pay tuition fees and even the books are provided to them for free.
In countries where tertiary education is not free, the recession could affect students’ willingness
and ability to obtain a student loan, and thus, could also affect students’ decisions over a specific
college or major based on costs. In such countries, concerns that surfacing over whether mounting
education debt and students’ inability to repay their loans will be the next big economic bubble
to burst Cronin and Horton (2009). Douglas (2016) estimates that the present discounted value of
attending college for the median student varies between $85,000 and $300,000 depending on the
student’s major. This is less of a concern in Greece because every tertiary education institution is
public, and free post-secondary education is a constitutional right.
A concern would be that students are less able to study in another city, because, after 2009, their
parents are more likely to face difficulties in covering the cost of living. Again, we believe that in
the early years of the crisis households had not experiences a considerable drop in their purchasing
11We refer to all jobs ie. public and private sectors
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power. However, as the crisis progressed, after 2012, this financial inability to cover living costs
is likely to restrict students options. We believe that potential education quality effects may exist
after 2012 because many universities had to cut back on funds for research and facilities. Also,
quantity rationing of slots, both overall and in specific degrees, took place, and were of paramount
importance for applicants to university departments. Nevertheless, in our study we are able to net
out any quantity effects by looking at self-reported preferences among specific degree program
choices made by candidates prior to the outcome of their college application.
To summarize, current economic circumstances as well as expectations over returns to edu-
cation and quality of education constitute crucial information for decisions concerning college
applications during the recent recession.
4.5 Analytical Evidence
In this section we explore some of our hypotheses statistically, using both simple tables de-
picting time series of data, as well as regression analysis. We follow the universe of university
departments in Greece which is also identical to the set of available college majors; this is because
university department offers exactly one college major, although the same major may be offered
by more than one department in different universities.
4.5.1 Time series statistics
Table 3 combines the supply of specific fields with the demand for specific fields. For each
field and year we report a measure of weighted popularity for each field (d) that is constructed in
the following way:
WeightedPopularityIndexf,t =
# of applications received as number one choicef,t
# of existing degreesf,t
To calculate the weighted popularity index 12, we divide the number of application each de-
partment receives as number one choice over the number of existing departments in each field and
we look at the evolution of this index over time. Table 3 shows the weighted popularity index over
time for various fields. For instance, in 2005, on average, 181 college applicants list economics as
their top choice. In the same year, each department in Law receives on average 871 applications
reporting a Law department as their top choice. The weighted popularity index clearly reflects rel-
ative preferences of college applicants across fields. For example, a Dentistry department receives
more applications listing it as top choice compared to a Veterinary department, given their supplies
of degrees. Given that the supply of degrees in each field is relatively stable across years (Table
2), if we observe considerable changes in the weighted popularity index within fields over time,
they will be caused by changes in the number of applications submitted to each degree this year
12An alternative to the weighted popularity index would be the total number of applications a degree receives in a
given year. However, it would not take into account possible changes in the supply of existing degrees.
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(demand side). For example, in Social, Political and European Studies the relative changes in the
weighted popularity index over time are not as large as the relative changes for Naval Academies
over time. We also find that each degree across fields attracted on average 174 top-choice ap-
plications in 2005, indicated by the mean number of applicants variable.13 The mean number of
applications drops from 2005 to 2009 and then it increases.
4.5.2 Regression analysis
In this section we investigate the effect of the recent recession on the demand for fields of study
at the university level, and for changes in degrees’ admission thresholds. Using OLS, we examine
how changes in the unemployment rate affect the demand for degrees or fields that have different
employment prospects.
Job insecurity
We compile information on job prospects and job insecurity that is, the fear of involuntary
job loss from a series of long-term surveys of college graduates in Greece published in Katsikas
(2006)14. This information is used to construct an index of employment prospects of different
college degrees, based on the structure of the Greek economy and year specific factors. For each
university department, the index takes a value between 1, 2, 3, indicating good, mediocre and poor
employment prospects. Katsikas (2006) stresses that the index is the result of the amalgamation
of information from the career offices of all universities, the Hellenic Bureau of Statistics, the
OAED15 employment observatory, and various labor unions. The index is intended to represent
differences in structural and frictional unemployment among those with available college degrees
and, most importantly, time-specific labor market conditions. As a result, it captures the economic
and employment prospects associated with a degree in that year. Degrees with a low job insecurity
index imply more available and stable employment conditions than degrees that are characterised
by a high job insecurity index. The latter imply poor employment prospects, a higher difficulty to
find a job and a higher risk of job loss.
Although this job insecurity index is provided for year 200616, it is still interesting to exploit
across-field variation in this index and examine if job insecurity has an effect on the demand for
college education. Intuitively, the demand for university majors that are tied to jobs with low job
insecurity might increase. Good employment prospects might make a profession more appealing.
13The mean number of applications is the ratio of total number of applications submitted each year over the number
of existing university departments in a given year
14This book acts as an informational guide for college applicants.
15OAED is the Greek Manpower Employment Organization.
16We managed to find the book published in 2006. This book is published every year providing information about
the current degree-specific job insecurity index. However, it is not easy to find the book for previous years, but only
the current one.
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Similarly, the popularity of college majors that are related to professions that face poor employment
prospects might drop. This might affect professions subject to cuts in salaries or higher unemploy-
ment rate than other professions. These conditions create insecurity about a particular profession,
sector or field of study. By restricting our sample to the year 2006, we exploit across-university
and across-field variation in the job insecurity index to examine if job insecurity associated with a
specific degree or field of study affects demand for college education.
In particular, we investigate the effect on job insecurity on college demand with the following
regression model:
Yd,f,c = b0 + b1JobInsecurityp + b2UniversityFEu + b3CityFEc + d,f,c (1)
where [p]=degree or field of study
where Yi,f,c,t indicates the number of applications a particular degree d in field f and city c
attracted that reported it as top, second or third choice.
The coefficient of interest is b1, indicating how job insecurity affects demand for college de-
grees. The job insecurity index could refer to the expected employment prospects a specific degree
or a specific field yields. In all specifications, we use campus-city fixed effects to control for unob-
servable time-invariant characteristics in campus-city demographics and characteristics that could
drive students’ preferences. Students might prefer a specific college because dorms in this city are
modern and better-equipped or because the campus is in a lively city. We control for university-
specific factors that affect students’ preferences and are constant over time by including a full set
of university fixed effects. For example, university fixed effects capture any “brand” or reputation
effects, as well as other time-invariant unobserved characteristics (different faculty/ student ratio
by university, level of resources), that could affect students’ preferences. We control for these
unobserved characteristics and we try to isolate the effect that changes in the unemployment rate
could have on students’ preferences to study one particular major over another. Standard errors are
clustered at the degree level.
Although the job insecurity index is only reported for different degrees in 2006, it gives us
an indication about the overall job-market prospects related to each field. Another, rather broader
measure to examine economic conditions and employment quality is the unemployment rate. We
examine the time variation of the uncertainty regarding the phase of the economy by looking at the
effect of the annual unemployment rate on the demand for degrees in various fields and years.
Analysis of College Majors
In this section, we investigate the effect of the annual youth unemployment on the number of
ordered applications submitted in each field with the following regression model:
Yd,f,c,t = b0 + b1Unemploymentt + b2FieldFEf × Unemploymentt + b3FieldFEf +
b4CampusCityFEc ++b5UniversityFEf + d,f,c,t(2)
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where Yi,f,c,t indicates the number of applications a degree d, in field f , in city c, and year t
attracted that reported it as top, second, third, and later choice.
The main coefficient of interest, estimated by standard OLS, is b2 and measures the effect of
youth unemployment on the popularity of each field relative to a benchmark field. Field fixed
effects control for mean differences in the popularity of departments that offer degrees in different
fields. A field is more popular than another when degrees in that field receive more applications
that list them in higher positions in the preference list. We include campus-city and university
fixed effects to control for unobserved time - invariant campus city- and university-related factors.
Unemployment refers to annual unemployment in the country for people between the ages of 18
and 25 (youth unemployment), and is taken from World Bank statistical reports. The standard
errors are clustered at the degree level.
One might worry about potential confounding factors that may have occurred during the reces-
sion, and that could affect the demand for higher education and for specific fields. As discussed
in a previous section17, there are no college costs (e.g. tuition and fees) that may alter students’
preferences when unemployment rate is high. So students’ ability to take out a loan, in this case,
does not seem to be very relevant. However, one might worry that changes in the supply of degrees
could happen during a recession, and might affect students’ choices. We are able to net out supply
effects by looking at students’ preferences and not the actual outcomes of college applications.
To control for possible changes in location that might occur, if, say, a specific university switches
the campus-city where a degree course will be offered, we add in some specifications for both
university and city campus fixed effects.
From a university perspective, we provide suggestive evidence that the number of existing
university department providing degrees in each field does not change significantly (Table 2). Ad-
ditionally, we believe that no considerable institutional changes within or across universities that
may have occurred by 2011 that could affect the demand for higher education and/ or for spe-
cific fields. After all, any systematic differences across institutions that are constant over time are
captured by the university fixed effects and will not bias our estimate.
One might be concerned that the increase in the unemployment rate might coincide with pro-
fessor salary cuts and significant drops in research funds that could threaten universities’ quality.
Any concerns about falling in academic standards and differences in university quality due to the
recession are alleviated by the fact that our analysis stops in 2011, when harsh austerity measures
had not yet been implemented. For robustness, we include a full set of university-specific, linear
time trends to control for any unobserved factors that could change over time within universities.
Another worry could be that some campus-city might experience a stronger deterioration in the
17Section 4.3
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services that they provide (entertainment, library closures, dorms, etc), and thus they might be-
come less or more appealing to students after 2009. To address the concern that there could be
campus-city trends in unobserved factors correlated with the unemployment rate, we add to the
above regression model a full set of campus-specific, linear time trends.
4.5.3 University admission cut-offs
Degree cut-offs express students’ valuations for the corresponding degrees. Table 8 provides a
list with the ranking of fields based on their average cut-off values in the period 2005-2011. The
factors determining the admission cut-offs are discussed in details in a previous section (Section
2.2). A higher demand for specific fields, as a result of the business cycle, might increase the
admission cut-offs of related university departments. This would make admission to specific degree
programs more difficult.
To investigate the effect of students’ preferences over specific degrees on degrees’ cut-off
marks, we propose the following regression:
DegreeCutoffd,f,c,t = b0 + b1NumberofF irstChoiceApplicationsd,c,t + b9Controlsd,f,c,t +
b3FieldFEf + b7Y earFEt + b4CityFEc + b5UniversityFEf + d,f,c,t(3)
We regress the cut-off score of a degree d in field f in city c and year t on the number of
applications submitted as students’ first (but also second, third and later) choice as well as other
controls. The main controls are some annual variables, such as the proportion of females, the
proportion of students from public or private schools, the aggregate supply of university seats, a
measure for the easiness of the exam, a dummy if the tertiary academic institution is an academic
university or a university of applied sciences (a technological educational institutes)18 measure
for the easiness of the exam.19 To control for field, time, campus city and university unobserved
heterogeneity we include field, time, campus city, and university fixed effects.
4.6 Main Results
Figure 4 displays the proportion of first-choice applications submitted for degree programs in
each field averaged over all years in the sample. It shows that the largest percentage of college ap-
plicants aspire to study the field consisting of Education, Greek and Foreign Language departments
18Technological educational institutes (or universities of applied sciences) offer undergraduate programs. They offer
four-years degrees, and are recognised by the state. Twelfth-grade students who take national exams can report in their
preference list degrees from both: academic universities and technological educational institutes. Since 2008 these
institutions have offered postgraduate degree programs that lead to a master’s degree.
19We calculate the average national exam performance of students who take the national exams each year. Assuming
that cohorts are of similar academic quality across time, the only change from one year to another is the overall
difficulty of the exam. If the overall performance in one year is greater than that of another year, then we assume that
the exams were on average easier that year.
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and the smallest percentage Home Economics. Figure 5 shows the weighted popularity index of
degree programs submitted as first choice in each field averaged over all years in the sample. The
fields that receives the most first-choice applications given their supply over all years are Law
and Psychology. The least number of first-choice applications are submitted to Agriculture and
Forestry departments.
This analysis considers 22 major categories. Table 4 details good employment majors versus
poor employment majors as indicated by the value of the degree insecurity index in 2006. The
higher the job insecurity is, the worse the employment prospects are. The job insecurity index
takes values from 1 to 1.5 for degrees that are characterized by “ good employment prospects,” 1.5
to 2 for “ mediocre employment prospects,” 2 to 2.5 for “ poor employment prospects,” and 2.5 to
3 for “ very poor employment prospects.” For example, for the enrolling cohort of 2006, studying
Engineering and Computer Science offers better employment prospects than studying Agriculture
and Forestry; a student embarking on a degree course in Social Political and European Studies
faces worse employment prospects than a student studying Mathematics and Statistics.
4.6.1 Degree Preferences and Employment Prospects
Table 5 reports OLS results using equation (1) for the 2006 cohort. In Panel A, we regress the
number of degree applications submitted as top, second and third option on a degree job insecurity
index. The estimates are negative across specifications and statistically significant. When the job
insecurity index of a specific degree increases by 1, then the related degree receives 62, 50 and 40
fewer applications listing it as the first, second and third option, respectively (columns 1, 4 and
7). For example, a degree that has good employment prospects (i.e. a degree in the department of
Police and Military with job insecurity index=1.08) receives on average 62, 50 or 40 more first,
second and third option applications than a degree that has poor employment prospects (i.e. a de-
gree in the department of Journalism with job insecurity index=2.2 ). In columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9
we add university, field and campus-city fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the
university, field and campus-city level. Our estimates remain negative and statistically significant.
Changes in the degree job insecurity index affect more students’ first choice preferences, as in it
indicated by the higher in magnitude coefficients compared to their second and third choices.
In Panel B, we regress the number of degree applications submitted as top, second and third
option on a field job insecurity index. We find that when the job insecurity index associated
with a field increases by 1 (for example if biology’s employment prospects change from good
to mediocre), then the related degree receives 53, 44 and 33 fewer applications that list it as first,
second and third options respectively (columns 1,4 and 7). The inclusion of campus-city and uni-
versity fixed effects in columns 2, 5, 8, and 3, 6, 9, respectively, hardly affects the results. Results
from both panels support our hypothesis, that students react to changes in the economy and em-
ployment prospects related to specific degrees and fields. Students seem to prefer degrees and
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Figure 4.4: Number of applications submitted as top choices per field
This figure shows the numbers of first choice applications submitted to degrees in each field. These
numbers are averaged over all years in the sample.
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of applications submitted as top choices per field
This figure shows the percentage of students who submitted a first choice application to degrees in
each field. These percentages are calculated using all years in the sample.
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Table 4.3: EVOLUTION OF WEIGHTED POPULARITY INDEX OVER TIME AND FIELDS
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Engineering and computer science 194 164 127 115 103 122 149
Agriculture and forestry 73 45 32 31 30 49 58
Economics 181 167 163 152 147 163 185
Mathematics and Statistics 113 127 128 111 142 164 188
Business and Management 180 154 133 113 93 105 135
Biology 109 143 104 103 96 138 190
Other 92 68 46 45 37 70 68
Physics and Earth Science 102 100 95 97 103 120 136
Liberal Arts and Humanities 94 97 82 82 73 117 130
Psychology 419 510 443 378 312 525 791
Social, Political and European Studies 94 101 111 95 110 130 131
Nursing and other Health 147 184 134 129 108 203 208
Journalism 167 131 145 133 108 163 152
Education, Language, History and P.E. 230 262 240 238 228 225 304
Home economics 67 74 113 102 73 44 25
Medicine 298 287 249 261 274 222 527
Pharmacy 182 225 227 258 235 295 360
Law 871 1016 995 943 815 762 1470
Veterinary Science 95 98 82 80 70 126 177
Dentistry 289 278 249 267 269 265 346
Police and Military 290 298 277 227 261 280 343
Naval Academies 691 293 212 192 170 405 1226
Youth Unemployment (%) 25.3 24.8 22.5 22.0 25.5 32.4 44.1
Mean # applicants 174 169 145 135 125 149 188
Note: The table shows ratio between total number of college applications listing a university de-
partment in a particular field as their number one choice in some year over the number of existing
university departments in that field in that year. Source of youth unemployment data: World Bank.
Mean # applicants is the ratio of the total number of applicants over the number of existing univer-
sity departments in a given year.
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fields that include a low job insecurity index and imply better employment prospects.
4.6.2 Unemployment and Fields of Study
We then look at the effect of time-varying youth unemployment on the demand for specific
fields of study while we look for the whole sample. Tables 6 and 7 report OLS estimates using
equation (2). We find that a unit increase in youth unemployment increases the number of appli-
cations each degree receives by approximately 1 on average (Table 6). We examine the effect of
the unemployment rate on the demand for degree applications submitted as first choice (Table 6,
columns 1 and 2), second choice (Table 6, columns 3 and 4), third choice (Table 7, columns 1
and 2) and later choice (Table 7, columns 3 and 4). The omitted field here is Economics. So, the
effect of unemployment on the popularity of each field is interpreted compared to Economics. We
use economics as our benchmark major, because the changes in the Weighted Popularity Index of
Economics degrees over the years are relatively small, as shown in Table 4.
To start with, a unit increase in youth unemployment causes an one unit decrease in the number
of first-, second-, and third-choice applications each university department offering a Business and
Management degree receives on average. On the other hand, a unit increase in unemployment
induces the number of first-, second-, and third-choice applications to each university department
offering a Psychology degree to rise by approximately 17, 11 and 11 respectively. The potential
increase in the prevalence of depression and mental health during the financial crisis (Caroli and
Godard 2016; Cooper 2011; McInerney, Mellor, and Nicholas 2013; Uutela 2010) may explain the
rise in the popularity of Psychology degrees. Similarly, a unit increase in youth unemployment
increases the number of top-, second-, and third-choice applications each university department
offering a Law degree receives by approximately 20, 13 and 10, respectively.
During the recession, there is an increase in students’ reported top, second and third preference
for destinations such as Military and Naval Academies and fields such as Mathematics and Statis-
tics, Humanities and Liberal Art, Nursing, Veterinary Science, Pharmacy, Medicine, Psychology,
Journalism, Biology, and Law. Conversely, Home Economics, Business and Management, Engi-
neering and Computer Science fall in popularity during the crisis. Our findings are in parallel with
job categorizations presented in Shatkin (2008)20 who report that job opportunities in the Mili-
tary and Health Care sectors are relatively less affected during economic turmoil. Furthermore, as
he reports, the wage gap across sectors diminishes during a recession, and thus Humanities and
Liberal Art jobs become more popular, as opposed to Engineering and Computer Science jobs.
20Shatkin (2008) book “150 Best Recession-Proof Jobs” examines the most secure jobs for the U.S. market. Using
databases of the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Census Bureau, and occupational outlook ratings from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which projects job growth and future job openings for more than 750 occupations, the
author identified various jobs’ sensitivity to changes in the economy and the projected outlook for jobs for the next
10 years. The author also lists the most recession-proof metropolitan areas and states, the most recession-proof skills,
and the jobs that are very sensitive to recession.
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The construction industry suffers heavily during the recent recession, in Greece, as housebuilding,
public infrastructure and major development projects stalled.
It’s interesting to explicitly look at the effect of the unemployment rate on the popularity of
degrees that guarantee an early source of income: degrees from Police, Military as well as Naval
Academies.21 Our findings show that a unit increase in youth unemployment causes a 2-, 3- and
4- units increase, respectively, in the number of top-, second-, and third-, choice applications each
military academy receives on average. In addition, a unit increase in unemployment lead the num-
ber of top and second choice applications each naval academy receives to rise by approximately
42 and 32 respectively. The military in Greece permits students to enlist and pursue tertiary ed-
ucation at the same time.22 Individuals who join the armed forces sign an enlistment contract,
binding them to service after graduation; in exchange, they immediately begin receiving a monthly
stipend. In addition, immediately after completing their degrees at naval academies, graduates are
guaranteed work serving on ships, and offered certain specialized training free of cost. Moreover,
they have the opportunity to pursue high-paying careers as captains or engineers in commercial
shipping. Greece’s commercial shipping industry remained among the strongest in the world even
during the recent recession, and therefore, employees of ship companies suffered few layoffs, and
experienced low or no reductions in wages.
In Figure 6, we draw the percentage of college applications that listed military and police
academies as their number-one choice over time (in the left panel). We see that it follows a pattern
similar to that of youth unemployment (right panel) with time lag. This is natural as students report
preferences based on expectations.
Our results in Tables 6 and 7 are fully aligned with the findings of Arcidiacono (2004) who
suggests that college students tend to switch away from degrees that are relatively more challenging
(i.e. engineering and computer science) when these degrees don’t promise higher economic returns
in comparison to other available degrees. Arcidiacono (2004) specifically mentions that fewer
students choose to major in business or engineering, when no return premium is anticipated after
graduation. We find that a unit increase in youth unemployment decreases the number of first-,
second-, and third-choice applications each university engineering program receives by 0.4-0.5 on
average.
21Naval academies are Military Academies. Their main responsibility is to educate and train competent Naval
Officers for the Hellenic Navy. The academies also educate Deck and Engineering Naval cadets. They also educate
Supply Officer cadets as well as Coast Guard Officer cadets.
22Interested students include combined choices in their preference list. For example one may list “Economics major
while in the armed forces”. Both men and women can enlist in the armed forces.
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Table 4.6: THE EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON FIRST AND SECOND CHOICES
Top Choice Second Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 1.053 0.656 1.311 1.146
(0.000)*** (0.293)** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.448 -0.008 -0.623 -0.494
(0.041)*** (0.257) (0.037)*** (0.231)**
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry -0.135 0.502 -0.498 -0.014
(0.000)*** (0534) (0.000)*** (0.361)
Unemployment ×Mathematics and Statistics 2.274 2.671 1.776 1.940
(0.000)*** (0.393)*** (0.000)*** (0.219)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -1.069 -0.477 -1.393 -1.180
(0.055)*** (0.395) (0.027)*** (0.268)***
Unemployment × Biology 2.762 3.159 2.216 2.379
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Other -0.341 0.922 -0.323 0.184
(0.020)*** (0.313)** (0.024)*** (0.237)
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.830 1.057 0.600 0.788
(0.000)*** (0.308)*** (0.000)*** (0.221)***
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 1.263 1.565 0.859 0.989
(0.005)*** (0.323)*** (0.006)*** (0.243)***
Unemployment × Psychology 16.608 17.005 11.428 11.591
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 1.332 1.810 1.127 1.060
(0.289)*** (0.450)*** (0.038)*** (0.249)***
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.171 3.397 2.788 2.777
(0.084)*** (0.314)*** (0.565)*** (0.246)***
Unemployment × Journalism -0.107 0.290 0.827 0.990
(0.000)*** (0.293) (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 1.494 1.692 0.648 0.745
(0.009)*** (0.316)*** (0.007)*** (0.233)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -4.527 -4.130 -3.126 -2.963
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment ×Medicine 9.632 10.028 6.827 6.990
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 5.330 5.727 2.945 3.109
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Law 19.737 20.134 13.088 13.251
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 3.439 3.836 3.243 3.406
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 2.337 2.734 2.663 2.827
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 2.355 2.925 3.623 3.891
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.026)*** (0.220)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 41.531 41.928 32.698 32.861
(0.000)*** (0.293)*** (0.000)*** (0.220)***
Fields and Campus F.E. X X X X
University F.E. X X
R2 0.32 0.42 0.37 0.45
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used as the
benchmark field. Standard error are clustered at the field level.
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Table 4.7: THE EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON THIRD AND LATER CHOICES
Third Choice Outside Top3 Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 1.396 1.279 16.967 12.753
(0.000)*** (0.291)** (0.000)*** (4.021)**
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.555 -0.413 19.317 21.381
(0.000)*** (0.296) (0.471)*** (4.021)**
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry -0.450 -0.029 -18.800 -28.315
(0.000)*** (0.416) (0.000)*** (9.950)**
Unemployment ×Mathematics and Statistics 1.249 1.366 13.522 17.736
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -1.359 -1.197 -20.030 -16.442
(0.101)*** (0.278)*** (0.948)*** (5.127)***
Unemployment × Biology 2.077 2.194 67.383 71.596
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Other -0.406 -0.306 23.332 23.746
(0.018)*** (0.349) (0.639)*** (5.225)***
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.912 1.017 10.221 8.841
(0.000)*** (0.319)** (0.000)*** (4.616)*
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 0.649 0.662 41.517 49.244
(0.004)*** (0.338)* (0.766)*** (4.426)***
Unemployment × Psychology 11.333 11.450 36.944 41.158
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 0.980 1.053 64.637 71.129
(0.517)*** (0.496)** (0.981)*** (3.484)***
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.528 3.545 151.288 158.163
(0.053)*** (0.298)*** (1.182)*** (3.883)***
Unemployment × Journalism 0.783 0.900 102.023 106.237
(0.517)*** (0.291)** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 0.167 0.275 21.793 23.937
(0.008)*** (0.308) (0.142)*** (4.976)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -3.167 -3.050 -34.510 -30.296
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment ×Medicine 6.488 6.604 35.548 39.762
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 2.624 2.741 53.548 58.049
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Law 9.949 10.066 16.729 20.942
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 0.478 0.594 30.461 34.675
(0.000)*** (0.291)* (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 0.291 0.408 43.496 47.710
(0.000)*** (0.291) (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 3.684 3.903 8.794 13.408
(0.024)*** (0.291)*** (0.214)*** (4.021)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 5.336 5.452 57.544 61.759
(0.000)*** (0.291)*** (0.000)*** (4.021)***
Fields and Campus F.E. X X X X
University F.E. X X
R2 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.43
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used as the
benchmark field. Standard error are clustered at the field level.
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Figure 4.6: Preference for Military/ Police/ Naval Academies and Youth Unemployment
The left figure depicts the percentage of college applicants per year that listed military or police
or naval related majors as their most preferred choice. The right figure shows annual youth unem-
ployment rate (%). Source for unemployment data: World Bank.
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We also report the effect of unemployment on the number of later-choice applications23 sub-
mitted to university departments. As we explained in a previous section (Section 2.2), college
applications in Greece bear no cost. In a framework of cost-less applications, each individual has
incentive to include every department in their preference list. Potentially, the only difference from
one preference list to the next applicant’s list is the ordering of the university departments. How-
ever, the direction of the effect of the unemployment rate on later choice applications indicated in
columns (3) and (4) (Table 7) is not much different than before. For example, a unit increase in un-
employment reduces later choice applications (outside top 3 applications) received by Agriculture
and Forestry, and Business and Management departments by 18 and 20, respectively, or 28 and 16
respectively when university fixed effects are included. On the other hand, Police, Military and
Naval Academies receive more later-choice applications when unemployment rises. As before,
Law, Medicine, and Psychology departments become more popular when the overall uncertainty
in the economy increases. Results remain almost unchanged when university fixed effects are
included.
To make sure that our results for the effect of unemployment on the demand for different
fields are not driven by university- or campus-city-specific time trends, that are correlated with
the unemployment rate, we include a university- or campus-city-specific linear time trend. These
robustness results are presented in Tables 10 and 11. Some coefficients slightly change while
some others become statistically insignificant. A couple coefficients flip sign, but they become
statistically insignificant. Overall, our results remain unchanged regarding which fields experience
a drop or a rise in popularity when unemployment rises.
4.6.3 University Admission Thresholds
Then we look at the effect of students’ reported college preferences on degrees’ cut-off scores.
If the supply of seats is constant over time, but competition for those seats grows, then the degree
threshold score should increase. This happens because, for a given supply, the admission score of
the last student admitted should be higher when there is more competition24 over the seats. First,
we rank the university fields based on the related degrees’ threshold values over the sample period.
Table 8 shows that dentistry is the field with the highest cut-off value for the period 2005-2011.
This means that among all fields, the most difficult one for admission (the one with the highest
cut-off threshold score), over the period of 7 years, is Dentistry. Second and third most difficult
fields for university admission are Medicine and Pharmacy, respectively. Over the period of 7 years
that is our sample period, naval academies rank low in terms of admission thresholds. But what
23Students’ submitted applications outside their top-three choices. For example, students’ top-four choice, top-five
choice, ..., top N-choice.
24The only exception to this could be if the average academic quality of students applying to this specific degree
drops on average. However, we have no reasons to believe that the average cohort academic quality varies by time.
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Table 4.8: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: CAMPUS AND UNIVERSITY LINEAR TIME TRENDS
Top Choice Second Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 3.167 3.162 2.968 2.670
(0.530)*** (0.380)*** (0.469)*** (0.329)***
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.235 -0.028 -0.078 0.266
(0.127)* (0.405) (0.124) (0.352)
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry 0.091 -0.692 0.058 0.044
(0.138) (0.404) (0.146) (0.333)
Unemployment ×Mathematics and Statistics 2.423 2.194 1.825 1.686
(0.230)*** (0.316)*** (0.109)*** (0.247)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -0.479 -0.092 -0.600 0.174
(0.093)*** (0.404) (0.094)*** (0.377)
Unemployment × Biology 2.912 1.789 2.811 2.151
(0.211)*** (0.321)*** (0.140)*** (0.288)***
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.791 -0.172 0.646 0.379
(0.174)*** (0.356) (0.141)*** (0.370)
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 1.173 0.527 0.932 0.715
(0.128)*** (0.559) (0.113)*** (0.422)*
Unemployment × Psychology 16.255 15.653 11.093 10.884
(0.317)*** (0.427)*** (0.285)*** (0.316)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 1.516 0.063 1.067 0.455
(0.341)*** (0.501) (0.135)*** (0.284)
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.485 3.844 3.158 3.885
(0.175)*** (0.677)*** (0.125)*** (0.532)***
Unemployment × Journalism 0.832 -0.133 1.586 1.290
(0.149)*** (0.363) (0.292)*** (0.188)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 1.331 0.796 0.459 0.528
(0.062)*** (0.400)* (0.040)*** (0.326)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -3.056 -5.456 -2.356 -2.667
(0.379)*** (0.500)*** (0.197)*** (0.272)***
Unemployment ×Medicine 9.545 8.604 6.985 6.422
(0.221)*** (0.332)*** (0.112)*** (0.336)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 5.278 4.280 3.330 3.090
(0.184)*** (0.446)*** (0.231)*** (0.389)***
Unemployment × Law 19.369 18.829 12.519 12.962
(0.287)*** (0.405)*** (0.190)*** (0.427)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 3.264 2.058 3.470 3.114
(0.279)*** (0.458)*** (0.401)*** (0.277)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 2.426 1.131 2.948 2.468
(0.280)*** (0.556)* (0.224)*** (0.458)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 2.524 4.344 3.995 3.624
(0.250)*** (1.317)*** (0.218)*** (1.059)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 43.002 46.221 33.470 36.633
(0.379)*** (5.740)*** (0.197)*** (4.402)***
Fields and Campus F.E. X X
Campus City Specific Linear Time Trend X X
Fields and University F.E. X X
University Specific Linear Time Trend X X
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is
used as the benchmark field. Standard errors are clustered at the field level. Estimates for the category “Other” are
not reported due to space constraints.
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Table 4.9: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: CAMPUS AND UNIVERSITY LINEAR TIME TRENDS
Third Choice Later Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment 3.193 2.863 77.767 70.927
(0.513)*** (0.400)*** (14.843)*** (11.193)***
Unemployment × Computer Science and Engineering -0.069 0.375 47.502 60.028
(0.185) (0.263) (4.079)*** (10.068)**
Unemployment × Agriculture and Forestry -0.068 0.215 -33.412 20.013
(0.256) (0.271) (12.214)** (16.510)
Unemployment ×Mathematics and Statistics 1.185 1.188 21.168 13.399
(0.204)*** (0.255)*** (5.558)*** (2.718)***
Unemployment × Business and Management -0.771 0.150 -18.508 44.460
(0.250)** (0.348) (6.319)** (14.483)***
Unemployment × Biology 2.426 1.934 89.124 60.478
(0.220)*** (0.303)*** (9.448)*** (3.597)***
Unemployment × Physics and Earth Science 0.914 0.672 25.942 11.569
(0.212)*** (0.296)** (5.768)*** (3.865)***
Unemployment × Liberal Arts and Humanities 0.693 0.444 53.401 47.560
(0.121)*** (0.286) (5.420)*** (3.497)***
Unemployment × Psychology 10.934 10.856 36.793 28.802
(0.262)*** (0.366)*** (3.937)*** (4.257)***
Unemployment × Social, Political and European Studies 0.826 0.736 66.034 62.470
(0.534) (0.274)** (4.134)*** (3.953)***
Unemployment × Nursing and other health 3.765 4.738 169.704 215.079
(0.219)*** (0.422)*** (6.471)*** (22.207)***
Unemployment × Journalism 1.282 1.251 130.280 125.705
(0.588)** (0.228)*** (27.812)*** (8.478)***
Unemployment × Education, Language, History and P.E. 0.017 0.217 25.934 21.384
(0.071) (0.281) (3.443)*** (3.579)***
Unemployment × Home Economics -2.692 -2.484 -22.857 -5.632
(0.248)*** (0.443)*** (3.210)*** (10.867)
Unemployment ×Medicine 6.523 6.094 49.985 26.719
(0.244)*** (0.341)*** (8.929)*** (4.085)***
Unemployment × Pharmacy 2.926 2.615 61.664 51.164
(0.211)*** (0.370)*** (4.245)*** (3.982)***
Unemployment × Law 9.649 9.773 8.038 7.798
(0.424)*** (0.542)*** (3.165)*** (3.965)***
Unemployment × Veterinary Science 0.911 0.305 75.797 23.881
(0.426)** (0.273) (29.541)*** (5.302)***
Unemployment × Dentistry 0.476 -0.002 49.951 38.173
(0.162)*** (0.527) (3.845)*** (4.844)***
Unemployment × Police & Military 4.081 2.325 12.506 -36.243
(0.272)*** (0.408)*** (3.994)*** (11.149)***
Unemployment × Naval Academies 5.811 5.242 69.198 19.772
(0.248)*** (0.684)*** (3.210)*** (18.507)
Fields and Campus F.E. X X
Campus City Linear Time Trend X X
Fields and University F.E. X X
University Linear Time Trend X X
Note: An intercept is included. Number of observations: 3,448 degrees. 43 universities are used. Economics is used
as the benchmark field. Standard errors are clustered at the field level. Estimates for the category “Other” are not
reported due to space constraints.
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is interesting is that, as the unemployment rate increases, Naval academies become more popular
and possibly more difficult to enter.
Table 4.10: Ranking of fields based on threshold scores
Field Threshold Rank
Dentistry 17,816 1
Medicine 17,563 2
Pharmacy 16,706 3
Military and police 16,601 4
Veterinary Science 16,157 5
Law 16,058 6
Psychology 15,493 7
Home Economics 14,659 8
Biology 14,437 9
Mathematics and Statistics 13,119 10
Education,Language, History and P.E 12,937 11
Engineering and Computer Science 12,510 12
Physics and Earth Science 12,442 13
Social,Political and European Studies 12,162 14
Journalism 11,899 15
Economics 11,813 16
Nursing and Other Health 11,442 17
Liberal Art and Humanities 11,358 18
Business and Management 10,571 19
Other 10,372 10
Agriculture and Forestry 9,165 21
Naval Academies 7,851 22
Note: The “threshold score” or the “cut-off score” for admission for most
university departments varies from 0 to 20,000. The higher the threshold
value is, the more difficult it is for a student to gain admission. Some uni-
versity departments require students to take exams in “special subjects”
(for example some Architecture departments require students to take an
exam in architectural design) and the maximum threshold value for these
degrees could exceed 20,000.
Then in Table 9 we present OLS estimates for equation (3). Results suggest a positive relation-
ship between the number of first-, second-, and third-choice applications and the degree-admission
threshold. Columns 1-3, shows that for each additional first choice application a degree receives,
the threshold score increases by 2,331 when only field fixed effects are included. This estimate
drops to 1.381 when year fixed effects are included and becomes 1.519 when campus city and
university fixed effects are included. The average degree cutoff in the sample is 12,084.91 (with
a s.d of 4,506.325). This means that for each additional unit of unemployment, the threshold for
Psychology departments will increase by approximately (17.005*1.519) 25.8, ceteris paribus. If
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the unemployment rate increases by one, then Medicine, Naval, and Mathematics and Statistics de-
partments will experience a rise in their thresholds by around 15.3, 63 and 3.8 respectively, ceteris
paribus. These numbers translate to 1 percent , 2.5 percent and 0.8 percent of the respective cut-off
s.d. for degrees in medicine, Naval and, Mathematics and Statistics. For an additional second
and third choice application a degree receives, the related degree admission threshold increases by
2.275 and 2.574 respectively, ceteris paribus.
In columns 10, 11 and 12 we examine if there is any effect on the admission threshold coming
from later-choice applications. As we expected, there is a negative and statistically insignificant
relationship between the number of later-choices applications and degree admission cut-offs. This
might be the case because students list many degrees in low positions in the preference list as a risk
aversion practice. Students might report degrees that cover a large range of cut-off values in order
to make sure that they will be admitted to some university department even if this year’s admission
threshold drops significantly. Keep in mind that when students submit their degree applications,
the actual degree admission thresholds are not determined or announced. Potentially, students have
incentives to report all university departments in the field they aspire to study or potentially degrees
from other fields too. Thus, intuitively the number of later-choice applications should not matter
for degrees’ threshold determinations.
4.7 Conclusions
This paper provides the first examination of switching college majors of study as a result of the
financial crisis that began in Greece in 2009. We identify the relationship between youth unem-
ployment and the demand for specific college degrees nationwide, while netting out supply-side
dynamics. We focus primarily on the abrupt expansion of the Greek college application rate, and
its fluctuation around the financial crisis. We document this expansion and develop a theory of
the demand for post-secondary education that stresses the importance of short-run economic con-
ditions in the decision-making of “marginal applicants.” Finally, we advance a body of empirical
evidence that supports a number of the inferences of the theory regarding the role of anticipated
job prospects in educational decisions.
We use unique administrative data from Greece for all existing degree programs to study
whether and how students’ preferences and degree admission thresholds depend on degree-, and
field-related employment prospects. Using panel data for the universe of degrees over a seven-year
period, we find the following: First, we show that college applicants prefer degrees and majors
with lower job insecurity. Second, we find that changes in the unemployment rate have different
effects on demand for different college majors. Indicatively, we find a decrease in the popularity
of academically rigorous degrees in Engineering and Computer Science. We also document a de-
crease in the popularity of Business and Management, Journalism and Home Economics during the
recession. During the crisis more people turn to Naval Academies, Police and Military Academies,
191
Ta
bl
e
4.
11
:
T
H
E
E
FF
E
C
T
O
F
T
H
E
D
E
M
A
N
D
F
O
R
D
E
G
R
E
E
S
O
N
C
U
T-
O
FF
S
C
O
R
E
S
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e:
D
eg
re
e
C
ut
-o
ff
sc
or
e
Va
ri
ab
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
N
um
be
r
of
:
Fi
rs
tc
ho
ic
e
A
pp
lic
at
io
ns
2.
33
1
1.
38
1
1.
51
9
(0
.3
94
)*
**
(0
.3
66
)*
**
(0
.3
43
)*
**
Se
co
nd
ch
oi
ce
A
pp
lic
at
io
ns
3.
51
8
2.
03
5
2.
27
5
(0
.6
99
)*
**
(0
.6
95
)*
**
(0
.6
45
)*
**
T
hi
rd
ch
oi
ce
A
pp
lic
at
io
ns
3.
60
7
2.
52
7
2.
57
4
(0
.5
64
)*
**
(0
.5
27
)*
**
(0
.5
48
)*
**
L
at
er
ch
oi
ce
A
pp
lic
at
io
ns
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
28
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
44
)
A
gg
re
ga
te
su
pp
ly
of
se
at
s
-0
.0
30
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
07
(0
.0
06
)*
**
(0
.0
06
)*
(0
.0
06
)*
(0
.0
06
)
E
as
in
es
s
of
th
e
ex
am
3.
15
2
3.
07
0
3.
06
7
3.
17
5
(0
.3
33
)*
**
(0
.3
31
)*
**
(0
.3
26
)*
**
(0
.3
35
)*
**
Fi
el
d
FE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Y
ea
rF
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
am
pu
s
ci
ty
FE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
FE
X
X
X
X
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
2,
74
6
N
ot
e:
A
co
ns
ta
nt
is
al
so
in
cl
ud
ed
.S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
de
gr
ee
le
ve
l.
*,
**
,*
**
de
no
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
lr
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
In
co
lu
m
ns
(1
),
(4
),
(7
)
an
d
(1
0)
,
w
e
al
so
co
nt
ro
l
fo
r
th
e
an
nu
al
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
gi
rl
s,
an
nu
al
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
st
ud
en
ts
at
te
nd
in
g
a
pu
bl
ic
sc
ho
ol
/p
riv
at
e
an
d
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ta
l
sc
ho
ol
,
a
du
m
m
y
if
th
e
te
rt
ia
ry
in
st
itu
tio
n
is
an
ac
ad
em
ic
un
iv
er
si
ty
or
a
te
ch
ni
ca
la
ca
de
m
y
an
d
th
e
an
nu
al
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
st
ud
en
ts
at
te
nd
in
g
an
ur
ba
n
sc
ho
ol
.T
he
av
er
ag
e
de
gr
ee
cu
t-
of
fi
n
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
is
12
,0
84
.9
1
(w
ith
a
s.
d
of
4,
50
6.
32
5)
.
192
which allow students to enlist and pursue tertiary education at the same time. Student in these
degree programs are also guaranteed an early source of income that may begin with enrollment
in the academy itself. For example, those who join the army sign an enlistment contract, binding
them to serve after graduation, and then immediately begin receiving a monthly stipend. When
the unemployment rate rises, we find an increase for the medical-related majors-such as Medicine,
Pharmacy, Nursing and Dentistry that lead to high-paying medical employment. We also find an
increase in the popularity of Psychology degrees. We speculate that the rise in the incidence of
mental health issues during the recession may explain the increase in the popularity of Psychology
degrees.
Third, we find that top choice-college applications influence degrees’ admission thresholds,
making enrollement in degrees with a low employment-insecurity index at the time of the reces-
sion more competitive. Our findings contribute to the understanding of workforce dynamics and
occupational choice during economic downturns and can inform policies that fight unemployment.
Understanding the flows of post-secondary education preferences during the recession might also
help to a more optimal allocation of resources.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF GRADE RETENTION
Table A.1: Average Grade Retention
Mean s.d.
Retention Rate 0.038 0.191
Grade
10th 0.058 0.235
11th 0.043 0.202
12th 0.015 0.122
Gender
Males 0.051 0.221
Females 0.027 0.162
Age
16 or younger 0.041 0.199
16-17 0.034 0.180
17-18 0.023 0.151
18 or older 0.190 0.393
Reason
Due to performance 0.025 0.155
Due to absences 0.013 0.114
Class Mean Math Score
Highest Quintile 0.021 0.143
Fourth Quintile 0.027 0.163
Third Quintile 0.036 0.186
Second Quintile 0.061 0.239
Lowest Quintile 0.068 0.251
Class size
Highest Quintile 0.039 0.194
Fourth Quintile 0.039 0.194
Third Quintile 0.038 0.190
Second Quintile 0.040 0.196
Lowest Quintile 0.043 0.203
Year
2006 0.038 0.191
2007 0.042 0.200
2008 0.039 0.195
2009 0.039 0.194
2010 0.041 0.197
2011 0.038 0.193
2012 0.022 0.148
Sample: 106,838 obs; 51,666 individuals.
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Table A.2: Grade Retention due to absences
Mean s.d.
Grade
10th 0.019 0.135
11th 0.016 0.126
12th 0.006 0.075
Midterm Math Score
Highest Quintile 0.001 0.029
Fourth Quintile 0.001 0.024
Third Quintile 0.000 0.021
Second Quintile 0.000 0.020
Lowest Quintile 0.031 0.173
Class Mean Math Score
Highest Quintile 0.009 0.095
Fourth Quintile 0.010 0.102
Third Quintile 0.013 0.112
Second Quintile 0.018 0.133
Lowest Quintile 0.024 0.152
Gender
Males 0.016 0.126
Females 0.011 0.104
Age
16 or younger 0.006 0.080
16-17 0.010 0.098
17-18 0.011 0.102
18 or older 0.149 0.356
Class size
Highest Quintile 0.011 0.102
Fourth Quintile 0.013 0.111
Third Quintile 0.013 0.112
Second Quintile 0.015 0.122
Lowest Quintile 0.017 0.130
Year
2006 0.013 0.115
2007 0.016 0.124
2008 0.015 0.120
2009 0.015 0.121
2010 0.011 0.107
2011 0.011 0.103
2012 0.006 0.080
Sample: 106,838 obs; 51,666 individuals.
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